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COLORADO COMPARATIVE
By

RICHARD W.

4

NEGLIGENCE

LAUGESEN*

N July 1, 1971, Colorado joined the ranks of an increasing
number of states which have adopted "comparative negligence" as a means of ascertaining liability and damages in
negligence cases. On that date, the provisions of Colorado's
Comparative Negligence Act' became effective and all legal
actions based upon torts occuring in Colorado on or after that
day are no longer subject to the common law contributory
negligence bar.
0

While the "comparative negligence" concept is certainly not
new, its introduction into Colorado practice has brought about
a relatively abrupt change. The purpose of this article is to
present an overview of the Colorado Comparative Negligence
Act of 1971, to examine its inner workings, and to consider the
ways in which selected areas of law may be affected by its
enactment. An appendix is included which contains several
forms designed to assist in the practical application of the Act
to specific cases.
I. BACKGROUND
Legislative enactments dealing with comparative negligence
in other American jurisdictions have varied in scope and content from extremely liberal applications of the comparative
negligence concept to greatly restricted interpretations of that
theory. To fully appreciate the impact of the Colorado Act,
some consideration of the evolution and present status of this
body of law is necessary.
A. Historical Development
The doctrine of contributory negligence was first pronounced in 1809 with the English case of Butterfield v. Forrester,2 wherein the plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries
Partner, Wolvington, Dash, Anderson, DeMoulin & Campbell, Denver,
Colorado; J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1962.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971).
2 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
*
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sustained in a horse riding accident because he was found to
be partially responsible for the mishap. From that case evolved
a legal precept which denied recovery to one who was even
slightly negligent. This idea found ready acceptance in England
and in the United States.
In a system that emphasized proprietary over social values
there seemed to be an element of justification in refusing to
allow recovery to one who himself was at fault. This was particularly true in cases where the plaintiff's conduct was as
culpable as the defendant's. However, where the level of culpability was disproportionate, the harshness of the doctrine
soon became apparent. As a consequence there has developed
increasing dissatisfaction among 20th century American legal3
scholars with the absolute defense of contributory negligence.
Courts have become more reluctant to rule that a plaintiff's
conduct was negligent as a matter of law, and juries are notoriously inclined to overlook the plaintiff's minimal negligence or
to make a haphazard reduction of plaintiff's damage in proportion to his fault, when necessary to avoid an unjust result.
It was this dissatisfaction which led to a number of attempts within the various states to find some substitute method
of dealing with cases where there existed negligence on the part
of both parties. The makeshift doctrine of "last clear chance,"
which evolved in England, 4 was adopted by a majority of jurisdictions in the United States in an attempt to soften the effect
of the strict rule of contributory negligence. Illinois and Kansas
at one time attempted to modify the harshness of contributory
negligence by classifying negligence into "degrees" and providing that if the plaintiff's negligence was "ordinary" while that
5
of the defendant was "gross" the plaintiff might recover. The
6
experiment was ultimately abandoned in both states.
In 1861, Georgia became the first state to seek a remedy for
the inequities of the contributory negligence bar by legislative
enactment when it adopted a number of regulations which permitted the application of comparative negligence principles in
tort claims. 7

In 1910, Mississippi enacted a "pure" comparative

2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.1 (1956); Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J 195 (1954); Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Turk, Comparative Negligence
on the March, 28 CHI-KENT L. REV. 189 (1950).
4
Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
5 Galena & Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858); Wichita & W.R.R. v.
Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P. 78 (1887).
6 Lanark v. Daugherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Chicago, K. &
N.R.R. v. Brown, 44 Kan. 384, 24 P. 497 (1890).
7 Goodrich, Origin of the Georgia Rule of Comparative Negligence and
Apportionment of Damages, 1940 GA. B.J. 174.
3
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negligence statute." This was followed in 1913 by the enactment
of the Nebraska Act which classifies the parties' negligence as
"slight" or "gross. ' In 1931, Wisconsin passed a statute which
permitted comparison of the plaintiff's and the defendant's
respective liabilities, but which barred recovery when both parties were equally at fault.1" South Dakota followed in 1941 with
a bill similar to that of Nebraska; 1 and Arkansas, in 1955, enacted a "pure" comparative negligence act much like Mississippi's, but repealed it in 1957 in favor of a statute which greatly
12
resembles the Wisconsin law.
To date 15 states have adopted some form of comparative
negligence and have thus eliminated contributory negligence
as a complete bar to tort recovery. They are: Arkansas, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and, most recently, Colorado.
Various federal statutes have provided for a similar apportionment of damages according to fault, including the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 13 the Jones Act, 14 and the Death on
the High Seas Act. 15 Also, many state railway and labor acts
contain provisions which reduce the awards payable to injured
workmen in proportion to their negligence in industrial mishaps.
B. Current Legislative Variations
As the above discussion indicates, comparative negligence
legislation in the United States has generally taken three forms.
Statutes in Nebraska and South Dakota typify the first variety
wherein the plaintiff's recovery is limited to situations in which
his negligence has been "slight" while that of the defendant
"gross," when compared. The determination of degree is, of
course, left to the jury. The net effect of these acts seems to
have been to revive the unsatisfactory experience at Illinois and
6
Kansas.'
s Shell & Bufkin, Comparative Negligence in Mississippi, 27 Miss. L.J. 105

(1956).
9 Johnson, Comparative Negligence - The Nebraska View, 36 NEB. L.
REV. 240 (1957).
lo See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 3.570 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as HEFT]; Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 289.
"See Comment, 7 S.D.L. REV. 114 (1962).
12 Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 AR. L. REV. 89 (1959).
1345 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
14 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
15 Id. § 766.
16 Lanark v. Daugherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Galena & Union
R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Il. 478 (1858); Chicago K. & N.R.R. v. Brown, 44 Kan.
384, 24 P. 497 (1890); Wichita & W.R.R. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P.
78 (1887). See HEFT, §§ 3.340, 3.490.
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The second form of statutory enactment applies "pure" comparative negligence to the effect that a plaintiff may recover
his damages less the percentage of negligence attributable to
him without regard to a maximum percentage. Thus a plaintiff
who is adjudged to have been 90 percent responsible for his
own injuries may still recover 10 percent of his damages from
the party who is found to have been 10 percent at fault. Only
Mississippi presently employs this extreme apportionment
1
scheme. 7
The third variation is the "modified" or "equal to or greater
than" rule which reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of his own negligence and denies recovery if the plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of the defendant.1 8 This was the
form taken by the Wisconsin Act 19 and has been the most popular among those states which have recently enacted comparative
negligence statutes.
II.
Colorado's statute 20
Hawaii in 1969,21 which,
"modified" comparative

THE COLORADo ACT
was patterned after an act adopted in
in turn, was modeled after Wisconsin's
negligence legislation. Thus Wisconsin,
which has operated under its statute for a number of years,
17MIss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
's Pfankuah, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence, 1968

INS. L.J. 725.
' WIs. STAT. ANN.

§ 895.045 (1966) (The statute was originally enacted
in 1931). Wisconsin amended its statute in June 1971 to bar recovery by
a plaintiff only if plaintiff's negligence was greater than defendant's.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1971).
20 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971). The actual text of the
Colorado Comparative Negligence Statute is as follows:
Negligence cases - comparative negligence as measure of damages. (1)
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
any action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made.
(2)
(a) In any action to subsection which (1) of this
secticn applies, the court in a nonjury trial, shall make findings
of fact or, in a jury trial, the jury shall return a special verdict
which shall state:
(b) The amount of damages which would have been
recoverable if there had been no contributory negligence; and
(c)
The degree of negligence of each party, expressed
as a percentage.
(3)
Upon the making of the finding of fact or the return
of a special verdict, as is required by subsection (2) of the section, the court shall reduce the amount of the verdict in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for
whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made; but if the
said proportion is equal to or greater than the negligence of
the person against whom recovery is sought, then, in such event,
the court will enter a judgment for the defendant.
21 HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 663 (1969).
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can be looked to by Colorado practitioners for interpretive
case law. Hawaii has, in the two years since passage of its act,
produced no appellate decisions of reference significance. In
attempting to utilize Wisconsin case law, however, one should
be aware that certain procedural systems such as a direct action
statute, non-unanimous jury verdicts, and common law contribution among tort-feasors are employed in Wisconsin but not in
Colorado. Also, Wisconsin has abolished all full or partial immunities including its guest statute.22 Fortunately, within the
next several years, there should be a body of law developing
23
in the various other states having the "modified" form.
The Colorado statute requires, as do the statutes in Hawaii
and Wisconsin, that the jury record percentage allocations on a
special verdict form. 24 The statute also requires that a jury
25
The trial
make a finding as to the total damages incurred.
to
reduce
computation
mathematical
the
judge then makes
damages by the extent of the plaintiff's percentage of negligence or dismisses the case against a particular defendant if the
2
plaintiff's negligence exceeds that defendant's allocable fault.
The highest court of Wisconsin has ruled that it is reversible error to inform the jury as to the operation of the statute
27
As a consequence, the
or the effect of its percentage findings.
know what effect, if
do
not
theoretically
jury
members of the
any, their percentages have on the amount awarded. Nor is the
jury informed that the plaintiff will not recover if his negligence is found to be equal to or greater than that of the de28
fendant.
These procedural differences should be borne in mind when considering
Wisconsin authorities. Permitted "direct action" and non-unanimous
jury verdicts probably have little effect. Contribution and abolishment
of immunities are considered elsewhere in this paper.
2-3Ark., Hawaii, Idaho, Me., Mass., N.H., Wis.
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971). Specific legislative intent
is expressed by the special verdict requirement. The jury's function is
clearly limited to special findings. There is obviously no necessity to
tell the jury the effect of their findings and it would seem violative of
the spirit of the clear legislative mandate to possibly prejudice their
function or encourage speculation by unneeded knowledge of judicial
implementation of the statute.

22

Id.
Id.
2T Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6,

25

26

66 N.W.2d 697 (1954)

(attempted reading of pleading which would also

inform jury of the effect of its findings); DeGroot v. Van Akkeren, 225

28

Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937) (reading statute to jury). Arkansas has
no special verdict requirement, so that its procedure is not helpful to
Colorado practice.
See generally the discussion on why the jury is not to be informed of
the result of their special findings. HEFT § 7.40.
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As to the special verdict form itself, the Colorado statute
requires only an ultimate fact determination as to percentage
allocations and total damages incurred. The jury is not required
to list the types or degrees of negligence involved. Originally,
Wisconsin jurors were given interrogatories which required
them to decide whether litigants were negligent with regard to
such factors as lookout, speed, control, and yielding of right-ofway. 29 Because of a great deal of confusion which resulted
from these specific findings, Wisconsin changed its procedure
so at present there are usually no specific findings, but only an
ultimate fact determination whether the litigants' acts, undefined by detailed interrogatories, were causally connected to
30
the occurrence.
Appropriate jury instructions and special verdict forms have
been developed by the Colorado Supreme Court Civil Jury Instruction Committee and approved by the Colorado Supreme
Court. 3 1 Because the Colorado statute applies only to accidents
occurring on or after July 1, 1971, there will be a period of time
during which a dual system will be in force.
To summarize, the Colorado Comparative Negligence Act
has four basic features: (1) the comparison of negligence determines liability of the person against whom recovery is sought
since a plaintiff cannot recover unless his negligence is of a
lesser degree than the negligence of that person against whom
he seeks recovery; (2) a comparison of negligence also serves
the purpose of reducing damages in proportion to the causal
negligence of the person seeking recovery; (3) the jury theoretically does not know the results of its findings as in a
general verdict; and (4) the court applies the doctrine upon
facts found by the jury in terms of percentages of negligence
attributed to each person contributing to the injury for which
recovery is sought. Apparently this is so even though such
person may not be a party in the suit. These features also apply
to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third party claims by and
between defendants.
It is not the kind, character, or number of negligent acts that are compared, but rather the degree of causality attributable to the persons involved. Grana v. Summerford, 12 Wis. 2d 517, 107 N.W.2d 463 (1961).
Hence, detailed interrogatories really serve no purpose.
30 Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d 593, 146 N.W.2d 433 (1966). See the present form of special verdicts used in Wisconsin. HEFT § 8.20. By statute,
the more detailed form may still be used in that state on a voluntary
basis, or at the discretion of the trial court. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.27
(1966).
31 The instructions and forms were approved by the Colorado Supreme
Court on Jan. 28, 1972 and are included as an appendix to this article.
The Colorado Supreme Court has already ruled that the statute will not
be given retrospective effect. Heafer v. Denver-Boulder Bus Co., 489
P.2d 315 (Colo. 1971).
29
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III.
A.

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE

One Plaintiff v. One Defendant

Application of the statute in this context is fairly simple.
Consider the following illustrative examples:
Example (1)
51% negligent
P
49% negligent
D
100%
Damages if there had been
$10,000
no contributory negligence
Defendant not liable.
Result:
Example (2)
P
D
Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

Example (3)
P
D
Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

49% negligent
51% negligent
100%
$10,000
Plaintiff r e c o v e r s
51% of his damages
or $5,100.
50% negligent
50% negligent
100%
$10,000
Defendant not liable.

It can be seen that what seems to be an anomaly exists
under the "modified" comparative negligence rule. If a plaintiff
is 50 percent negligent or more he recovers nothing, whereas if
the plaintiff is only 49 percent negligent as against a particular
defendant, he recovers 51 percent of his damages. For those
who would criticize this feature, however, it should be remembered that comparative negligence is a compromise amelioration
of strict contributory negligence, which denied recovery to a
plaintiff who was even 1 percent negligent, with retention of
the concept that one who is equally at fault should not be entitled to recover.
B.

One Plaintiff v. Multiple Defendants

When multiple defendants are joined, the question arises
as to whether the plaintiff's negligence is to be compared with
the negligent conduct of each defendant or with the defendants'
negligence as a unit. It appears clear from a reading of the
Colorado statute that the plaintiff's conduct is subject to comparison only with the actions of each defendant against whom
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recovery is sought rather than against the combined
of the defendants.3 2 This has been the Wisconsin
tion, 33 and, in point of fact, individual comparison
be the established procedure in all comparative
34
states except Arkansas.
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negligence
interpretaappears to
negligence

Under the Arkansas view, a plaintiff has been allowed to
compare his negligence with that of the sum negligence of the
defendants and thus to recover damages from a defendant
3
whose negligence was judged to be less than the plaintiff's.
This result seems not only to represent a strained construction
of the Arkansas Act, but appears to also seriously imperil the
effectiveness of the statute itself by allowing the plaintiff
to control the substantive result simply through procedural
joinder. With the orthodox Wisconsin interpretation, this latter
problem is avoided and the outcome is the same whether defendants are sued separately or as a unit.
The following examples are illustrative of the multiple defendant consideration under the Colorado statute:
Example (4)
P
DI
D2

Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:
Example (5)
P
D1
D2

Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

10% negligent
5% negligent
85% negligent
1007,
$10,000
D 1 dismissed; P re-2
covers $9,000 from D .
45% negligent
40% negligent
15%. negligent
100%
$10,000
Neither D 1 or D 2 is
liable, because plaint if f' s negligence,

The Colorado statute provides that comparison is made with "the person
against whom recovery is sought." Had the legislature intended a group
comparison it could easily have made such provision. See discussion by
James Smith concerning interpretation of an identical Massachusetts
Comparative Negligence Statute: Smith, Comparative Negligence in
Massachusetts, 54 MASS. L.Q. 140, 145 (1969).
:13Schwenn v. Lcraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961);
Kirchen v. Tisler, 255 Wis. 208, 38 N.W.2d 514 (1949); Walker v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
:1457 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 434 (1971).
35 Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
32
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though not as great
as the combined negligence of defendants, was greater
than each of the defendant's individual
negligence.
Another question which arises under the comparative negligence act is that of the disposition of the absent tort-feasor
who either cannot be found or is not joined for litigation of the
dispute. The Colorado statute requires that the court's finding
of fact or the jury's special verdict state the degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage. 36 The Wisconsin
special verdict form and the recently adopted Supreme Court
Instruction Committee verdict form require that all causal negligence be accounted for so that the allocations of negligence
of the involved parties total 100 percent. It therefore becomes
apparent that if the jury is to make an accurate apportionment
of negligent involvement in a multi-party accident case where
all parties are not joined, some accounting for the absent causative element must be made. This could easily be done by including an "other" category on the special verdict form.
This consideration is illustrated by the following example:
Example (6)
P
DI
D2
Phantom or immune D
(party involved in collision
but could not be found or
joined in lawsuit)

10% negligent
9% negligent
11% negligent

70% negligent
100%

Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence
Result:

$10,000
D 1 dismissed; P re- 2
covers $9,000 from D .
The example seems somewhat harsh on D 2 . However, in
defense of this apparently inequitable result, it may be positively stated that the defendant's negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury and the plaintiff's negligence was
of a lesser degree. The same seemingly harsh result obtained
prior to comparative negligence when only one of several negligent parties was sued.-7 Plaintiff could proceed to judgment
against both as a unit, against each separately, or against only
36

COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971).

37

The reason for nonjoinder of defendants may be immunity, insolvency,
unavailability, or plaintiff's choice. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS §§ 46, 47 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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one if desired. Although plaintiff could have two separate judgments, he could have but one satisfaction .3 The only change
with the advent of comparative negligence is that strict contributory negligence is now abrogated and plaintiff's negligence
is compared with that of the defendant against whom he
proceeds.
1. Multiple Defendants - Agency
Where an agency or quasi-agency relationship exists between defendants joined in an action, with one defendant vicariously liable only by reason of the relationship, defendants are
considered as a unit for the comparison with plaintiff's conduct. 39 This is the necessary result because there is really only
the agent's conduct to consider. If the principal is guilty of
negligent conduct apart from his agent, then each would be
compared with plaintiff's conduct, with the principal also being
40
vicariously responsible for his agent's neglect.
2. Multiple Defendants - Contribution
As has been observed, where there are multiple defendants,
the sum of their negligence is not compared to the plaintiff's
negligence, except when defendants are or may be deemed to
be acting as agents for each other. The jury makes the determination of the percentage of fault on the part of each party,
and percentages of fault on the part of individual defendants
may differ markedly.
It would seem that if a determination and apportionment
of damages based upon the degree of negligence attributable to
each party is to be made, then the amount each defendant will
actually pay should be based on those same percentage determinations. However, this would amount to "contribution" between joint, concurrent or successive tort-feasors and such is
not permitted in Colorado. 41 The reason for refusing contribution in this situation is largely historical and developed out of
situations involving "intentional" torts as distinguished from
matters of mere inadvertence. 42 As with the concept of strict
contributory negligence, if the parties are in pari delicto, the
law grants no relief but leaves the parties as it finds them.
38 Id. at § 47.
39 COLO. JURY INST. 8:1-7.

It is the court that groups parties together for the comparison, if applicable. It is the jury's function only to find course and scope of employment, if that is disputed, and the percentage of causal negligence
of the agent/employee and possibly also the principal if he is guilty
of conduct separate from his agent/employee.
41 Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 304, 353 P.2d 73, 76 (1960).
40

42

PRossER § 50.
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Such is the present state of law in Colorado today and the
statute on its face does not alter it.
Wisconsin has recently adopted, by judicial decision, a
"comparative contribution" rule.43 It provides that each defendant should bear that portion of the amount owed to the
plaintiff in the ratio of his negligence to the total amount of
the negligence found attributable to defendants liable to the
plaintiff. 44 It would seem that some form of contribution or
comparative contribution would be a logical extension to the
law of comparative negligence in Colorado. This, together with
the liberal joinder rules provided by existing rules of procedure, would make a fair and relatively uncomplicated assignment of the loss. Until that occurs, however, no contribution
between defendants as to a particular plaintiff's loss will be
permitted. Without contribution, those defendants who are
found to have been individually at fault to a greater extent
than the plaintiff will be held jointly and severally responsible
for such damage regardless of their individual proportions of
fault.
3. Multiple Defendants- Res Judicata
In situations where the plaintiff is unable or unwilling to
join all parties potentially responsible for the claimed injury,
a question arises as to the res judicata effect of a jury determination against only those defendants joined in the suit.
We have observed that the jury is required to assign a percentage of fault to parties involved in the claimed injury at
least so far as such parties are before the court in a particular
action. If two of three party defendants are joined, the relative
proportion of the absent defendant will be determined. The
questions then become whether this determination would be
binding on the plaintiff in a subsequent action against that
absent defendant and whether such determination would be
binding upon the absent defendant in a subsequent determination.
The law relating to res judicata is well-established in this
state and it does not appear that the comparative negligence
statute will substantially affect existing precedents. 45 Generally, a plaintiff who sues one of two or more joint tort-feasors
and is unsuccessful in his effort, is not precluded or bound by
the previous result in a subsequent action against one who
43

Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).

44 Id. at 2, 114 N.W.2d at 107.
45 City of Westminster v. Church,

167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
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was not a party to the first suit.46 Similarly, a defendant subsequently joined in an action is not bound by a judgment to
which he was not a party, and he is entitled to a complete and
separate determination of relative fault.47 This would appear to
create the opportunity for successive individual lawsuits with
varying results, but the same is true under the present system.
A plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction and can enforce
a judgment only against the individual defendant against whom
it was obtained. There are therefore no additional problems
presented.
C. Multiple Plaintiffs
Where multiple plaintiffs bring an action jointly, the principles previously discussed will apply to each plaintiff. Ordinarily, each plaintiff's conduct is considered and compared on
an individual basis. There will be relationships, however, which
48
will bring about group-plaintiff comparisons.
1. Multiple Plaintiffs- Death Statute
In death cases prior to comparative negligence, contributory negligence on the part of either the party claiming dam49
It
ages or of the decedent himself was a bar to recovery.
would appear that consideration of negligent conduct by both
beneficiary and decedent will remain under the comparative
negligence statute in that it provides that any damages allowed
shall be diminished "in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person for whose injury, damage, or death
recovery is made." 50 By this provision, a beneficiary would
be a "person for whose damage recovery is made," and the
decedent would be "the person for whose death recovery is
made." The recently approved Pattern Jury Instructions on
comparative negligence retain the consideration of negligence
by both decedent and beneficiary. 51
With this feature of Colorado law remaining, the next
question becomes whether the negligent actions of the decedent
and beneficiary, if both were causally negligent, are to be con46 The test of -res judicata is set out in Newby v. Bock, 120 Colo. 454, 210

P.2d 986 (1949): "For the plea to be a complete defense, there must be
'identity of subject matter, identity of cause of action, identity of persons
to the action and identity of capacity in the persons for or against whom
the claim is made.' "
47 46 AM. JuR. 2D Judgments § 519 (1969). But see Presser v. United States,
1963).
218 F. Supp. 108, 111 (S.D. Ill.
48 See notes 51, 53, 54, 55 infra.
49 COLO. JuRY INST. 10: 1, 2 and cases cited therein. See recently approved
changes in appendix p. 492 infra.
50 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971).
51See revised COLO. JURY INST. 10: 1, 2, appendix P. 500 infra.
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sidered individually with each defendant or whether their conduct is to be lumped together for comparison. This question
has been answered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in West52
ern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Co.,
which held that a widow's negligence would have to be added
to that of the decedent in making a statutory comparison with
the negligence of the defendant.
It seems obvious that if only the decedent or the beneficiary is negligent, then it is only his negligence which is compared with the defendant's negligent conduct. Where only one
of several beneficiaries is negligent, his negligence is compared
with that of the defendant for a determination of that beneficiary's recovery of his proportionate share of the damages re53
sulting from the decedent's death.
The following example is illustrative of the application of
the comparative negligence statute in death cases:
Example.. (7)
P1 (beneficiary)
P 2 (beneficiary)
Decedent
D1

6%
30%
7%
8%

D 249%

negligent
negligent
negligent
negligent
negligent

100%
Damages if there had been
no contributory negligence:

P' $10,000

P2 $10,000
D1 dismissed (b ecause P' and decedent's combined negligence exceeds that
of D'); P 1 recovers
2
$8,700 from D ; p2
recovers $7,300 from
D 22. If negligence of
P is imputable54 to
decedent or P1 , the
result would be D 1
dismissed; P 1 recovers $5,700 from D 2 ;
P 2 recovers $ 6,3 0 0
from D 2 .
2. Multiple Plaintiffs- Loss of Consortium, Loss of Services and Medical Expenses
It would appear that consortium loss claims will be conResult:

52
53
54

273 Wis. 349, 77 N.W.2d 599 (1956); See also Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis.
632, 51 N.W.2d 205 (1952).
Happy Valley Farms v. Wilson, 192 Ga. 830, 16 S.E.2d 270 (1941); Hansberry v. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626, 284 N.W. 556 (1939).
See Multiple Plaintiffs - Imputed Contributory Negligence, p. 482 inlra.
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sidered in a manner similar to death claims, since loss of consortium is essentially derivative in nature. Where only the injured spouse is negligent, that negligence is used as the basis
for comparison on a consortium claim. If both the injured
spouse and the party entitled to services are causally negligent,
their combined negligence is considered as a unit for comparison
with the conduct of the individual defendants. 55 This same basis
would be used in parent/child claims for loss of services and
56
medical expenses.
3. Multiple Plaintiffs- Imputed Contributory Negligence
Under the present state of the law, certain persons may
be found contributorily negligent by imputation of another's
conduct to them; these include joint venturers, heads of household who allow household members to use the "family car,"
employers, and joint owners of automobiles who are passengers
in their own vehicles.5 7 This is so because the law presumes
some degree of inherent right of control. Comparative negligence will not change this aspect of the law, but the effect of
any imputed contributory negligence will be to bring about a
comparison and reduction of damages, or the "50 percent bar,"
according to the degree of culpability attributable to the party
whose conduct is to be imputed. 58
III. THE

RELATIONSHIP OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

TO OTHER AREAS OF COLORADO TORT LAW

A. Differing Standards of Care
An important question which might arise under the statute
concerns the effect upon the negligence comparison process of
a differing standard of care between the plaintiff and defendant.
Although the courts have consistently stated that the standard
of care is always reasonable care under the circumstances, 59 on
occasion a defendant, such as a common carrier, will be held
to the "highest degree" of care.6 0 Jury instructions in Wisconsin recognize different levels or standards of care in such cases
without describing how this differentiation should affect apportionment.6 1
55 As in death cases, it is the court that groups parties together for the
comparison, if applicable, rather than a jury function. See revised
COLO. JURY INST. 9:16, appendix p. 492 infra.
56 See revised COLO. JURY INST. 9: 17, appendix P. 493 infra.
57 COLO. JURY INST. 11:23 and cases cited therein.
58 See Example (7), p. 481 supra.
59 See generally, PROSSER § 72.

INST. 12: 23.
,' WIS. JURY INST. Civil No. 1532. But see Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,
(0 COLO. JURY

114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), wherein the concept of "gross negligence" was
abolished.
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Apportionment might reasonably be made by comparing
the degree of relative deviation by each party from his own
standard of care. As an example, in a personal injury suit involving an 8-year-old plaintiff pedestrian and an adult defendant automobile driver, the acts of the child would be compared with others of his age, intelligence, and experience, and
the degree of any deviation from this standard would then be
compared with the degree of deviation of the adult driver
from his standard of care. 2 While it appears that a jury might
have difficulty in attempting to assign percentages of fault
where there are two varying standards of care applicable, in an
ultimate fact verdict jurisdiction such as Colorado, weight to
be given to a particular type of negligent conduct can be left to
jury determination upon proper instruction of the legal standard involved.6 3 Comparative negligence, therefore, actually effects no change from existing practice in this regard.
B. Differing Degrees of Negligence
An additional problem presents itself when the parties to a
tort action have each been negligent to a different degree, as in
cases arising under the Colorado Guest Statute, wherein a defendant's liability is predicated upon a finding of "willful and
wanton" negligence. 64 In those circumstances, the Colorado
Supreme Court has distinguished this type of conduct from
ordinary negligence.6 5 "Willful and wanton" or "reckless" acts
have been grouped together as an aggravated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from ordinary
lack of care. There presently exists an imposing body of law
which holds that contributory negligence is not a defense to
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct unless such contributory
negligence was also willful, wanton, and reckless.66 It is unclear whether contributory negligence is a defense to willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct in this jurisdiction, since Colorado
pattern jury instruction are silent on the question and the
67
applicable cases are old and somewhat vague.
Until recently, Wisconsin did not compare negligence where
9:4.
63 See generally CoLo. JURY INST., with Supreme Court Jury Instruction
Committee amendments for comparative negligence cases in appendix
P. 492 infra.
64
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963).
65 COLO. JURY INST. 11: 16 and cases annotated therein.
66 P ossM § 65.
67 Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 P. 211 (1898); Chicago
R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Nuney, 19 Colo. 36, 34 P. 288 (1893); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Atkinson, 23 Colo. App. 357, 129 P. 566 (1913).
62 COLO. JuRY INST.
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each of the parties was found to have been negligent to a
different degree. Thus plaintiff's ordinary negligence, for example, was not compared to defendant's gross negligence. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court now permits such a comparison to be made and although it has provided no guidelines
to facilitate the comparison, it seems to retain in theory at
68
least, the distinction in degree.
Analogous to this problem is the question of whether "active" and "passive" negligence should be compared.69 In this
regard the Wisconsin Supreme Court has reversed a trial court
which permitted a verdict form to be submitted to a jury comparing the passive negligence of co-guests with that of the
70
host.
As to standards of care, qualities and kinds of negligence,
it would seem then that the uncertainty which now exists will
probably remain, leaving ultimate weight and negligence comparison to jury determination.
C. Assumption of Risk and Last Clear Chance
Among Colorado's trial bar, there will certainly be an
interest in the probable influence of the comparative negligence
statute on the well-known doctrines of assumption of risk and
last clear chance. The former doctrine would seem to remain
unaltered;7'1 that is, assumption of risk by a plaintiff will still
be an absolute defense. This is so primarily because the theory
behind it had its origin in contract and was but a form of
consent.7 2 It can thus be applied without any form of fault.
When both contributory negligence and assumption of risk
barred recovery, the distinction was academic and there were
often factual situations wherein assumption of risk and contributory negligence were one and the same. 73 But when comparative negligence becomes the rule, the distinction between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence becomes extremely important.
The accepted Colorado definition of assumption of risk
is as follows: "A person assumes the risk of injury or damage
resulting from the negligence of another if he voluntarily and
unreasonably exposes himself to injury or damage with
68

Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
(, See discussion of "active/passive" negligence considerations in indemnity, p. 489 infra.
70 Vroman v. Kempe, 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967).
71 The statute makes no reference to assumption of risk.
72 PROSSER
73 Id.

§

68.
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knowledge and appreciation of the danger and risk involved." 74
As defined, assumption of risk is not necessarily incompatible
with comparative, contributory negligence. 75 However, Wisconsin has blended the two defenses into one so that assump76
tion of risk as a separate legal entity has been abolished.
Nevertheless it would seem that Colorado's rather clear and
orthodox definition of assumption of risk makes the defense a
distinctly different consideration from contributory negligence
and applies only where plaintiff's assumption was "unreasonable." Without clear legislative intent, the concept should not
be abolished for the sake of expediency. The recently adopted
revisions of the Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions have re77
tained assumption of risk in a comparative negligence context.
As to the doctrine of last clear chance, it developed as a
rule designed to soften the harsh effect of contributory negligence. 78 Thus, it would seem that the necessity for such a rule
is eliminated when comparative negligence becomes applicable.
Looking to other comparative negligence states for interpretive
insight, it may be seen that Nebraska has retained the doctrine of last clear chance and has thereby virtually eliminated
the slight/gross negligence standards of comparison, so as to
apply last clear chance in all cases unless the plaintiff's negligence was active and continuing until the very moment of the
accident. 79 South Dakota has also retained the doctrine of last
clear chance, and has determined it to be compatible with comparative negligence.80 Arkansas, Mississippi, Maine, and Wisconsin have apparently abrogated the last clear chance rule
and simply use the apportionment, comparison, and reduction
features of their comparative negligence statutes in its stead.,
No reason seems to exist for preserving last clear chance
74 COLO. JURY INST.

9: 21.

Hass v. Kessell, 245 Ark. 361, 432 S.W.2d 842 (1968); Wade v. Roberts,
118 Ga. App. 284, 163 S.E.2d 343 (1968); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814,
29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Brackman v. Brackman, 169 Neb. 650, 100 N.W.2d
774 (1960).
76 Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963).
77 The Supreme Court Jury Instruction Committee has not deleted as75

sumption of risk from revised Instructions in comparative negligence

cases.
78 MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1225
(1940).
79 Bezdek v. Patrick, 120 Neb. 522, 103 N.W.2d 318 (1960).
80 Vlack v. Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817 (1960).
81 Reppeto v. Raymond. 172 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Cusman v.
Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co., 188 Wis.
330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925); Price, Applicability of the Last Clear Chance
Doctrine in Mississippi, 29 Miss. L.J. 247 (1958); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 12 ARK. L.
REv. 89 (1959).
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either under a proximate cause consideration or a mitigation
of contributory negligence theory. Even prior to comparative
negligence, the courts were hesitant to apply the doctrine except in clearly applicable cases, and it now appears that this
doctrine will be one of the first laid to rest. The revised Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions eliminate last clear chance
instructions in actions where comparative negligence is
82
applicable.
D.

Res Ipsa Loquitur
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are generally acknowledged to be: (1) under the facts and circumstances the type
of accident does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2)
the injury must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the injury must not have been due to any voluntary action or contributory action on the part of the plaintiff.83 When these elements are established, an inference or presumption arises that
the negligence must have been that of the defendant and the
doctrine operates as a substitute for actual proof of negligence.
In Wisconsin, in the case of Turk v. H.C. Prange, Co.,84 the
court held that the third element was dispensed with by operation of the comparative negligence statute. Thus, in Wisconsin
at least, the negligence of the plaintiff does not bar applicaion of res ipsa loquitur in a comparative negligence context,
but is considered in the overall comparison.
The Colorado Pattern Jury Instruction on res ipsa loquitur
does not include freedom from contributory negligence as an
element necessary to the application of the doctrine.8 5 The instruction does speak of "exclusive" control, however, and if a
plaintiff is deemed partially in control of the particular instrumentality, then his conduct may become a consideration
in determining the statute's applicability.
E. Proximate Cause
Considerations of proximate cause under comparative negligence should theoretically remain as they existed before the
Act. Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions on causation need not
be changed,8 6 and the Supreme Court Pattern Jury Instruction Committee's revisions do not incorporate such a change.
82
83
84
85
86

Revised COLO. JURY INST. 9:18, appendix P. 493 infra.
PROSSER § 39; 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905).
18 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365 (1963). See also Welch v. Neisius, 35
Wis. 2d 682, 151 N.W.2d 735 (1967).
CoLo. JURY INST. 9:14.
COLO. JURY INST. 9:24-28.
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A comparative negligence statute does not eliminate contributory negligence as a defense in a negligence action, but
rather merely modifies the common law rule to the extent
that contributory negligence is no longer an inexorable bar
to recovery in every case. Hence the same causal connection
must be shown in a comparative negligence context as would
have been necessary if common law contributory negligence
had been in effect.
F. Intentional Torts and Strict Liability
As for tort actions based on intentional acts, the comparative negligence statute will simply not operate.87 Nor will it
generally apply where strict liability governs. The latter is
actually outside a consideration of contributory negligence because negligent conduct by either party is not the basis for
s8
recovery. However, in the Wisconsin case of Dippel v. Sciano,
section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) was deemed
applicable notwithstanding comparative negligence, and the
rule of strict liability in tort was adopted for product liability
cases. Commenting that the defense of contributory negligence
was nonetheless available to the seller, the court likened the
basis of the seller's liability to negligence per se and per89
mitted the defense.
IV.

PLEADING AND EVALUATION UNDER THE STATUTE

The style and substance of pleading a complaint need not
materially change under the statute. Since comparative negligence is but a statutory refinement of the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence, plaintiff need not plead freedom
from, or a lesser degree of negligence than defendant to state
a claim. 90 There should, therefore, be no change in the rule
that a claiming party need not anticipate a defense in his
pleading. 91
Contributory negligence under the comparative negligence
statute is an "affirmative defense." Its difference from the previous contributory negligence rule has been noted as operating
either to reduce plaintiff's damages, or, if of appropriate degree,
to completely bar the plaintiff's action. This difference should be
reflected in defendant's answer.
87

F.

HARPER

&F.

JAMES,

supra note 3 § 22.6;

PRossER

§ 65.

88 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).

Id. at 452, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
90 Stevens v. Strauss, 147 Colo. 547, 364 P.2d 382 (1961); Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961).
91 Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957).
89
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Notice pleading is sufficient in Colorado,1 and simplicity of
93
pleading is preferred under the rules. Since the comparative
negligence defense is based upon statute, an allegation that plaintiff was contributorily negligent together with an incorporation
of the statute by reference, should adequately state all features
94
of the defense.
Evaluations of claims under the statute will change less
materially than might be thought. Some degree of percentage
allocation to relative fault was being made in most evaluations
anyway. Very seldom were even undisputed liability cases absolute. Therefore, the same method employed in the special jury
verdict would probably be a useful technique in evaluating a liability case. After a reasonable factual investigation, a determination should be possible as to relative percentages of fault attributable to the involved parties. From a knowledge of the
nature and extent of injury, a determination of damages can be
approximated, and chances for dismissal based on the estimated
degree of plaintiff's negligence, or the potential amount of any
judgment can be calculated.
It seems that for years jurors have been applying a degree
of comparative negligence to their awards in liability cases anyway. Now that the thought processes of the jury are harnessed
be less difficult
and directed along specified lines, results should 95
facilitated.
to predict and the evaluation process

Wisconsin attorneys have developed a table of "suggested
comparisons" of negligence between drivers in ordinary motor
96
That table is as follows:
vehicle cases.
"SUGGESTED

COMPARISONS OF NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN

DRIVERS IN ORDINARY CASES"

Rear End

Defendant
100%

Plaintiff

92 Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 (1950).
93 "A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim

asserted." COLO. R. Civ. P. 8(b). "Each averment of a pleading shall
be simple, concise and direct." CoLo. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (1). See Ripple &
Howe, Inc., v. Fensten, 156 Colo. 322, 399 P.2d 97 (1965).
94 COLO. R. Civ. P. 9 (i) provides that when pleading a statute of Colorado,
it need not be set forth at length but can be referred to by appropriate
designation or otherwise identified, and the court will take judicial
notice thereof. See 3 V. DITrMAN, COLORADO PRACTICE § 9.6 at 261 (1965).
Simple comparative negligence pleading forms are set forth in HEFT,
app. at 20-47.
1968
95Pfankuch, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence,
INS. L.J. 725; Note, Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REv. 692 (1969).
It should be observed that this table is based upon
96 HEFT § 450 (1971).
Wisconsin experience where "direct action" against insurance companies

is permitted.
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Intersection
Uncontrolled
Stop Sign
Signal Light
Left Turn
Oncoming
Failure to Yield
Improper Passing
Wrong Side of Road
Improper Turn

60%
85%90%

40%
15%
10%

80%
70%
75%
90%
80%

20%
30%
25%
10%
20%

While this type of table may be helpful, each case will obviously
differ as to its own facts, '7 so that any sort of mechanical analysis
will be of limited value.
Where the liability of one of several defendants is based
upon negligence which was "secondary" and "passive," whereas
the other defendant or defendants' negligence was "active," "primary" and "proximate," a right of indemnity between defendants
arises which permits recovery not only for any amount the
secondary/passive defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff, but
also for defense expenditures incurred in his defense of the plaintiff's action98 It is unlikely that this doctrine will change through
comparative negligence. Even now, for the doctrine to apply, one
party's negligence must be different in kind. If that difference
in the quality of conduct exists, full reimbursement results. If
the difference in kinds of negligence does not exist, then the
doctrine is inapplicable because at that point the recovery
would be one of "contribution," which Colorado courts do not
allow.11 There should therefore be no change in the concept
of indemnity other than the possibility of increased usage resulting from an increase in the number of multiple-party
actions.
The statute may alter present patterns of pleading and
evaluation in a variety of other ways. For example, a claiming
party in a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim is treated
as a plaintiff and thus he is subject to the comparative negligence
considerations previously discussed. For this reason the special
For example, defendants are not always 100% negligent in rear-end
accident cases. Gaulin v. Templin, 162 Colo. 55, 424 P.2d 377 (1967);
Hickman v. Hock, 486 P.2d 442 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for
official publication); Varcoe v. Form & Pour Co., 480 P.2d 591 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
98Jacobson v. Dahlberg, 108 Colo. 42, 464 P.2d 298 (1970); Parrish v.
DeRemer, 117 Colo. 256, 187 P.2d 597 (1947); Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d 974 (1934); Colorado & S. Ry. v.
Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 P. 30 (1923).
99 Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73 (1960).
97
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verdict arrangement with judicial implementation of the result
should greatly simplify a jury trial involving counterclaims,
cross-claims or third party claims.
Comparative negligence may also encourage more ancillary
actions of this nature. Defendants who are only slightly negligent
may be more inclined to counterclaim if joined by a potentially
more negligent plaintiff or to cross-claim when joined with more
negligent co-defendants. Cross-claims and third party actions
may become more prevalent as defense devices where actual
percentages of negligent involvement are being determined by
a jury with implementation by the court.
Additionally, it would seem that courts will become considerably more reluctant to direct a verdict based on the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Before comparative negligence, the test was whether reasonable minds could differ as to
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the cause of
plaintiff's claimed injury. 100 Under comparative negligence, that
test would only be a starting place with a determination of the
degree of involvement to follow. It would seem that even where
plaintiff's negligence is patent, unless the evidence of degree is
overwhelming, the courts will be extremely reticent to direct
a verdict against the plaintiff based on his negligent conduct
alone.
Comparative negligence should apply to all disputes arising
out of the claimed negligence of the parties where the issue of
contributory negligence is raised. The statute contemplates both
trials to the jury and the court. 101 An arbitration proceeding
would be handled in a manner similar to that of a trial to the
court. The arbitrator, as the trier of fact, would simply determine
the percentage of negligence on the part of the involved parties
and make his award accordingly.
It may be worth noting one specific situation wherein the
statute will probably have wide application. This is in the area
of auto accidents and the seatbelt defense. Recent emphasis on
automobile design safety has brought about correlative emphasis
upon the use of safety equipment in motor vehicles. Failure to
use available safety equipment, which would have prevented
or lessened the claimed injury, falls squarely within orthodox
100 Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Driscoll Truck Lines, Inc., 158 Colo. 552,
101

408 P.2d 445 (1965); Nygren v. Dimond, 472 P.2d 169 (Colo. Ct App.
1970) (not selected for official publication).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14(2) (a) (Supp. 1971).
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definitions of contributory negligence and proximate cause.
Such neglect on the part of a claiming party, however, was
usually slight as compared with the conduct of the party causing the collision so that application of strict contributory negligence principles seemed unduly severe. As a result, many strict
contributory negligence states treated plaintiff's omission only
as a matter of "mitigation."

Comparative negligence eliminates the harshness and provides for mitigation so that failure to use an available safety
device may now be recognized for what it really is-simply another form of failure to exercise reasonable care. The seatbelt
defense as a type of comparative contributory negligence is wellrecognized in Wisconsin.' 03
CONCLUSION

The Colorado comparative negligence system, which incorporates the "less-than" rule, has retained the basic legal precept
that one should not recover if he is equally at fault, and yet has
allowed the harsh barriers of strict contributory negligence to
be lowered somewhat. In this manner the jury, as the proper
social and legal instrument of the community, may fairly measure
proportionate individual fault and assess damages as they are
proved by the evidence. When used with a special verdict procedure, comparative negligence" harnesses and directs the juror's
thought processes toward specific findings which are then implemented by the court. The system appears to be quite workable,
and seems to fairly compromise the interests of all parties. While
the adoption of comparative negligence will surely entail a period
of transition, experience in those states presently operating under
such a system indicates that it can be adopted with minimal disruption and change.

COLO. JURY INST. 9:15, 24, 26; Carlson v. Millisack, 82 Colo. 491, 261 P.
657 (1927); Deep Mining & Drainage Co. v. Fitzgerald, 21 Colo. 533, 43
P. 210 (1895). The injured party does not sue for the happening of an
accident; he sues for injury and claims that defendant proximately
caused the injury. If that injury was partly caused by the plaintiff's
own omission, his conduct falls within the definition of contributory
negligence. See Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.
1971).
103 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
102
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APPENDIX

Order
WHEREAS, the Colorado Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instructions has
formulated instructions concerning comparative negligence, necessitated by the enactment by the General Assembly of an Act Concerning Comparative Negligence As A Means
Of Ascertaining Damages in Negligence Cases, which amended Article 2 of Chapter 41 of
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, as amended, by the addition of a new section, C.R.S.
1963, 41-2-14, effective July 1, 1971, and
WHEREAS, this Court has considered the comparative negligence instructions and
notes on use prepared and submitted by the jury instructions committee for approval by
the Court, numbered as follow: 4:16, 4:17, 9:1, 9:16, 9:17, 9:18, 9:31, 9:32, 9:33,
9:34, 9:35, 9:36, 9:37, 10:1, 10:2 and 14:1,
NOW, THEREFORE, it isORDERED that the foregoing jury instructions and notes on
use are approved by this Court for use in jury trials in the State of Colorado, subject to
the following qualification.
These instructions are merely intended as guidelines. Since the comparative negligence
statute has not been tested in an adversary proceeding, the Supreme Court cannot pass
upon the propriety or necessity for other instructions, and corrections, or additions that
may necessarily have to be made in the future concerning these instructions. Until the
instructions are tested in an adversary proceeding, they are approved only in principle,
and shall be used where applicable in accordance with C.R.C.P. 51.1.
BY THE COURT, EN BANC, this 28 day of January, 1972.
Edward E. Pringle
Chief Justice
4:16 Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting
Notes on Use: Add as the first pa.agraph:
For the appropriate special verdict instruction to be used in comparative negligence
cases, see Instructions 9:32, 9:34 and 9:36.
4:17 Special Verdict Form
Notes on Use: Add as the first paragraph:
For the appropriate special verdict form to be used in comparative negligence cases, see
Instructions 9:33, 9:35 and 9:37.
9:1 Elements of Liability
Change last paragraph of instruction to read:
On the other hand, if you find all of these (number) propositions have been established
by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff (unless
you should also find that the defendant's affirmative defense of [insert any affirmative
defense other than contributory negligence] has been established by a preponderance of
the evidence, in which event your verdict must be for the defendant).
Notes on Use: Change to read:
In actions arising out of events occurring prior to July 1, 1971, the former instruction
and Notes on Use are applicable. The present instruction and following Notes on Use
apply to actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1, 1971.
Omit any numbered paragraphs, the facts of which are not in dispute.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate and omit the parenthesized
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clause of the last paragraph if the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or
there is insufficient evidence to support any defense.
Whenever the defense of contributory negligence has been properly raised, the
applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31 through 9:37)
should be used rather than this instruction.
Other appropriate instructions defining the terms used in this instruction, e.g.,
Instruction 9:2, defining "negligence," must be given with this instruction.
This instruction should not be used when liability has been admitted (see Instruction
2:4) or when the court has directed a verdict as to liability (see Instruction 2:6).
Source and Authority: Change to read:
The basic elements of a negligence case are set out in Independent Lumber Co. v.
Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P.2d 1052 (1938). Also in general support of this
instruction, see Instructions approved in Folck v. Haser, 164 Colo. 11, 432 P.2d 245
(1967).
9:16 Negligence of Spouse as Bar to His Claim for Loss of Consortium or for Injuries to
Spouse
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: While the negligence of one spouse in proximately causing injuries to the
other spouse is a defense to the former's claim for loss of consortium, Prosser, Torts
§125, at 893-94 (4th ed. 1971), it is not necessarily a complete bar under C.R.S.
§41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at 496). For that reason the former
instruction should not be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July
1, 197 1. Instead the applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31
through 9:37), appropriately modified, should be used.
9:17 Parents' Negligence as Bar to Parents' Claim for Injuries to Child
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: While the negligence of a parent in proximately causing injuries to his
child is a defense to that parent's claim for loss of services, expenses, etc. Prosser, Torts
§125, at 893-94 (4th ed. 1971), it is not necessarily a complete bar under C.R.S.
§41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at 496). For that reason the former
instruction should not be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July
1, 1971. Instead the applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31
through 9:37), appropriately modified, should be used.
In the absence of some basis such as master and servant, the contributory negligence of
one parent in causing injuries to his child is not imputable to the other parent. See
Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912).
9:18 Last Clear Chance
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: The applicable comparative negligence instructions (see Instructions
9:31 through 9:37), based on C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at
496), should be used rather than the former instruction in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 1971.
Source and A uthority: The doctrine of last clear chance is logically subsumed under a
comparative negligence statute such as Colorado's. Prosser, Torts § 67, at 438-39 nn 7 & 8
(4th ed. 1971 ). See also Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual § 1.220 (1971) and
2 Harper & James, Torts §22.14 (1956).
F. Comparative Negligence
9:31 Comparative Negligence -Elements
If you find the claimed damages were proximately caused by both the negligence of the
plaintiff, (name), and the defendant, (name), then you must determine to what extent
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the negligent conduct of each contributed to the damages of the plaintiff, expressed as a
percentage of 100 percent.
Notes on Use: This instruction applies only in actions arising out of events occurring
on or after July 1, 1971. It must be given whenever Instructions 9:32 or 9:33 are given or
when, after it has been appropriately modified, Instructions 9:34 and 9:35 or
Instructions 9:36 and 9:37 are given.
This instruction should be appropriately modified in cases where the negligence of
another would be available as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, the
negligence of a decedent in a wrongful death action; the negligence of a child in a suit by
a parent for medical expenses, etc.; the negligence of an injured spouse in a suit by the
other spouse for loss of consortium, or the negligence of an employee in a suit by an
employer against a third person who jointly with the servant negligently injured the
employer.
Source and Authority: This instruction is based on C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971,
ch. 125, section 1 at 496).
9:32 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting-No Counterclaim-Single Defendant
The court instructs you to answer the following questions which present the ultimate
issues of fact in this case, and which will be on a form for Special Verdict:
1. Was the defendant, (name), negligent?
2. Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the plaintiff's, (nme),
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
4. Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her)
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
5. If you answer all the four foregoing questions "yes," then you are to answer this
question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the (injuries) (damages)
(losses) as 100 percent, what percentage of that negligence was attributable to the
defendant and what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff?
6. If you answer questions 1. and 2. "yes," then state the amount of damages, if any,
you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if any.
[Insert any other questions which may be necessary to resolve properly any other
claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of the defendant.]
Before you return the Special Verdict answering these questions, you must unanimously agree upon your answers to each question for which an answer is required. Upon
arriving at such agreement, the foreman will insert each such answer in the verdict and
then sign it, upon the completion of all such answers.
Notes on Use: This instruction is applicable only in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 197 1.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.
This instruction should be used "in any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property"
and in which the defense of contributory negligence has been raised and sufficient
evidence presented to warrant submitting that issue to the jury.
Whenever this instruction is given, Instructions 9:31 and 9:33 must also be given as well
as such other instructions relating to negligence, contributory negligence, proximate
cause, damages, etc., as are appropriate to the case.
This instruction should be appropriately modified in cases where the negligence of
another would be available as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, the
negligence of a decedent in a wrongful death action; the negligence of a child in a suit by
a parent for medical expenses, etc.; the negligence of an injured spouse in a suit by the
other spouse for loss of consortium; or the negligence of an employee in a suit by the
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employer against a third person who jointly with the employee negligently injured the
employer.
If, in a district court case, the parties have stipulated to a verdict or finding by some
stated majority, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 48 (Rev. 1970), this instruction should be modified
accordingly.
Source and Authority: This instruction is based on C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971,
ch. 125, section 1 at 496).
To be effective as a defense, any contributory negligence must have been a proximate
cause of the claimed injuries or losses. Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871
(1969); Matt Skorey Packard Co. v. Canino, 142 Colo. 411,350 P.2d 1069 (1960).
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense on which the party asserting the
defense has the burden of pleading and the burden of proof. C.R.C.P. 8(c) (Rev. 1970);
Stevens v. Strauss, 147 Colo. 547, 364 P.2d 382 (1961) (citing earlier cases).
9:33 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict Form-No Counterclaim
IN THE
COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF_,
STATE OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.

Plaintiff,
SPECIAL VERDICT
V.

Defendant,

We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the court, to which we
have unanimously agreed:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, (name), negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 1:
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2:
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the plaintiff, (name), contributorily negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 3:
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of (his) (her) claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses) (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4:
QUESTION NO. 5: If you have answered all the four foregoing questions "yes," then
you are to answer this question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the (injuries) (damages)
(losses) as 100 percent, what percentage of that negligence was attributable to the
defendant and what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 5:
%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to defendant, (name):
%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to plaintiff, (name):
100%
Total:
QUESTION NO. 6: If you have answered Questions I and 2 "yes," state the amount of
damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if any?
ANSWER NO. 6: $
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[Insert any other questions and appropriate answer forms which may be necessary to
resolve properly any other claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of the
defendant.]
Notes on Use: This instruction is to be used in conjunction with Instruction 9:32.
Notes on Use to Instruction 9:32 are also applicable to this instruction.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32.
9:34 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting-Counterclaim
The court instructs you to answer the following questions which present the
ultimate issues of fact in this case, and which will be on a form for special verdict.
1. Was the defendant, (name), negligent?
2. Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the plaintiff's, (name),
claimed (injjiries) (damages) (losses)?
3. Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her) own claimed
(injuries) (damages) (losses)?
4. Was the plaintiff, (name), negligent?
5. Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the defendant's claimed
(injuries) (damages) (losses)?
6. Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her) own claimed
(injuries) (damages) (losses)?
7. If you answer all the six foregoing questions "yes," or if you answer Question I and
either Questions 2 or 3 "yes" and also answer Question 4 and either Question 5 or 6
"yes," then you are to answer this question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused (injuries) (damages) (losses) to
either or both the plaintiff and the defendant as 100 percent, what percentage of that
combined negligence was attributable to the defendant and what percentage was
attributable to the plaintiff?
8. If you answer Questions 1 and 2 "yes," then state the amount of damages, if any,
you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the plaintiff, if any.
9. If you answer Questions 4 and 5 "yes," then state the amount of damages, if any,
you find were sustained by the defendant and proximately caused by the (accident)
(occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the defendant, if any.
[Insert any other questions which may be necessary to resolve properly any other
claims of the plaintiffor affirmative defenses of the defendant. ]
Before you return the Special Verdict answering these questions, you must unanimously agree upon your answers to each question for which an answer is required. Upon
arriving at such agreement, the foreman will insert each such answer in the verdict and
then sign it, upon the completion of all such answers.
Notes on Use: This instruction is applicable only in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 197 1.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.
This instruction should be used "in any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property"
and in which the defense of contributory negligence has been raised as a counterclaim and
sufficient evidence presented to warrant submitting that issue to the jury.
Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 9:31, appropriately modified, and
Instruction 9:35 should also be given as well as such other instructions relating to
negligence, proximate cause, damages, etc., as are appropriate to the case.
This instruction should be appropriately modified when the alleged negligence
constituting the basis of the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's counterclaim is that of a
third person imputable to the defendant or the plaintiff. Similarly appropriate
modifications should be made when the defendant has alleged the personal negligence of
the plaintiff as the basis for the counterclaim and, separately, the negligence of a third
person as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, a suit by a parent for medical
expenses for injuries to his child in which the defendant has claimed damages based on
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the negligence of the parent in causing the accident and, separately, the contributory
negligence of the child in also causing the accident.
If, in a district court case, the parties have stipulated to a verdict or finding by some
stated majority, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 48 (Rev. 1970), this instruction should be modified
accordingly.
Source and Authority: In addition to the Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32,
see C.R.C.P. 13 (Rev. 1970).
9:35 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict Form-Counterclaim
IN THE-COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF_, STATE OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.

Plaintiff,
SPECIAL VERDICT
V.

Defendant,

We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the court to which we
have unanimously agreed:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, (name), negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. I:
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's, (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2:
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his)
(her) own claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 3:
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff, (name), negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4:
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
defendant's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 5:
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his)
(her) own claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 6:
QUESTION NO. 7: If you have answered all the six foregoing questions "yes," or if
you have answered Question I and either Question 2 or 3 "yes," and you have also
answered Question 4 and either Question 5 or 6 "yes," then you are to answer this
question:
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused (injuries) (damages) (loss) to
either or both the plaintiff and the defendant as 100 percent, what percentage of that
combined negligence was attributable to the defendant and what percentage was
attributable to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 7:
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to the defendant, (name):
-%
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to the plaintiff, (name):
100%
Total :
QUESTION NO. 8: If you have answered Questions I and 2 "yes," state the amount of
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damages, if any, you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately caused by the
(accident) (occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the plaintiff, if any?
ANSWER NO. 8: $__
QUESTION NO. 9: If you have answered questions 4 and 5 "yes," state the amount of
damages, if any, you find were sustained by the defendant and proximately caused by the
(accident) (occurrence), without regard to the negligence of the defendant, if any.
ANSWER NO. 9: $
[Insert any other questions and appropriate answer forms which may be necessary to
resolve properly any other claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of the
defendant.]
Foreman
Notes on Use: This instruction is to be used in conjunction with Instruction 9:34. The
Notes on Use to Instruction 9:34 are also applicable to this instruction.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instructions 9:32 and 9:34.
9:36 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict-Mechanics for Submitting-Multiple Defendants
The court instructs you to answer the following questions which present the ultimate
issues of fact in this case, and which will be on a form for Special Verdict.
1. Was the defendant, (name of first defendant), negligent?
2. Was the defendant's, (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's, (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
3. Was the defendant, (name of second defendant), negligent?
4. Was the defendant's, (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
5. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
6. Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate cause of (his) (her)
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)?
7. If you answer all the six foregoing questions "yes," or if you answer questions I and
2 or questions 3 and 4 "yes" and also answer questions 5 and 6 "yes," then you are to
answer this question:
Taking as 100 percent the combined negligence of those parties whom you may have
found to be negligent and whose negligence you may have found was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses), what percentage of that combined
negligence was attributable to defendant, (name of first defendant), if any; what
percentage was attributable to the defendant, (name of second defendant), if any, and
what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff (name)?
8. If you answer questions 1 and 2 "yes" or questions 3 and 4 "yes," then state the
amount of damages, if any, you find were sustained by the plaintiff and proximately
caused by the (accident) (occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, if any.
[Insert any other questions which may be necessary to resolve properly any other
claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of either of the defendants. ]
Before you return the Special Verdict answering these questions, you must unanimously agree upon your answers to each question for which an answer is required. Upon
arriving at such agreement, the foreman will insert each such answer in the verdict and
then sign it, upon the completion of all such answers.
Notes on Use: This instruction is applicable only in actions arising out of events
occurring on or after July 1, 1971.
Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.
This instruction should be used "in any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,"
in which the defense of contributory negligence has been raised and there is sufficient
evidence presented to warrant submitting that issue to the jury, and in which the
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defendants would each be liable as joint tortfeasors, if at all, for all the damages claimed
by the plaintiff. If one defendant might be liable for having negligently and proximately
caused all the plaintiff's injuries, while the other defendant might be liable only for a part
of such injuries, this instruction must be appropriately modified.
Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 9:31, appropriately modified, and
Instruction 9:37 should also be given as well as such other instructions relating to
negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, damages, etc., as are appropriate to
the case.
This instruction should also be appropriately modified in cases where the negligence of
another would be available as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, for example, the
negligence of a decedent in a wrongful death action; the negligence of a child in a suit by
a parent for medical expenses, etc.; the negligence of an injured spouse in a suit by the
other spouse for loss of consortium; or the negligence of an employee in a suit by the
employer against a third person who jointly with the employee negligently injured the
employer.
If, in a district court case, parties have stipulated to a verdict or finding by some stated
majority, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 48 (Rev. 1970), this instruction should be modified
accordingly.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32.
9:37 Comparative Negligence-Special Verdict Form-Multiple Defendants
IN THE-COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF __, STATE OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.

Plaintiff,
SPECIAL

VERDICT

V.

Defendant,
We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the court, to which we
have unanimously agreed:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, (name of first defendant), negligent (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 1:
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant's, (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's, (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 2:
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant, (name of second defendant), negligent? (yes or
no)
ANSWER NO. 3:
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the defendant's (same name), negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's (name), claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 4:
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the plaintiff, (name), contributorily negligent? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 5:
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, a proximate
cause of (his) (her) claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses)? (yes or no)
ANSWER NO. 6:
QUESTION NO. 7: If you have answered all six foregoing questions "yes," or if you
have answered questions I and 2 or questions 3 and 4 "yes" and you have also answered
questions 5 and 6 "yes," then you are to answer this question:
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Taking as 100 percent the combined negligence of those parties whom you found to be
negligent and whose negligence you found was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
claimed (injuries) (damages) (losses), what percentage of that negligence was attributable
to the defendant, (name of first defendant), if any; what percentage was attributable to
the defendant, (name of second defendant), if any, and what percentage was attributable
to the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 7:
Percentage, if any, of combined negligence attributable to defendant,
(name of first defendant):
Percentage, if any, of combined negligence, attributable to defendant,
-%
(name of second defendant):
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to plaintiff, (name):
100%
Total :
QUESTION NO. 8: If you have answered questions I and 2 "yes" or questions 3 and 4
"yes," state the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff and proximately
caused by the (accident) (occurrence), without regard to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, if any?
ANSWER NO. 8: $
[Insert any other questions and appropriate answer forms which may be necessary to
resolve properly any other claims of the plaintiff or affirmative defenses of either of the
defendants.]
Foreman
Notes on Use: This instruction is to be used in conjunction with Instruction 9:36.
Notes on Use to Instruction 9:36 are also applicable to this instruction.
Source and Authority: See Source and Authority to Instruction 9:32.
10:1 Contributory Negligence of Decedent
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use: While the contributory negligence of a decedent is a defense in a
wrongful death action, Willy v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 115 Colo. 306, 172 P.2d 958
(1946) (construing what is now C.R.S. §41-1-2 (1963)); Restatement 2d, Torts §494
(1965), and Prosser, Torts §127, at 910 (4th ed. 1971), it is not necessarily a complete
bar under C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section 1 at 496). For that reason,
the former instruction should not be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or
after July 1, 1971. Instead the applicable comparative negligence instructions (see
Instructions 9:31 through 9:37), appropriately modified, should be used.
Source and Authority: See sources and authority above.
10:2 Contributory Negligence of a Plaintiff
Instruction not to be used in actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1,
1971.
Notes on Use; While the contributory negligence of a plaintiff is a defense in a
wrongful death action as to that plaintiff's claim, Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53
Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Prosser, Torts § 127, at 913 (4th ed. 1971), it is not
necessarily a complete bar under C.R.S. §41-2-14 (Colo. Laws 1971, ch. 125, section I at
496). For that reason, the former instruction should not be used in actions arising out of
events occurring on or after July 1, 1971. Instead the applicable comparative negligence
instructions (see Instructions 9:31 through 9:37), appropriately modified, if necessary,
should be used.
Source and A uthority: See sources and authority above.
14:1 Manufacturer's Liability Based on Negligence -Elements of Liability
Notes on Use; Add as first paragraph:
In actions arising out of events occurring on or after July 1, 1971, in which the defense
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of contributory negligence has been properly raised, the applicable comparative
negligence instructions (see Instructions 9:31 through 9:37), appropriately modified,
should be used rather than this instruction.

FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION
IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
By

JOE

A.

CANNON*

N the wake of the increased attention focused on juvenile
courts by In re Gault,' resort to federal injunctive and
declaratory relief as a means of testing the constitutionality of
juvenile statutes and processes has become increasingly common. 2 It is the purpose of this article to examine the viability
of this course of action.
I. TACTICAL ADVANTAGES
There are a number of compelling reasons for electing a
federal over a state forum in cases involving the validity of
juvenile statutes and processes. An initial consideration is the
inadequacy of relief available in state courts. Overloaded state
appellate dockets produce inordinate delay; and, since few
courts are willing to grant stays of execution or bail pending
appeal in juvenile proceedings, such delay inevitably reduces
the value of a favorable decision for the juvenile.
A second reason for seeking federal intervention is that a
favorable decision by a state appellate court does not have the
direct, broad effect on the field of law that is characteristic of
Associate Director of the National Juvenile Law Center, St. Louis University; B.A., Oklahoma State University, 1961; J.D., Tulsa University
School of Law, 1966.
Gault is the first Supreme Court case to consider
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
the major questions of fundamental fairness and procedural due process
and resolve them in favor of the juvenile.
2 Mailliard v. Gonzales, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal
filed, (U.S. April 9, 1971) (No. 1565). This case challenges the constitutionality of a statute bringing within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court any person under age 21 "who from any cause is in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." The state is appealing an adverse decision of a three-judge court. At the time of this
writing, no decision has been made on probable jurisdiction. Compare
Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (decided on the vagueness issue).
In Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Miss. 1968) the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the trial of juveniles for delinquency under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970) unless they were properly advised of their right to counsel
and counsel was appointed in appropriate cases. The court found federal intervention appropriate and enjoined court proceedings after consideration, and rejection, of the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Using
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) as its base, the court required proper
advisements of the right to counsel in the Mississippi Youth Court.
In Conover v. Montemuro, 304 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969) the
failure of a juvenile court to provide constitutional standards at intake
was attacked. The court found that the complaint stated a substantial
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970) and denied a motion to dismiss.
*
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federal declaratory or injunctive relief.8 Thus, although a decision by a state appellate court may set out requirements for its
juvenile courts or release a child from wrongful detention, the
actual malpractice in the reversed court may continue, requiring
correction on a case by case basis.
A third consideration is that direct appeal within the state
system wastes the legal resources of various defense and legal
services agencies by requiring repetitious representation. In
contrast, one successful declaratory judgment or class action
injunction consolidates the work of many lawyers representing
individual children in direct appeals.
Finally, resort to federal relief provides direct access to the
federal appellate courts.4 Here, one is more likely to find a
sympathetic and attentive forum when challenging governmental practices which abuse the constitutional rights of children.
In summary, for those concerned with the reform of juvenile law, federal injunctive and declaratory relief is desirable
because it offers a speedy, adequate remedy and provides a
direct avenue to the federal appellate courts. Whether such
relief is available under the present law of federal intervention
is considered below.

11.

THE

LAW OF FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION IN STATE

Younger v. Harris
The most recent expression by the Supreme Court on the
law of federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings
is Younger v. Harris.5 This case, together with its companion
cases, 6 seems to foreclose the possibility of federal intervention
in juvenile proceedings. However, a close comparison of the
facts of these cases with the nature of juvenile proceedings reveals the inapplicability of the reasoning of the Younger series
to juvenile cases.
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS -

A prime example has been the continuing problem of In re Gault. See
Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive
Stasis, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 431.
4 If a federal complaint is filed seeking to enjoin the operation of a state
statute on grounds of conflict with the Federal Constitution, it may be
necessary to convene a three-judge court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
Appeals from decisions of three-judge panels are made directly to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). If a three-judge
court is not required to hear the action, appeal proceeds to the court of
appeals for that federal circuit. On the question of when a three-judge
panel must be convened see generally Currie, The Three-Judge District
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1964).
5401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77
(1971); Bryne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401
U.S. 200 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
3

JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS

A. Injunctive Relief Under Younger
Decided February 23, 1971, Younger involved a challenge
to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act 7 on grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth. Plaintiff, Harris, while being prosecuted for a violation of the Act, brought a complaint in federal
court praying for injunctive relief. He alleged that the California statute was unconstitutional and, therefore, further prosecution under it should be enjoined. Several plaintiff-intervenors
entered the case claiming that possible prosecution under the
statute inhibited their constitutional rights to engage in political
activity and to teach.
Pursuant to the federal anti-injunction statutes, a threejudge district court was convened to consider the constitutionality of the Act.8 The court concluded that the Act was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and enjoined the defendantprosecutor from further prosecutions under it. 9 Utilizing the
direct appeal statute, 10 the defendant proceeded to the Supreme
Court. After considering issues of comity" and abstention 12 not
raised by the appellant, the Court ruled that:
[T]he judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant,
Younger, from prosecuting under these California statutes, must
be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings
13
except under special circumstances.

The plaintiff-appellees who had not actually been charged with
violations of the California Act were denied standing to challenge it, the Court considering it a small likelihood that they
§§ 11400, 11402 (West 1970). See Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), dealing with the same statute and overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970), provides for the convening of a three-judge
district court in cases challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.
For a general discussion of the pre-Younger requirements for convening
a three-judge court see D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND MATERIALS
530 (1968); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in
State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MicH. L. REV. 1145
(1932); Comment, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State
Courts, 35 CAL. L. REV. 545 (1947); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions
Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (1965).
9 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
1028 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966).
11The doctrine of comity is a policy of non-interference based on the concept that "federal courts, in exercising their jurisdiction, should give
consideration to the sovereign status of the individual state." Maraist,
Federal Injuctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REV. 535, 541 (1970).
12 The doctrine of abstention is a doctrine of judicial self-restraint. Under
it, a federal court whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked, may
postpone its decision pending disposition in the state court. See Note,
Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HAnv. L. REV. 604, 607 (1967).
13 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 41 (1971).
7 CAL. PEN. CODE
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would ever be prosecuted under the statute. 14 Harris, however,
was found to have sufficient standing by virtue of his prosecution, and the Court discussed the issues on the bases of his case.
Justice Black in delivering the opinion of the Court stated
that the underlying reason for limited intervention in state
prosecutions was the prevention of unnecessary conflict between
state and federal governments in accordance with the concept
of federalism.' 5 Only in those cases where irreparable injury
would result should the federal courts take jurisdiction to enjoin
pending state criminal prosecutions. The irreparable injury
The Court summarized:
But here appellees Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky do not claim
that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a
prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely
possible. They claim the right to bring this suit solely because,
in the language of their complaint, they "feel inhibited." We do
not think this allegation even if true, is sufficient to bring the
equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin
a pending state prosecution. A federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons having
no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or
speculative, are not to be excepted as appropriate plaintiffs
in such cases.
Id. at 42.
15 While the historical precedent for such reasoning is clear enough, it
is the author's belief that the conflict is three-sided. The people as a
third entity must be considered in terms of present day effect and in the
historical perspective. The widespread use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
as a device to provide a federal forum for state-people conflicts cannot
be overlooked when considering modern practice. Historically, the
thrust of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments was the
protection of the people against the acts of the states rather than the
federal government. To limit the role of the federal courts in such disputes may result in more conflict than might result in federal-state
relations by allowing broader intervention. Justice Douglas in his
dissent to Younger adopted the view that the constitutional perspective
was changed by the events of the Civil War and thereafter:
There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute
dealing with federalism passed at the end of the 18th century
to control another statute also dealing with federalism, passed
almost 80 years later, than to conclude that the early concepts
of federalism were not changed by the Civil War.
401 U.S. at 62.
That was the view of Judge Will in Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp.
200, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1968):
This revolution, in turn, represents a historical judgment. It
emphasizes the overwhelming concern of the Reconstruction
Congresses for the protection of the newly won rights of freedmen. By interposing the federal government between the states
and their inhabitants, these Congresses sought to avoid the risk
of nullification of these rights by the states. With the subsequent passage of the Act of 1871, Congress sought to implement
this plan by expanding the federal judicial power. Section
1983 is, therefore, not only an expression of the importance of
protecting federal rights from infringement by the states but
also, where necessary, the Congressional desire to place the
national government between the state and its citizens.
Injunctions Against
See, Note, The Dombrowski Remedy -Federal
State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS
L. REV. 92 (1966), which supports Justice Douglas' view that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction
Statutes.
14
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threatened must be "both great and immediate" and beyond the
injury one might risk by the mere fact of being prosecuted in
the state court. The Court concluded that:
Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered "irreparable" in
the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the
plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that cannot
be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. 16
In an attempt to clarify this standard, the Court indicated
that the threat of multiple prosecutions might present the injury required by Younger if the prosecution is coupled with bad
faith. However, whether a single or multiple prosecution is
threatened, the additional factor of bad faith was seen as a
7
requirement in most cases.1
The court went on to conclude that it is the quality of bad
faith which distinguishes Younger from Dombrowski v. Pfister,18
an earlier Supreme Court case relied upon by the lower court
in granting the original injunction. The element of bad faith in
Dombrowski was the intent of the Louisiana prosecutor to prevent the plaintiffs from exercising their constitutional rights by
instituting prosecutions without legitimate hope of securing
convictions. Although Justice Black believed Dombrowski was
correct in this narrow sense, he noted that the case had subsequently been too broadly construed on the issue of whether
the unconstitutionality of a state statute on its face is sufficient
to meet federal equitable requirements of irreparable injury.
According to Justice Black:
It is undoubtedly true, as the Court stated in Dombrowski, that

"[a] criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression

usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms." But this sort of "chilling effect," as the Court called it,
should not by itself justify federal intervention. 19

It appears that with respect to injunctive relief, Younger
stands for the proposition that federal courts may not intervene
in state criminal proceedings without a clear showing of irreparable injury. While what constitutes irreparable injury is
401 U.S. at 46 (footnotes omitted).
At the end of his opinion in Younger, Justice Black did indicate that
"[t]here may be ... extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary
irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment." 401 U.S. at 53. See also Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) (Justice Brennan's dissent).
Is380 U.S. 479 (1965).
19 401 U.S. at 50.
16

17
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not precisely defined, bad faith prosecution under a challenged
law clearly falls within the standard.
B.

Declaratory Relief Under Younger
A request for declaratory relief commonly accompanies a
prayer for injunctive relief.2 0 Consequently, a collateral question is raised concerning the applicability of the standards announced in Younger to cases brought under the Declaratory
Judgment statute. 21 Consideration of this issue is necessary
when seeking to avoid the possible restrictive application of
Younger.
In Samuels v. Mackell,22 a companion case to Younger, it
was reasoned that the practical effect of a declaratory judgment is the same as an injunction, since under a declaratory
judgment statute a court can effectuate and protect its own
orders (the declaratory judgment) by means of an injunction.
In this circuitous manner, federal courts may intervene in state
court prosecutions. This being so, to apply different standards
to declaratory judgment actions and injunction cases would
operate to frustrate the questionable policy of noninterference
with state criminal prosecutions. 23 Nevertheless, the language
of Samuels suggests that declaratory judgment actions may
enjoy a greater flexibility than injunctive cases. The Court
carefully pointed out that:
We do not mean to suggest that a declaratory judgment
should never be issued in cases of this type if it has been concluded that injunctive relief would be improper. There may be
improper. There may be unusual circumstances in which an
injunction might be withheld because, despite a plaintiff's strong
claim for relief under the established standards, the injunctive
remedy seemed particularly intrusive or offensive; in such a
situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and
might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines govern24
ing the availability of relief.
Such a claim was not joined in Younger, although the Court indicated
that a prayer asking "such other and further relief as to the Court may
seem just and proper," might include a declaratory judgment. 401 U.S.
at 42 n.2.
21 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970).
22401 U.S. 66 (1971).
The plaintiffs had been indicted for violations of
the New York Anarchy statute prior to filing their suit.
23 The Younger court ruled that the injunctive relief sought actually
existed as a remedy not by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, but as a judicially
fashioned exception to that statute. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). Also, the Court dismissed the argument that, because declaratory judgment relief is founded upon a statute unlike the injunctive
remedy, the traditional requirements for irreparable injury and standing are not applicable. It reiterated that the actions were quite similar
in nature and effect, and that the legislative history of the declaratory
judgment statute indicated "traditional equitable principles" were intended to apply.
24 401 U.S. at 73.
20
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Obviously, this is a restrictively worded exception; nevertheless, it indicates that where an injunction is not an appropriate remedy, declaratory relief will not necessarily be barred as a
device for entry into a federal court. What would constitute
the requisite "unusual circumstances" to justify declaratory relief is left for future consideration by the courts.
Even if the same stringent standards apply to the propriety
of declaratory relief where state prosecution is pending, it may
be possible to draw a distinction between pending and threatened proceedings and argue that in the latter situation an allegation of an overbroad or vague law 25 is sufficient to warrant
declaratory relief. Such was the tack taken by Justice Brennan
dissenting in Perez v. Ledesma.26 He argued that, if the state
prosecution has been filed prior to the federal action, the state
"provides an adequate forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights, [and] the federal courts should not ordinarily
intervene. '27 If, however, the state criminal prosecution has not
been filed, or has been terminated by nolle prosequi, then no
forum exists in which the plaintiff may assert his constitutional
objections. Under such facts, the compelling reasons for nonintervention have not arisen.
Arguably, then, the federal forum may be sought where
no active state prosecution is in progress at the time of the
federal hearing, because the basis for nonintervention, i.e.,
interference with the state criminal process and the supposed
resultant federal-state friction, no longer exists. In such cases
declaratory relief would be a proper remedy since it is unnecessary to risk prosecution under a criminal statute to avail oneself of the protection of the Declaratory Judgment Act. These
were issues not considered by the majority in Perez.
III.

JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS AND FEDERAL COURT
INTERVENTION IN CIVm ACTIONS

It seems clear that the rules involving federal intervention
in state civil proceedings do not fall within the purview of
Younger and its companion decisions. Thus, if a case can be
25 It is important to note that an allegation of "overbreath" is preferable

to one of "vagueness" when attempting to gain federal intervention.
The decision of Justice Brennan in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967) illustrated that, in an overbreadth situation, there is no possibility of the state court remedying the federal question; while, if the
claim was one of vagueness, the state court could resolve the issue.
Because of this, federal court abstention is less appropriate irk an overbreadth situation, and intervention is more palatable for the state

courts.
26 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
27 Id. at 103.
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categorized as civil, it is legitimate to assume that Younger may
be successfully avoided. Obviously, this approach must be taken
in a federal suit attacking juvenile statutes and proceedings if
the bad faith requirement is to be avoided and the irreparable
injury requirement minimized.
In the same term as the Younger case, the Supreme Court
in Wisconsin v. Constantineau21 affirmed a three-judge court
decision which struck down a state statute requiring the posting
of the names of excessive drinkers and forbidding the sale of
liquor to them. The statute29 made no provision for a hearing
prior to such posting. Justice Douglas in delivering the majority
opinion (Justice Black and others dissented) considered whether
or not the three-judge court should have abstained from making
a decision and thereby allowed the state judicial machinery to
consider the constitutionality of the statute in question. The
Court said:
Congress could, of course, have routed all federal constitutional
questions through the state court systems, saving to this Court
the final say when it came to review of the state court judgments. But our First Congress resolved differently and created
the federal court system and in time granted the federal courts
various heads of jurisdiction, which today involve most federal
constitutional rights. Once that jurisdiction was granted, the
federal courts resolved those questions even when they were
30
enmeshed with state law questions.

Clearly, the issues of federalism raised in the criminal context
of Younger were more liberally treated in the civil context of
Constantineau.
A.

The Noncriminal Nature of Juvenile Proceedings

Whether juvenile proceedings are to be characterized as
criminal or civil creates an immediate dilemma. Many of the
major reforms accomplished in the juvenile field have been
attained by analogizing juvenile cases to the criminal process.
As pointed out in Gault, "[a] proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected
to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution. '31 The Court slipped easily into the
criminal analogy, as evidenced by this statement: "The essential
difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is
that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's
28400 U.S. 433 (1971).
2!) WIs. STAT. ANN. § 176.26

30 400 U.S. at 438.
31 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
32 Id. at 29.

(1957).
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case. 's 2 On the other hand, when speaking of the due process
notice requirement, the Court indicated that the petition must
inform the parties of the charges in a manner "which would be
deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding."38
For the purpose of interjecting fifth amendment self-incrimination privileges into the juvenile court process the Court
stated:
[J]uvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may
lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as
"criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience
which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, in over
half of the States, there is not even assurance that the juvenile
will be kept in separate institutions, apart from adult "crimi34
nals."

A similar attitude is reflected in Justice Black's separate
concurrence in Gault. He pointed out that the goals of treatment and rehabilitation had not been attained in the juvenile
court process, and, therefore, because incarceration in an institution penal in nature was possible, the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights should uniformly apply to juvenile proceedings. He
dismissed the civil label generally attached to juvenile proceedings stating:
[B]oth courts and legislators have shrunk back from labeling
these laws as "criminal" and have preferred to call them "civil."
This, in part, was to prevent the full application to juvenile
court cases of the Bill of Rights safeguards .... 35

Criticism of the use of the civil designation also appears in
Kent v. United States.36 Here, a cursory waiver of jurisdiction
over a child resulted in the transfer of the case to a district
court for an adult criminal trial. In reversing, the Supreme
Court questioned the civil status of the proceeding but did not
preclude that characterization. The majority stated:
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of
other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather
than in the corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as civil
rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather
37
than adjudicating criminal conduct.
33
34

Id. at 33.
Id. at 49-50.

35 Id.at 59.

36 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37 Id. at 554. This case was the harbinger of Gault:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.
Id. at 555.
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Kent suggests that the failings of the juvenile court process
have been recognized and that a label will no longer insulate
the juvenile system from the Bill of Rights where these inadequacies have remained unremedied.
While Gault rejected the value of nomenclature such as
"civil" and "criminal," In re Winship"8 indicated that the label
of delinquency might also lack significance. In that case, the
appellant had been adjudicated a delinquent for violation of
New York's larceny statute. The standard of proof applied by
the juvenile court was a preponderence of the evidence rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that
due process requires the reasonable doubt standard to be applied
in delinquency cases. The reasoning was similar to Gault in
that emphasis was placed on the possibility of incarceration
after adjudication. The Court, however, did not take the absolutist view that all adult criminal safeguards were required
in juvenile cases. Rather, as established in Gault, a pattern of
selection and adoption under the due process clause was continued. Justice Harlan squarely faced the selective application
question in his concurrence:
I wish to emphasize, as I did in my separate opinion in Gault
...that there is no automatic congruence between the procedural requirements imposed by due process in a criminal case,
and those imposed by due process in juvenile cases. It is of great
importance, in my view, that procedural strictures not be constitutionally imposed that jeopardize "the essential elements of the
State's purpose" in creating juvenile courts .... 39
Justice Harlan's admonition that the original purpose of
juvenile courts not be forgotten in the process of giving juveniles greater procedural safeguards is echoed loudly in Mc
Keiver v. Pennsylvania.40 This case represents a significant
shift away from Kent, Gault, and Winship where the emphasis
had been on procedural fairness and the assurance of fair treatment through the application of procedural safeguards.
38 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

Mr. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice

Stewart, dissented:
The Court's opinion today rests entirely on the assumption
that all juvenile proceedings are "criminal prosecutions," hence
subject to constitutional limitations. This derives from earlier
holdings, which, like today's holding, were steps eroding the
differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal
courts.
I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to
transform juvenile courts into criminal courts .
Id. at 375-76. The Chief Justice's view became the majority view in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
39 397 U.S. 374-75 (1970).
40403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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McKeiver eliminates the possibility of an absolutist view
prevailing in applying criminal safeguards to juvenile proceedings. The opinion reflects the philosophy of earlier juvenile
reformers, such as Judge Julian Mack, 4" and reaffirms the traditional notion of the juvenile court as a surrogate father figure.
However, McKeiver can be strongly criticized for its failure to
suggest any remedy for the unfortunate child who is shuffled
through the juvenile process only to receive little of what was

41

Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23

HARV. L. Rxv. 104 (1909). This article has
been widely quoted as a statement of the original philosophy of the
juvenile court system. An excerpt will amply demonstrate the thrust
of this view:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course,
be made to know that he is face to face with the power of the
state, but he should at the same time, and more emphatically,
be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.
The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in
such hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the
boy standing at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic
spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can
on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad
to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity,
will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work ....
Id. at 120. See also Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97 (1971).
Two patterns of change are presently operating in the field. One
is the major thrust of Kent, Gault and Winship providing adult criminal
safeguards in juvenile cases. See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88
Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968);
In re the Interest of B., 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967); In re
R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969); Ciulla v.
State, 434 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) applying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to juvenile proceedings. The requirement to
hold probable cause hearings was discussed in Brown v. Fauntleroy,
442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Lineup requirements for juvenile proceedings were set out
in In re Spencer, 288 Minn. 119, 179 N.W.2d 95 (1970). On double
jeopardy, consider Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968); and on free transcript for appeal see In re Karren, 280 Minn. 377,
159 N.W.2d 402 (1968).
On the other hand, there has been a significant effort to require
the court to provide treatment as prescribed by the underpinnings of
juvenile court philosophy. In support of a right to treatment, see Kent
v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Creek v. Stone, 379
F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Lollis v. New York, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); White
v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div.
128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969); Bazelon, Forward, A Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 675 (1969); Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment
Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process, 57 GEO. L.J. 848 (1969); Note,
The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
Do the attempts to provide treatment and incorporate criminal safeguards collide? There is no legal reason why one must exclude the
other. The hopes of Judge Mack, at least with respect to courtroom
decorum, have been dashed. However, procedural fairness as pointed
out by Justice Harlan in Winship need not interfere with the treatment
aspects of the procedure. Rather, it seems fairness in the courtroom
would aid whatever treatment came later. This may be so even though
Justice Fortas in Gault at footnote 30 indicated treatment might be a
quid pro quo for the lack of procedural safeguards.
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promised. The "worst of both worlds" philosophy is reinforced
42
and given renewed vitality in McKeiver.
The selective approach to the application of constitutional
safeguards taken by McKeiver is based upon a laissez-faire concept of the federal judiciary; i.e., the states should be free to
experiment in order to achieve high goals in the juvenile court
process. Consequently, the requirement of jury trials was felt
to impede this self-correcting process by compelling the use of a
full adversary procedure and thereby defeating what the Court
'4
described as an "intimate, informal protective proceeding.
This view was adopted even though the Court recognized that
the history of the juvenile court is replete with failure.
On the other hand, for all of its shortcomings, McKeiver
does support the proposition that Younger should not apply to
juvenile court proceedings because they are essentially noncriminal in nature. As stated by the Court:
[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a
"criminal prosecution," within the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid
of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given
the civil label.

44

In addition to case law, some juvenile jurisdictional statutes
clearly indicate the unique nature of the juvenile institution. A
typical example of such a statute found in every state is the
CHINS, PINS or wayward child provision. 45 Dealing only with
42403 U.S. 528 (1971).

There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including
that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities,
and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the
State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact,
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protection
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
While McKeiver states a declaration of delinquency is significantly
different from a criminal conviction, it is interesting to note the provisions of the Proposed RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR COURTS, Vol. 91, No. 12
S. Ct. Rptr. Advanced Sheets in the same regard. Rule 609(d) states
evidence of a juvenile adjudication is generally not admissible under
this rule. The judge may, however, allow evidence of juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the judge
is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
It will be interesting to see whether or not this version of the rule
remains in the draft finally adopted by the Supreme Court.
43 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
44 Id. at 541.
45 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 1967).
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children who are "beyond control" or are in danger of "leading
an immoral life," such statutes do not effect the adult criminal
law enforcement scheme. No particular act is proscribed by
such statutes; rather, the crime is one of status which, if applied to adults, would be impermissible. 46 Additionally, most
state statutes declare that the proceedings in juvenile court are
"civil." 47

The scope and purpose of juvenile statutes indicate a far
different objective from that evidenced in criminal statutes. The
aim of the latter is to protect society by stigmatizing certain
conduct, while the goal of the former is to enhance and improve
the well-being of the child, the benefit to society being only
consequential. Therefore, the concern shown in the Younger
series to the potential disruption of the state's scheme of criminal law enforcement is arguably inapplicable to juvenile proeedings because the ramifications are not the same. Thus, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that challenges to juvenile statutes
can escape the procedural limitations imposed by Younger since
such statutes deal with the status of a child rather than criminal
conduct per se.
B.

The Existence of Irreparable Injury

Regardless of whether the proceeding is criminal or civil
in nature, irreparable injury prevails as a threshold requirement
before an injunctive remedy can be granted. In Younger, the
Court indicated that the standard for irreparable injury in criminal proceedings must be greater than the normal injury incidental to a single state criminal prosecution, even though the
state prosecution includes the threat of imprisonment and the
expense of a defense. However, in a civil proceeding the standard
is clearly less stringent. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau48 the injury consisted of the infamy and embarrassment of having one's
name posted publicly as an excessive drinker. The Court held
that this injury presented a sufficient federal question and,
therefore, federal court intervention was deemed proper. It
would seem appropriate that cases involving injunctions in ju49
venile proceedings should be judged by a similar standard.
46 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.

660 (1962).
47 See, e.g., CoLo. R. Juv. P. 1 (1970); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

22-1-12 (Supp. 1969).
48 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
41 Note, however, the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)
staying pending state court proceedings.

§§ 22-1-7,
concerning
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In the typical juvenile case the injury that can be incurred
through subjection to the juvenile processes can be extremely
grave. Institutionalization itself may be sufficient irreparable
injury to justify federal intervention. Rehabilitation and treatment are the goals sought; however, the juvenile institutional
system has many critics who believe it fails to achieve those
goals on a grand scale. 50 Thus, in Gault the Court noted:
A boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained
of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence -and
of limited practical meaning - that the institution to which he
is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home"
or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or
lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed
walls, regimented routine and institutional hours .... Instead of a
mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything
from "waywardness" to rape and homicide. 5 '

Generally, no bail is granted or allowed in juvenile cases
pending appeal,5 2 and some states do not even provide a direct
appeal system.5 3 Thus, the child suffers incarceration while an
appeal or collateral attack is pending. As a result, before an
appeal can be heard, the child will often have completed the
term of incarceration prescribed by the court. Therefore, it
would appear that the lack of bail pending appeal and the conditions of incarceration would be sufficient to show irreparable
injury in a juvenile context.
Even temporary incarceration has been condemned as seriously injurious to a child. 54 If the system of incarceration is
demonstrably punitive, the injury to a child is far more serious
than the incidental injury to an adult in a normal criminal
prosecution. The association with institutional personnel and
other more sophisticated delinquents has been criticized as
causing the child to identify himself as a delinquent and "no
50
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51387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
52 Colorado appears unique in this aspect. Bail, and perhaps bail pending
;,

appeal, is provided for in COLO. R. Juv. P. 59(c) (1970).
387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967). This situaticn, however, makes the avenue of
federal habeas corpus more attractive since the exhaustion of state
remedies has been accomplished. See Comment, Appellate Review of
Juvenile Court Proceedingsand the Role of the Attorney, 13 ST. L.U.L.J.
90 (1968).

54 S. NORMAN, DETENTION PRACTICE (National Parole and Probation Asso-

ciation 1960).
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good." 55 It would seem that such danger to the child, given the
unfulfilled promise of homelike surroundings in such institutions, would support a finding of immediate and irreparable
injury. 56
CONCLUSION
Younger v. Harris and its companions create problems in
seeking federal injunctive and declaratory relief in pending
juvenile proceedings. The problems appear, however, to be
surmountable by careful pleading according to the scope of the
cases noted in this article. The ultimate question of whether
or not juvenile proceedings are criminal, for federal injunctive
purposes, must be resolved. By analyzing the recent juvenile
cases considered by the Supreme Court, it does appear that these
proceedings are to remain classified as civil. Upon this premise,
most of the inhibiting factors found in Younger may be dismissed as inapplicable to federal actions challenging juvenile
statutes and practices. Hopefully, however, juveniles will not
receive the "worst of both worlds" in the resolution of this
issue.
Where desirable, the federal courts offer an excellent forum
for the redress of constitutional grievances occurring in juvenile
court. Although the pitfalls of lack of federal jurisdiction are
plentiful, they may generally be successfully avoided. With due
consideration of those problems, federal courts can provide a
workable avenue for sophisticated juvenile law reform.

5a

In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970). In
the TASK FORCE REPORT it is stated:
Detention facilities for youngsters in many communities do
little to include law-abiding behavior on their part and in many
instances may actually contribute to later violations of the law.
The National Survey found that an estimated 100,000 juveniles
are detained in jails and similar facilities for adults in the
United States each year. Only three jurisdictions -Connecticut, Puerto Rico and Vermont - can actually claim that their
jails are never used for children, though many States have laws
forbidding such practices.
The failure of a juvenile court to advise children of their right to coun-el was considered irreparable injury in Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp.
1049 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO AN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS:

THE FAILURE OF STATE AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL

*

By JAN LArros**
INTRODUCTION
ACED with increasing air pollution resulting from rising
population and industrial growth, the Colorado legislature
responded by enacting a series of state air pollution control laws.'
An examination of these laws, the various agencies which they
created,2 and the effectiveness of the legislative and administrative response to the state's air pollution problem, forms the
basis of this article.
The article does not purport to discuss the economic, political,
or sociological ramifications of formalized air pollution control
efforts; nor does it propose any tentative recommendations for
a revision of the current state pollution control program. Rather,
its scope is limited to disclosing how and why the state's legal
responses to the problem of air pollution have not been successful. More precisely, it examines how these responses were fashioned by a sequence of events through which the problem was
first identified, then recognized by official governmental bodies,
and finally confronted by agencies and institutions charged with
solving the problem but ill-equipped and unwilling to affect it.
From these observations one can begin to evaluate whether the
law's function in the context of control over the environment
has been correctly perceived.
Although the primary focus of the discussion is on the re*

This article is drawn from a study of Colorado's air pollution agencies
which began in the summer of 1970 and was updated to 1972. The initial
1970 study was funded by the Ford Foundation as part of the Environmental Law Intern Program at the University of Colorado School of

Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the impetus and
encouragement provided by Professor Don Carmichael who supervised
the study and would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Luize Laitos,
the author's persevering wife, who helped edit the article.
** B.A., Yale College, 1968; J.D., University of Colorado Law School, 1971.
Mr. Laitos was Comments Editor of the Colorado Law Review and is a
member of the Colorado Bar. He is currently law clerk for the Honorable Edward E. Pringle, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
1 The most recent and comprehensive of such laws is the 1970 Colorado
Air Pollution Control Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 66-31-1 to -26

(Supp. 1971).
2The following agencies were created by statute in Colorado: the
Variance Board, the Air Pollution Control Division, and the Air
Pollution Control Commission. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -26
(Supp. 1971).
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sponse of Colorado institutions to air pollution, the analysis applies to the many other pollution problems that affect the
the environment. It is therefore hoped that an examination of
the Colorado experience will benefit other states in their attempts
to deal with the current environmental crisis.
I. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A.

The Nature of the Problem
Ironically, the air pollution crisis is essentially a product of
economic success. The principle sources of air pollution employ
millions of Americans, significantly contribute to the Gross National Product, and satisfy needs which have become essential to
daily existence.
If air pollution is an environmental crisis born of success,
it is by implication a problem which is here to stay. Even with
the great public outcry against automobile pollution, it has been
predicted that it will be 1992 before the automobile ceases to be
a major polluter.3 With respect to industrial pollution, the
public's myopic perception of private industry protects this
major offender from effective criticism. A similar problem
exists with respect to the third great source of air pollutionthe publicly regulated utility companies, which are by far the
most significant stationary air polluters. As with the automobile and industry, their continued existence is indispensible to
modern life.
The specifics of the pollution problem may also be seen
from a more conceptual level. Fundamentally, air pollution is a
problem because pollution source P harms citizen C. If C complains, P must respond to the complaint, or some intermediate
body, such as an agency, A, will become involved. Usually P will
not respond because C is incapable of generating sufficient pressure; therefore, C's only effective recourse is to turn to A. A
must stand between P and C and work towards a compromise.
A must require each party to sacrifice something-in the case of
P it is usually time and money; in the case of C it is tax money
and the increased cost of goods produced by non-polluters. If
neither P nor C are willing to sustain the sacrifice required by
this "outsider," A's efforts fail.
There is another variation on this conceptual theme. Since
P is hurting C through P's air pollution, it appears that the only
way to help C is to hurt P. However, this ignores the fact that
C is also unwittingly hurting himself. For example, consider C
as an automobile owner or a worker in the polluter factory.
3

Dr. James P. Lodge, Chairman, Air Pollution Control Commission,

Denver Post, Nov. 28, 1971, at 58, col. 1.
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Since C is conditioned to ignore the fact that he is harming himself, it is almost impossible to convince him to make the necessary sacrifices (e.g., install costly air pollution control devices
in his car or take the bus to work every day). This reciprocal
nature of the air pollution problem-the P-C dichotomy-sometimes complicated by an intervening governmental agency, significantly contributes to the difficulties of grappling with the
problem.
It is evident that an ultimate choice cannot be made between
pollution on the one hand and the elimination of its sources on
the other. A compromise must be effected. Unfortunately, due
to the political and practical problems involved, the difficulty
of arriving at a satisfactory solution is of considerable magnitude.
The Gravity of the Problem
Despite the inherent difficulty in solving the air pollution
problem, its gravity makes some degree of abatement essential.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency's Rocky
Mountain Regional Administrator, the most important environ4
mental problem facing Colorado is air pollution.
Colorado's urban centers, located along the eastern slope of
the Rocky Mountain uplift, are faced with a "natural" air pollution problem. These areas lie in a basin created by the mountains
which prevents effective wind dispersal along a north-south axis
while supporting inversions which trap the pollutants over the
cities. ' As a result of this situation, the annual average concentration of particulates throughout the Denver City-County area
is above the level suspected of causing increased mortality for
people over 50 years of age. This high particulate concentration
has been responsible for an occasional reduction of visibility to
less than 8 miles, as well as a cost to Denver residents of over
$100 per capita annually. 6
B.

Concentrations of non-particulate air pollutants are equally
offensive. Sulfur oxides cause metal corrosion; photochemical
oxidants cause nose and throat irritation as well as vegetation
damages; and carbon monoxide levels in Denver are high
enough to decrease the oxygen carrying capacity of the blood
7
and thus interfere with time-interval discrimination.
4 Address by John Green, Rocky Mountain States Section of the Air

Polluticn Control Association Dinner Meeting, Dec. 8, 1971.
. Denver is classed by the Environmental Protection Agency as being,
along with Salt Lake City, one of the nation's two worst urban air
pollution areas. Denver Post Mar. 26, 1972, at 57, col. 1.
6 COLORADO DEP'T OF HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PUBLIC ON AIR POLLUTION7

1971 at 11.
Id. at 10-12.
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II. RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION
The mere existence of a problem does not necessarily insure
recognition and response. Accordingly, it was many years after
air pollution had become acute in Colorado before the gravity of
the state's problem was specifically identified. However, by the
mid-1960's, pollution had become a visible problem not only in
Denver but in several other burgeoning urban centers. This, together with the increasing appearance of anti-pollution literature,
precipitated gradual public awareness of the severity of the problem and the need for remedial action. Since traditional legal
doctrines were inadequate,8 the burden fell on the legislature to
formulate a remedy.
In addressing the problem, the legislature was confronted
with two basic tasks: first, it had to make pollution of the air
illegal; second, it had to provide a method of enforcement. The
only important choice before the legislature with respect to illegality was whether to set the standards and emission levels by
law or to delegate the responsibility to an administrative agency.
As to the enforcement of the law, however, the choice was less
clear-cut. 9
8 A traditional legal response takes the shape of remedies through the

courts and remedies through the legislature. The first possibility is
adequate only if the legislature has already sanctioned a method by
which an aggrieved citizen or official can prove that a particular type
of air pollution caused by a particular source is illegal. Absent such
legislative causes of action, the aggrieved plaintiff is forced to rely
on traditional common law remedies, usually in tort and specifically
in nuisance. However, the common law concept of nuisance has not
been universally broadened to allow an individual to successfully petition a eourt to enjoin a particular source's air pollution. Hobbs v. Smith,
493 P.2d 1352 (Colo. 1972); Robinson Brick v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169
P.2d 171 (1946).
9 The legislature had to decide whether to provide for citizen suits against
polluters or to create governmental machinery to carry out the law's
sanctions. This choice was between individual and collective action. The
advantage of the former is that in each ca-se there would be a comprehensive adjudication in court with a final black and white decree at the
termination of the legal proceeding. The disadvantage of he latter is
that administrative bodies would have to be created which could identify
the polluter, notify the source, determine whether a violation had
occurred, hold a hearing, and adjudicate the issue of remedies, as well
as be responsible for failures to control air pollution. Such newly created
administrative bodies would have to be staffed, equipped, and paid on
a relatively full-time basis.
On the other hand, governmental action has one significant advantage over individual action against air pollution. Reliance upon
governmental agencies is an ingrained tradition in American politics
and history. If a problem arises that needs to be corrected, the typical
American response has been to create an agency, give it the duty and
responsibility of curing the problem, and blame it should something
go awry. Faced with the choice of delegating responsibility to the
public and courts, or creating a government-sponsored apparatus which
was clearly identifiable and subject to examination, the Colorado legislature chose the latter.
But once the agency was decided upon as the means for curbing
air pollution, the issue became more complex. Should the legislature
create a monopolistic or integrated agency approach to the problem?
Should any primary agency be able to delegate some responsibility to
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Essentially there were four alternative enforcement techniques available to the legislature. First, it could have regulated
pollution either by performance standards or specification standards. 10 Performance standards specify the limits for particular
pollutants and forbid the potential polluter to exceed them, while
specification standards require only that pollution control devices meet ce rtain design and engineering requirements."
Secondly, the legislature could have subsidized air pollution
control programs by either providing tax incentives 12 or awarding payments to the polluter who initiates and establishes a
reliable pollution control program. Generally, subsidies are disfavored by legislatures as too difficult to administer and highly
unpopular with the public. The citizen taxpayer does not want
his tax monies to be disbursed as awards to polluting industries;
nor does he want businesses to be given additional tax breaks.
A third alternative open to the legislature was to institute
a pricing program whereby the polluter would be charged for
each unit of emission which violated a control standard. This
scheme is based on the assumption that the polluter does not
wish to be fined for his pollution, and therefore the economic
charges levied against him will motivate a more efficient disposal
of his waste. 3 The perceived political advantages of a pricing system lie in its decentralized approach to governmental regulation.
Moreover, it allows the polluter to change or alter production
methods in the way most advantageous and efficient to him while
maintaining responsiveness to traditional market forces. The
difficulty with this method, however, is that firms often decide
that the least expensive response to the imposition of fines is to
"pollute and pay" while passing the cost on to their customers.14
This difficulty is compounded by the infrequency with which
study groups for policy decisions and some responsibility to adjudicatory
bodies for fact-finding decisions? And, once the framework and organization of the agency's machinery is decided upon, its roles and functions
must yet be refined: should it be primarily regulator, decisionmaker,
policymaker, gatherer or disseminator of information? Unfortunately,
most of these important questions were unanswered as they were never
asked.
10 See Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control-State and Local
Legislative Purpose and Techniques, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 331

(1968).

11 Note, Local Regulation of Air Pollution, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 232.
12

This approach usually takes the form of accelerated depreciation and
investment credits.

13 J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRMES 81-82 (1968).
14

A 1972 tax on sulphur dumped into the air was criticized as costing
the polluter less than it would cost to install devises to remove sulphur
from smokestack emissions. Denver Post, Feb. 9, 1972, at 6, col. 1.
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fines are actually levied on polluters, and the fact that when
levied, these fines are often ludicrously low. 15
The fourth alternative technique was to require scrupulous
supervision by the agency charged with administering the state's
air pollution control program. Under this approach the agency
can obtain a court-ordered legal sanction against the polluting
source. Usually this sanction is in the form of an injunction or
a cease and desist order. Such sanctions are the most severe of
all remedies and therefore necessitate the most cumbersome
governmental apparatus. Before the equitable sanction is actually enforced, several steps must be taken to insure that due
process is not violated or that an unlawful "taking" has not
occurred.' 6 These intermediary steps lead to considerable delay
in enforcing the injunction, thereby allowing the violator's pollution problem to continue during the interim.
These were the alternatives before the Colorado state legislature in 1966 when it first faced the task of drafting legislation.
As has been noted, each alternative had political as well as technical and practical overtones. As a consequence, any solution
was expected to reflect a variety of considerations, thereby producing a result not entirely consistent with the original goal.
The object of the following analysis is to isolate the elements
of the decisionmaking process and examine their influence on
the success of the resulting statutory design.

III. THe CoLoRADO RESPONSE
In 1966 Colorado passed the first of a series of bills de7
signed to curb the state's growing air pollution. The 1966 Act'
contained three key features. First, various "basins" within
the state were delineated and required to decrease their air
contamination to a certain level fixed by the legislature.
Second, the Act created an Air Pollution Control Division responsible for enforcement. The Division was empowered to
single out individual or industrial sources which polluted in
excess of the permissable levels and issue cease and desist
orders in the event that the polluter failed to rectify his viola-

15 The Ford Motor Company, for example, was recently fined only $10,000

by the Environmental Protection Agency for delivering cars without
federal certification. Denver Post, Dec. 2, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
16 Walker, Enforcement of Performance Requirements with Injunctive
Procedure, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 81 (1968).
7

I CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-29-2 to -29

(Supp. 1967).
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tion within a reasonable time.' Third, an Air Pollution Variance
Board was created. Upon the issuance of a cease and desist
order by the Division, the polluter could petition the Board for
a "variance" from the law. This variance would suspend the
enforcement of the cease and desist order for a period specified
by the Board and thereby stay the time within which the
polluter was forced to shut down its polluting operations. 19
Ideally the variance would provide a "grace" period within
which the polluting company could work to install pollution
control equipment. Too often, however, a variance became
synonymous with a license to pollute.
In 1967 and 1968 minor amendments to the 1966 Act were
adopted, but the basic structure of the statute remained unchanged. However, it was becoming increasingly clear that the
original statute was ineffective. The primary deficiency was
the retention of too much responsibility and decisionmaking
authority by the legislature, particularly with respect to the
promulgation of ambient air standards. In response, the legislature decided to completely overhaul the 1966 Act. The result
was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1970.20
The 1970 Act provides for an Air Pollution Control Commission 21 to develop and maintain the state's program for prevention, control, and abatement of air pollution throughout the
state. In effect, the Commission replaces the legislature as the
body primarily responsible for developing an effective air pollution control program. Since its creation, the Commission has
been able to accomplish what the legislature could not do
effectively. It has classified and defined different degrees and
types of air pollution, has set emission control regulations, and
has promulgated ambient air standards.
Administration and enforcement of the air pollution control
programs adopted by the Commission remain in the hands of
the Division. The responsibility of the Division is to locate,
identify, and, if necessary, bring action against those parties
who violate the Commission's standards. 22 These tasks can be
performed either independently upon the Division's initiative,
or upon receipt of a formal complaint. 23 The Division is also
18 Id. § 66-29-8.
19 Id. § 66-29-7.
2
oCoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -26
21 Id. § 66-31-4.
22 Id. § 66-31-10.
23

Id.

(Supp. 1971).
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responsible for providing the Variance Board with technical
advice, services, and personnel, thereby acting as an arm of the
24
Board.
The provisions of the 1970 Act respecting the Variance
Board substantially redefine and rework the Board's functional
relationship to the other legal institutions created by the statute
2
Section 14
and also clarify some of its internal workings.
requirequorum
articulates
establishes the Board's composition,
ments, and provides for alternates to attend meetings in the
absence of regular Board members. Section 15 sets out the
grounds upon which the Board will be able to grant a variance.
Moreover, it grants the Board the right to place conditions upon
granted variances which, if not carried out, will void the
variance and reinstate the cease and desist order. This section
also gives the Board the power to "hold public hearings, conduct investigations, compel attendance of witnesses, receive
such pertinent and relevant proof and such other things as it
may deem to be necessary. '26 Finally, Section 16 sets forth the
broad rules of procedure within which the Board must operate.
The availability of judicial review is clarified by Section
17. Any "final order or determination" by the Variance Board,
the Division, or the Commission may now be appealed to a
Colorado district court. 27 Although the Commission remains
the first avenue of review for a Board decision granting or
denying a requested variance, 28 the Commission's predelictions
are so much in favor of affirming Board decisions that the
courts provide the first effective forum for review. Section 17's
mandate to "stay" all Board or Commission determinations
pending a court decision 29 encourages judicial review as a
popular recourse.
Other sections of the 1970 Act provide for the issuance of
30
injunctions to enforce violations of any cease and desist order,
for the levy of fines and civil penalties against polluters who
violate final cease and desist orders not subject to stays pending
Board or judicial review, 31 and for the prohibition of incinerator
24 Id.

Id. §§ 66-31-14 to -17.
Id. § 66-31-15 (6).
27Id. § 66-31-17 (1).
28 Id. § 66-31-16 (9).
29 Id.§ 66-31-17 (1).
30 Id. § 66-31-18.
31 Id. § 66-31-19.
25

26
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and open burning. 2 Section 25 attempts to define the relationship between the cities, towns, and counties and the Act. The
purpose of this section is to clearly express the legislature's
intent that the state statute shall invalidate all inconsistent
local air pollution laws or policies, including local variance
33
board decisions.
Perhaps the most important section in the Act is its "Legislative Declaration," expressing the broad policies of the state.
According to this pronouncement of legislative intent, the state
is to achieve "the maximum practical degree of air purity in
every portion of the state . ..by requiring the use of all available practical methods to reduce, prevent, and control air pollution. '3 4 This standard, along with the degree of air pollution
still existent in this state, must be remembered when examining
the numerous difficulties confronted by those operating under
the Air Pollution Control Act. It is also important to recall the
role envisioned for the most active, and hence the most interesting, administrative body created by the Act-the Variance
Board. The Board's purpose is to grant variances to those polluters who cannot meet the Commission's standards at the present,
but who, given enough time under a variance, can implement a
schedule to bring the polluting source into compliance with the
emission control regulations of the Commission. If convinced
by facts and statistics that this grace period is both necessary
and sufficient, the Board can grant a variance, stay the desist
order, and require the polluter to devote his full energies to
abating his pollution before the expiration of the term of the
variance. At the end of the variance, the pollution should be
within acceptable limits, and there should be no need for another variance or, more importantly, a cease and desist order.
Whether the Board has fulfilled or even approached this functional ideal will be examined in depth later in this article.
Before examining the difficulties and failings of the statute
itself, it may be worthwhile to note the significance of the
mere passage of the 1970 Act. The enactment of the 1970 statute,
repealing the existing legislation, indicated that most members
of the Colorado House and Senate in 1970 were convinced that
pollution was a problem, that this problem was not being corrected, that something had to be done immediately, and that
the state was prepared to assume responsibility for regulating
Id. § 66-31-20.
33Id.§§66-31-25 (1) to (3).
34 Id. § 66-31-2.
32
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pollution-causing activities. The guidelines established by the
Act served to make clear to affected parties what would occur
if the fact of pollution was established and approximately how
long it would be before action to alleviate the problem would
be undertaken. Therefore, both governmental response and
polluter reaction to that response might be more predictable.
Whether the law supplied any direction and whether the private
and social costs of the Act outweighed its benefits can be
ascertained by a closer examination of the statute.
IV.

THE STATUTE ON ITS FACE: FAILURES, OMISSIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Although the 1970 Act was an improvement over the 1966
legislation, defects remain within the law. This section will
analyze these deficiencies by studying the Act on its face and
illuminating the general as well as the specific faults.
This investigation alone, however, will not lead to an
accurate prediction of how the statute operates within the
context of ever-changing factors: e. g., politics, economics, business practices, costs, and the profits to be derived from air
pollution. An examination of these factors and the actual operation of the statutory agencies must supplement an analysis of
the statute itself and, therefore, will be included in Section V.
A.

Defects in the Statutory Scheme
Two of the 1970 Act's most glaring defects stem from omissions. Most obvious is the exclusion of the automobile from
legislative regulation. The Colorado Department of Health's Air
Pollution Report for 1971 reveals that pollution from mobile
sources accounts for up to 65 percent of the state's air pollution.35 The same report estimates that the quantity of air pollutants emitted from automobiles in the Denver metropolitan
center is sufficient to impair an individual's reaction time on a
typical Colorado day. 3"; More recently, it has been estimated
that 90.9 percent of the state's air pollution tonnage comes from
37
transportation sources.
Given these figures, it seems quite alarming that the legislature chose not to deal with the automobile in the 1970 Air
Pollution Control Act. How can this omission be explained?
One might speculate that the legislature was having a sufficiently difficult time attempting to control the identifiable pollution
of the few stationary sources and did not wish to compound the
35 REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
36 Id. at 12.
37 COLORADO BAR ASS'N, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 554-55

(1971).
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problem by attempting to curb the relatively invisible pollution
emitted by innumerable automobiles. One might also assume
that since the federal government had in 1970 amended the
Air Quality Act of 1967 to provide that all new cars had to meet
certain antipollution standards, 8 the Colorado legislature felt
that the responsibility for automobile pollution was Washington's. But perhaps the real reason for the failure to regulate
automobile pollution was the legislature's reluctance to squarely place the blame for a substantial proportion of Colorado's
air pollution on automobile owners. Such a determination would
have required car owners or drivers to either reduce their
driving time or to curtail the emission from their cars. The
legislature was probably reluctant to come to grips with the
politically explosive economic issue of forcing the Colorado
driver to spend more money on his automobile in order to decrease its emissions. Rather than face these issues, the legislature simply chose to ignore them. In so doing, it conveniently
excluded from the regulatory scheme one of the prime sources
of air pollution.3 9
38

42 U.S.C. § 1857-57 (e) (1970).

3 This omission is particularly inexcusable when one considers the fact
that Colorado is one of the few states which can legally control automobile-caused pollution without interfering with the Federal Air Quality
Act of 1967. This federal statute prohibits individual states from regulating air pollution from automobiles after 1967 unless the state already
has a statute that attempts to deal with the pollution caused by automobiles. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-157 (Supp. 1965), passed in the
waning days of the 1966 General Assembly, required a crankcase
ventilating system on all cars and trucks in Colorado. It was an admittedly toothless and overly broad statute which could never be enforced. Neverthless, it was part of the state's law and its existence would
have therefore allowed the state to develop its own clear air standards
for automobiles.
Colorado in 1972 finally began to address the problem of auto pollution. In the Governor's State of the State Message for 1972, Governor
Love concluded that the state needed "an effective motor vehicle emissions control and inspection program," although he made it clear that
the "problem of the internal combustion engine . . . demand[s] a national solution." State of the State Message of Governor John Love,
Jan. 10, 1972.
After the Governor's message, the Colorado legislature and the
various air pollution control agencies jumped on the auto-control
bandwagon. The Colorado House and Senate approved a resolution
calling for a year's study of air pollution caused by motor vehicles.
Denver Post, Feb. 22, 1972, at 18, col. 1. The Colorado Air Pollution
Control Commission held a public meeting Jan. 12, 1972, to discuss the
possible administrative adoption of a state-wide air quality "implementation" plan, which included the creation of an automobile-emissions inspection and control program. The meeting was held and the
draft of the plan discussed, but the result was far from satisfactory.
Environmentalists tore into the plan's provisions pertaining to auto
pollution control on several grounds. First, the plan cnly attempted to
deal with federal clean air standards, ignoring entirely the possibility
that the state could propose more stringent standards. Second, the plan
did not attempt to deal with the problems associated with pollution
emissions at Colorado's high altitude. This is not entirely the fault of the
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Another important omission was the legislature's failure to
statutorily create private remedies to be initiated by citizens.
Citizens who are dissatisfied with the progress of air pollution
abatement might wish to pursue their own private remedies.
Each individual is affected differently and each polluting source
is operated uniquely. Would it not, therefore, be more efficient
to grant the affected citizen the option of bypassing the public
enforcement scheme to seek his own sanction? The legislature
could have accomplished this through two techniques: first,
it could have granted the aggrieved citizens a statutory cause
of action based on private nuisance; 40 or second, it could have
state legislature as the Federal Clean Air Act has a ridiculous requirement which forbids making necessary engine adjustments on late-model
automobiles to reduce pollutant emissions at Colorado's altitude. Denver
Post, Mar. 18, 1972, at 46, col. 1. Third, the implementation plan relied
upon auto manufacturers to play a major role by 1975 in cleaning up
the air. Finally, although the plan did discuss the possibility of mass
transit as one strategy for reducing air polluticn, it rejected mass transit
on the basis that it would not be possible to develop except over a very
lengthy period of time. Colorado State Air Pollution Control Commission
hearings on state air pollution implementation plan, Jan. 12, 1972.

40

Thus, although someone had at last addressed the fact that the 1970
Act did not mention pollutants stemming from transportation sources,
the problem remains undented. Such efforts are too late and do not
propose good starting points from which this complex issue can be
faced. In a futile attempt to excuse a glaring omission with rhetoric,
the state has once again proved that it is still incapable of squarely
meeting the problem of the state's air pollution.
Section 23 of the 1970 Act does contain the following language:
Nothing in this article shall abridge or alter rights of action or
remedies now or hereafter existing, nor shall any provision of
this article ... be construed as estopping individuals . . . or duly
constituted political subdivisions of the state, from the exercise of their respective rights to suppress nuisances.

COLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 66-31-23 (Supp. 1971).

To understand the ineffectiveness of this section, however, one must
understand the common law concept of "nuisance" in Colorado.
The law of nuisance in Colorado is divided into two areas, Baughman
v. Cosler, 169 Colo. 534, 459 P.2d 294 (1969). A "private" nuisance occurs
when one individual is affected in a peculiar sense by another party. A
"public" nuisance occurs when there is an interference by another party
which detrimentally affects more than one individual. Echave v. Grand
Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P. 277 (1948). For a public nuisance to be
private also, it must occasion special damage to land owners different
from that suffered by the public in general. Platte & Denver Ditch
Co. v. Anderson, 8 Colo. 131, 6 P. 515 (1885). All these potential remedies
became unusable, however, under the famous Colorado decision of
Robinson Brick v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946). Robinson
Brick held that where the conduct of an offending party is sanctioned
by statute, an injunction based on nuisance will be denied. This means,
with respect to air pollution violations, that when a party is operating
under a variance pursuant to the provisions of he 1970 Act, his offensive
conduct is "sanctioned" by the statue and, therefore, cannot be prohibited by an injunction. This partially abrogates § 23 of the 1970 Act
because a private citizen has no private nuisance action in Colorado
whenever the violator is operating under a variance.
Hobbs v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1352 (Colo. 1972) limited Robinson Brick
to its facts and allowed an injunctive remedy based on nuisance per
accidens, even though the nuisance was pursuant to statute. However,
Hobbs held that Robinson Brick's rationale will still be applicable
whenever the statute permitting the nuisance had a foreseeable term-
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provided for special proceedings by private citizens to abate
nuisances in the name of the state. 41 Michigan's Environmental
Protection Act, 42 for example, clothes the private citizen with
the state's unexercised enforcement authority. A similar approach could have been adopted in Colorado as an alternative
strategy to governmental control of air pollution.
The Act may be criticized for what it does as well as for
what it fails to do. Through the creation of several governmental agencies-some of them overlapping, some of them in administrative limbo-the legislature fostered an incredibly complex
adjudicatory scheme in which the polluter is shunted through
several different agencies: the Division, the Commission, the
Board, and the Department of Health. These agencies point to
the existence of the polluter, tell him how badly he is polluting,
and decide whether to allow him to continue his pollution-causing activities. If these were the only functions of these agencies,
the process might be intelligible to the polluter. Unfortunately,
these four bodies are vested by both the Act and practical
necessity with several other functions. "Who should I turn to?"
is an oft-heard complaint by those who find themselves the
subject of the Act's regulatory and control scheme. "What
should I expect?" is the more relevant query, but, as will be
discussed later, this question is sometimes unanswerable.
The regulatory scheme is further complicated by the fact
that, in addition to the four state-level agencies, the Act specifically involves in the control program local governments,
the office of the state attorney general and the Colorado judiciary. These institutions perform various roles depending upon
the numerous pressures upon them at any particular time. They
ination point. This would be in the case of variances, whose provisions

41
42

apply for a definite period and have a finite termination point. See also
Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NATURAL REs. LAW. 475
(1970).
A second possibility would have been for the statute to allow state
officials to bring "public nuisance" actions against air pollution violators.
Without specifically allowing a state official to bring the public nuisance
action, the statute eliminated all chances for public nuisances suits in the
air pcllution field, for in Colorado, only a state may abate public
nuisances. Christianson v. Cecil, 109 Colo. 510, 127 P.2d 325 (1942).
There was, fortunately, a proposed bill before the 1972 Colorado legislature which gave district attorneys the power to enjoin "public nuisances" where public nuisance is defined as any "unlawful pollution of
land, water, or air." Unfortunately, district attorneys conceded that
this provision would probably be interpreted to mean that variances
granted to particular industries would be a defense to district attorney
action. Denver Post, Mar. 5, 1972, at 45, col. 4.
See Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38
U. CIN. L. REv. 587 (1969).
MICHi. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528 (201)- (207) (1970).
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add to the confusion primarily because their intended functions
are nowhere apparent on the face of the statute. Without the
benefit of experience within the process, a polluter is faced with
a myriad of governmental bodies and no clear avenue of
approach.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty apparent on the face of the
1970 Act is delay. Legislatively sanctioned delay is one of
the prime reasons why air pollution has not been abated and
has actually increased since the statute was enacted in 1970.
To underscore this point, and to clarify the confusing provisions of the statute which become operative whenever the
Division discovers a polluter, a hypothetical chain of events
may be useful. The procedure which shall be traced is that
which would be employed as a result of a particular company's
43
polluting the air in alleged violation of emission standards.
The hypothetical should expose three important aspects of the
1970 Act: the number of governmental, administrative, and
judicial bodies involved in enforcement; the complex procedure that must be followed before the Act's ultimate injunctive sanctions come into play; and why air pollution is a
problem to which Colorado's present Air Pollution Control
Act is an inadequate response.
With these objects in mind, let us assume that in July,
1970 Citizen C becomes annoyed by excessive smoke emanating
directly from Polluter P's smokestacks. Approximately 3
months later, C complains in writing to the State Air Pollution
Control Division. 44 Because the Act states that the Division
shall then cause a "prompt" investigation to be made, the
Division personnel make a personal inspection of the area
within a month. After recording their observations and studying the pollution at various times over a period of approximately 2 months, the Division concludes that P is in violation
of the Act and notifies both the violator and the Air Pollution
Control Commission in writing. Thereafter, the Division "diligently endeavor[s] to obtain voluntary abatement" 45 of the
alleged violation by working and consulting with P. Because P
does not have the economic resources to pay for antipollution
devices, because no apparatus has been designed which can
43 This hypothetical

is a compilation of approximately 30 actual cases
which have been involved with the Variance Board.
44 This assumes that the citizen knows where the complaint is filed. The
Act recognizes complaints only when filed with the Division. COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-13 (2) (Supp. 1971).
45

Id.

1972

FAILURE OF STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

533

curb its kind of pollution, or because it does not feel it is in
violation of the Act, there is no abatement. The Division is
now forced to issue a cease and desist order against P within
6 months of the initial notification of violation. Thus, 1 year
after C was originally annoyed by P's pollution, a cease and
desist order has finally been issued. This, unfortunately, is
only the beginning.
P now has two choices before it: it can either "cease and
desist from such violation" within 6 additional months," or it
can file a written request with the Air Polluton Control Commission appealing for a hearing to determine whether it is
entitled to a variance. P has 10 days after receipt of the cease
and desist order to file with the Commission.4 7 Once P has so
filed, the cease and desist order is stayed pending a final
determination.
In the event that P chooses to contest the alleged violation
of the Act, it so notifies the Commission which in turn refers
the question to the Variance Board. Within 15 days after the
hearing has been requested, the Variance Board grants the
request and sets a time and place for a meeting.4" Unfortunately, at this stage of the proceedings, the Act does not set
any time limit within which the Variance Board must meet with
the petitioning party. However, the normal practice is to set
a date not more than 6 months after the hearing has been
requested.
Let us assume, then, that P finally comes before the Variance Board 6 months after it originally filed its request for
a hearing and that the Board finds P in violation. P still has
30 days in which to ask the Commission to review the Variance
Board's findings, 4 and, after a decision by the Commission, P
may still appeal the issue to the state courts.50
Let us assume instead that P accepts that fact it is in
violation. The cease and desist order is stayed another 30 days
within which P may file a written request for a variance with
Invariably, the Commission refers this rethe Commission.'
quest to the Variance Board and the Board again has 15 days
to set a time and a place for the variance hearing.52 As with
46

Id. § 66-31-13 (3).

4

Id.§ 66-31-13 (4).

Id. § 66-31-16 (1).
(9).
0 Id. § 66-31-17 (1).
51 Id. § 66-31-13 (4).
52 Id. § 66-31-16.
48

49Id. § 66-31-16
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the request for a hearing on the question of whether a violation exists, the Act places no time limits on when the Board
must schedule a meeting with the petitioning party. However,
it is customary for a requesting party to receive a hearing before the Variance Board within 6 months of its initial request.
Thus, over 2 years after C was first bothered by P's pollution,
the offending party is finally before the Variance Board on
the merits of whether it should receive a variance.
At the initial hearing before the Variance Board, either the
entire issue can be resolved, or, as more frequently happens,
the Variance Board may postpone its decision while P gathers
more information to present to the Board. In perhaps another
3 months, the Variance Board schedules another meeting with
P, which by that time has gathered enough information to
convince the Board that it should be given a 1-year variance.
During this 1-year respite from the law, let us assume that P
suffers financial difficulties and is not able to purchase the
required abatement equipment. When P meets with the Variance Board again after 1 year, its accomplishments in abating
its pollution are negligible. Subjected to increasing pressure
from the public, the Variance Board denies P's request for
an extension of its original variance. Nearly 31/2 years after
C was bothered by P's pollution, P has at last exhausted the
1970 Act's administrative delaying devices.
However, P is not yet finished. It still has 20 days from
the date of the Variance Board's final order to file for judicial
review in the district court for the district in which its air
contamination source is located1 3 After a filing for judicial
review, the original cease and desist order is again stayed.
The length of time which transpires before a petitioning party's
complaint is heard by a court varies from case to case, but very
conceivably 1 year may pass between the time of the variance
denial and the first court hearing. Furthermore, after the trial
of the case has finally ended, a court decision is usually not
forthcoming for another 2 months, and should the polluter
appeal the trial court decision to the court of appeals or
supreme court, up to 2 more years can pass without a final
54
resolution.
.V53
Id. § 66-31-17 (3).

,4 The case of Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams
County Dist. Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.
v. Colorado Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971);
argued June 20, 1972 was in Colorado courts for over 2 years.
The Fry Roofing case has been the only air pollution case to reach
the state supreme court. The court upheld the constitutionality of the
1970 Air Pollution Control Act and further held that it was "harmless
error" for a Variance Board member to introduce independently acquired evidence regarding a polluter's activities in a neighboring state.
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Under the 1970 Act, then, it is conceivable that 6 to 7
years can pass from the time of C's initial observation of and
discomfort from P's air pollution to a final court determination
on the matter. 55 Thus, it is not surprising that little improvement has been observed in the abatement of air pollution from
Colorado's stationary sources. The state's only affirmative
action to date, the enactment of the 1970 Air Pollution Control
Act, appears doomed to ineffectiveness because of its blatant
omissions and the dilatory practices it permits.
B. Defects in the Statute's Sections
If one confronts the statute's sections individually it becomes obvious that it has been inartfully drafted. There are
several instances where lack of clarity is responsible for delaying the final disposition of the polluter's case and for adding to
the confusion already engendered by the functional vagueness
of the various agencies provided for within the statute.
1. Enforcement
Section 13 is important because it elaborates the procedure
a polluter must follow once the Division has notified it of a
violation of the Commission's air pollution standards. After
the Division has issued a cease and desist order, section 13
allows the polluter to petition the Board for a variance. Most
polluters will do so as the mere request for a variance from
the Board automatically "stays" the operation of the cease and
desist order .5 Moreover, the lengthy hearing before the Variance Board, the variance which will likely be granted, the
petition for a re-hearing at the expiration of the variance, and
the appeal from a Board decision continue to stay the order.
Section 13's "staying" procedure is thus one of the most significant aspects of the 1970 Act. It creates a tremendous incentive for polluting parties to involve themselves with variance procedures as long as it is feasible. As a consequence, the
shutting down of polluting operations is postponed and the
abatement of air pollution is indefinitely delayed.
Another problem with section 13 is that it does not address
the question of what the Board should do when no cease and
desist order has been issued and the party voluntarily comes
before the Variance Board to present a proposed plan to the

55 The Public Service Company has been polluting the air while under a
variance for 6 years, and it has not yet brought an action in court.
56 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-13 (4) (Supp. 1971).
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Board for approval. 57 This omission has created confusion because section 13 allows for a variance request only after the
cease and desist order has been issued. Without a cease and
desist order, the petitioning party thus comes either within the
purview of section 12, which authorizes the Division to grant
permission to construct and install antipollution devices, 58 or
section 15, which authorizes the Variance Board to modify the
"enforcement" of any emission control regulation. 59
Further difficulties are encountered under section 13 because of its underlying assumption that the recipient of the
cease and desist order will clearly indicate to the Board whether
he elects to have the Board sit as a fact-finder and decide if a
violation exists or whether he wishes the fact of the violation
to be assumed. Unfortunately, the lack of familiarity with
section 13 on the part of petitioning parties often results in an
ambiguous choice by the party, confusing the Board as to
whether it should address itself to the issue of granting a
variance or whether it should determine if the party before
it is in violation of the Act."" A party before the Board may
not know what to do with respect to the question of the existence of a violation because he is generally unprepared before
the Board or because he does not recognize that the existence
of a violation can be at issue. Yet, it is important that the party
be notified of the consequences of admitting that he is in violation of state emission standards in order to avoid self-incrimina.57 This

has happened several times in the Variance Board's history and was
not clarified by the 1970 Act. It occurred because of the Department of
Health's urgings (Colorado State Hospital, Nov. 9, 1967); because the
polluter wants the Board to review a proposed system which is designed
to bring the company in compliance with the law (Colorado Springs
Martin-Drake Power Plant, Aug. 6, 1970); because the party is under
a local variance and it will be given a cease and desist order as soon
as it expires (Allied Chemical, Aug. 6, 1970); or because the Division
has not had a chance to issue the order yet (Thompson Pipe and Steel,
June 18, 1970).
The method of footnoting cases before the Board shall be as follows:
The proper name used is that of the polluter who is before the Board
at a hearing, decisionmaking meeting, or an informal discussion of the
case by the Board. If the Board or the Commission is noted, it refers to a
Board or Commission meeting. The dates which follow are the dates
when the Board met for the hearing or to decide the case. Dates may
also refer to letters sent or received by the Board or Division and will
be identified as such. The numbers which may follow the date refer to
the page numbers for the particular transcript record where the cited
material can be found. If no page numbers follow the date, it is either
because the hearing was attended by the author or the Board meeting
was to decide a variance request, in which case no official transcript was
recorded. The transcripts, decisionmaking deliberations, and lettersmemoranda relevant to the cited cases may be found under the name of
the party and appropriate date in the Variance Board files at the Air
Pollution Control Division, State Department of Health.
58
1971).
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-12 (4) (Supp.
5 Id. § 66-31-15 (1) (a).
60Banner Wrecking Co., July 6, 1966 at 35-36. In such cases the Board
often refers to the legal counsel provided by the Office of the Attorney
General.
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tion problems. Once he admits being in violation, he is later
estopped from raising this issue on appeal6i
It might be useful to consider abolishing the Board's function as a fact-finder on the violation issue altogether. This is
because petitioning parties may feel, however inaccurately, that
by contesting the violation they are risking the possibility of
harsher treatment from the Board on the eventual variance
determination.
2.

The Variance Board

Section 14 of the 1970 Act defines the Board's composition
as follows: (a) one member designated by the State Board
of Health; (b) one registered professional engineer not from
industry; (c) one physician or toxicologist not from industry;
(d) three members from industry; and (e) three members
from the public at large. This statutory composition was obviously designated to make the Board a representative body
of all the interests which might possibly appear before it. The
state is represented by three citizens from the public at large,
and business is represented by three members from industry.
One difficulty with the Board's composition is that the
various interests represented by its members might constitute
something other than a fair and impartial tribunal. The United
States Supreme Court has declared that an administrative
agency exercising quasi-judicial powers, such as the Board,
must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality.62 Although this requirement of impartiality has not
been taken to mean that the agency must be indifferent to
results, it nevertheless raises questions as to the statutorily defined "interests" Board members apparently represent.
Another difficulty with the Board's present composition
is that the Act does not provide for enough Board members
with needed expertise. The most obvious example of this shortcoming is that the statute requires that only one engineer be
on the Board. Considering the fact that the crucial point of
almost every hearing is the feasibility of a proposed abatement plan, one statutorily required engineer is not sufficient to
adequately judge the often elaborate antipollution schemes
61 See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951). The Floyd Acceptances,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868); Stockstom v. C.I.R., 190 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.
1951). See also City & County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289,
310 P.2d 296 (1957); K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
17.03, 17.06 (1958).
62 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Escoe v. Zubst,
295 U.S. 490 (1935).
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of petitioning parties. Adequate evaluation necessitates a number of engineers from industry and the public-at-large to serve
as checks on the petitioning party's technological testimony.
An additional kind of expertise which is currently altogether
absent from the Board is legal training and experience. Although the Commission and the State Board of Health have
attorneys as members, the Variance Board does not. The inclusion of lawyers in its membership would enable the Board
to make more independent judgment on questions of law which
are presently beyond its understanding, and would place it
on a more equal footing with the polluting party, who is almost
always represented by legal counsel.
Another interesting and important problem is presented
by the section 14 quorum requirements. Section 14 provides that
five members of the nine-man Variance Board constitute
a quorum; but at the same time, and against the recommendations of various governmental bodies, it requires the concurrence of at least a majority of all members for a final determination. 3 This latter requirement has been interpreted to mean
that if a bare five-man quorum shows up at any meeting, a
unanimous vote of those present is required to render a binding
decision. Failing unanimity, the hearing must be rescheduled
in the hopes that more members will appear at the next meeting. At any such subsequent meeting the entire proceeding must
be repeated since members who were absent at the original
hearing would otherwise be ineligible to vote. An obvious solution to these difficulties would be to allow a majority of the
quorum to make a conclusive determination for the entire
Board. This solution, however, was rejected by the legislature.
There are, however, two extra-legislative solutions to the
problem presented by the section 14 quorum requirements. The
Board could provide that, although a member may not have
been present at a previous hearing, all he must do to qualify
to vote on the matter discussed at the prior meeting is review
the transcript. This would result in speeding up the decisionmaking process by reducing the number of hearings. Such an
approach is probably legally justifiable. The leading Supreme
64
Court case in this area, Morgan v. United States, has required
merely that in order for an administrative decision to be valid
61 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-14 (5) (d) (Supp. 1971).
See also WIBC v. FCC, 259 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.
64 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
1958); Joyce v. Brockman, 257 App. Div. 795, 15 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1939).
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the "one who considers the facts which underlie the order must
have considered evidence or argument." 65 Thus, the Board need
open the hearing for "evidence only" whenver a quorum of
five is not present. The Board might also have the petitioner
acquiesce on the record to this procedure. When the party
before the Board has agreed beforehand to this procedure, he
can be said to waive his right to subsequently object to the
votes of absent members of the Board.
Another possible solution to quorum attendance problems
may be found in the 1970 Act's alternate provisions. The governor is required to appoint alternates to the Board who could
theoretically act as official Board members when the members
for whom they are alternates fail to appear. 6 However, though
reasonable on its face, this solution could lead to other problems. It could conceivably result in the existence of two separate
Boards-the regular Variance Board and the Board of alternates.
Assuming an issue was not decided on the day that the alternate attended, the provision might require the alternate to
attend all subsequent Board meetings on that subject so that
he would still be eligible to vote. A court might also decide
that because an alternative system had been provided by
statute, a system allowing Board members to render a decision
on the basis of the record alone would be invalid. A court
might further hold that the Board is under an obligation to
call in alternates in the event of foreknown absences of some
Board members in order to always operate at full nine-man
strength. An additional problem is that section 14 does not
state whether alternates must fall within the same statutory
category as the regular members of the Board whom they replace. Thus, all the alternates could be from industry or from
the public at large.
3.

Variances

Section 15 articulates the grounds upon which the Board
is able to grant a variance. The Act provides that the Board
"may" grant a variance when (a) control techniques are not
available, (b) compliance with emission control regulations
would create an unreasonable economic burden, and (c) the
granting of the variance would be consistent with the legislative policy of the Act. 67 If a petitioning party can prove any
65298 U.S. 468, 470 (1936).

The Colorado Supreme Court followed the

Morgan rationale in Big Top, Inc. v. Hoffman, 156 Colo. 362, 399 P.2d

249 (1965).
66

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.

67 Id. § 66-31-15 (1).

§ 66-31-14 (3)

(Supp. 1971).
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of these three conditions, then the Board has the right, but not
the obligation, to grant a variance. It should be obvious that
it is not difficult to fall within these categories. Absolutely
effective control techniques are rarely available; the legislative
policy of the Act is vague enough so that it is not an impediment to the granting of a variance; 8 and antipollution devices are expensive enough to fall within the "unreasonable
economic burden" category. 9
Section 15 also provides that the Board "shall" grant a
variance when it determines that there would otherwise be
"an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or . . .the
practical closing of any lawful business or activity and such
7' 0
would be without sufficient corresponding public benefit.
This language contains an apparent contradiction of terms. If
a party is violating the Act, it is not really a "lawful" business.
Thus, since the petitioning party is not "lawful" within section
15, the Board may arguably deny a variance regardless of the
possibility of a "closing."
4. Hearings
Section 16 sets down the broad rules of procedure within
which the Board must operate. Unfortunately, section 16 has
many shortcomings, often making it difficult for the Board to
act effectively. Subsection (1), for example, provides that
within 15 days after a hearing has been requested, the Variance
Board shall grant such a request and set a time and place for
the meeting. As previously mentioned, the section does not
set a time limit within which the Board must schedule a meeting with the requesting party and thereby creates the possibility of a cease and desist order being stayed indefinitely.
Subsection (1) also fails to explain what kind of "notice" should
be given the petitioning party once a date has been fixed. In
the past, this omission has resulted in a failure to properly notify
parties as to what to expect before the Variance Board. 71 The
consequence of this lack of notice is that the party is often
unprepared and that the hearing must be rescheduled for a
later date.
Id. § 66-31-2. The 1970 Act did eliminate the language of the 1966 Act
providing that the policy of Colorado is to further "the industrial
development of the state," and thus at least this aspect of legislative
policy is no longer available to the polluter.
69 The "economic burden" condition of § 15 was condemned by environmentalists as weakening the Act by making variances too easy to
obtain. Denver Post, Mar. 15, 1970, at 18, col. 1.
68

70
71

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

66-31-15 (2)

(Sum. 1971).

Banner Wrecking Co., July 6, 1966, at 10; Rio Grande County Bd. of
County Comm'rs, Feb. 17, 1972.
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Subsection (4) insures that information relating to secret
processes, methods of manufacture or production need not be
publicly disclosed at the hearing.7 2 The main difficulty with
subsection (4) is that it does not clearly indicate the kinds of
information about which the Board may legally inquire. This
failure has caused confusion in the past when the Board has
asked for financial and business data from the petitioning party
and the latter has objected not on grounds of confidentiality,
but on grounds of irrelevancy. 73 It seems that subsection (4)
must be clarified so that the Board can know the proper scope
of its inquiry. However, the best solution would be to allow
the Board to freely question the petitioning party about all
aspects of that party's operations which may be relevant to
pollution control.
It is subsection (5) which is in greatest need of clarification. This section purports to define when a person may become a "party" to the Variance Board hearing. By statute, only
the petitioning party and the Division are original parties to
the hearing. Subsection (5) was included in the Act in order
to give members of the public the right to be heard, to present
and cross-examine witnesses, and to seek judicial review of
Variance Board decisions.74 The difficulty with subsection (5)
is that the conditions for becoming a party to the hearing, as
articulated in the Act, are far too ambiguous:
Any person who is affected by the proceeding and whose interests are not already adequately represented, shall have the
opportunity to be a party thereto upon prior application to and
approval by the Variance Board or Commission, in its sole
discretion, as deemed reasonable and proper by said Variance
75
Board.

On its face, the language of the subsection does not specify
(a) what is required for a person to be "affected by the proceeding;" (b) when that person's interests are "already adequately represented;" (c) whether "interests" refers to a private
individual interest or the interest of the public-at-large; (d) how
72

§ 66-31-16 (4) (Supp. 1971).
Rock Wool. May 8, 1967, at 48.
7vThough subsection (5) does not include the right to judicial review,
§ 17(2) allows "any party" to move a court to "remand" the case
once it has been the subject of judiical review. Section 17(1) makes
all Variance Board decisions subject to judicial review but omits to
state who shall have the right to so appeal. Arguably, since subsection
(2) speaks in terms of "party" insofar as remanding a case which has
been appealed to the courts, this same party must have had the right
to ask for judicial review under subsection (1) of § 17. Furthermore,
'"party" presumably refers to those persons having been made a party
to the hearing.
75COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-16 (5)
(Supp. 1971).
73

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
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soon "prior to" the hearing the application must be submitted;
(e) when the Board "shall" grant a person "party" status if
he fulfills the statutory conditions; and (f) whether the Board
may still deny the application for "party" status to a person
meeting the three conditions "in its sole discretion." Nor does
subsection (5) address itself to these issues: (a) If a new party
is admitted, should the Board begin the hearing again so that
the new party has an opportunity to cross-examine all the
witnesses who have testified before the Board previously?
(b) Should the voting on admission be in open session so
that all interested parties have the right to object? (c) Does
"sole discretion" as used in subsection (5) mean that the Board
can in its sole discretion decide whether a person's interests
are already adequately represented or does it mean that the
Board can in its sole discretion decide whether to admit a
party? (d) If a party is admitted, can it then broaden the
issues concerning the case before the Board?
The poor draftsmanship in subsection (5) raises many
sensitive questions. First, one of the effects of allowing an outside interest to be a party to the variance hearing is that, as
a party, he may ask for a continuance of the hearing. Such
action would have the effect of further delaying final resolution of the case-a result the new party would presumably not
desire. Second, when a member of the public applies for "party"
status, the Board is faced with making a decision as to whether
the party's interests are "already adequately represented." In
making this decision, the Board must realize that there are
two potential and widely divergent "interests" at stake in any
hearing. On the one hand, there are the special interests of
the particular group of individuals petitioning for party status.
On the other, there are the broader and more general interests
of the public-at-large. These two interests may be incompatible
at times, and therefore, it is necessary for the Board to decide
whether the persons petitioning to be made "parties" are claiming that their private or that the public's general interest is
not adequately represented at the hearing. For if the interest
is really "public," then the Board is faced with the statutory
presumption that the public's interest is adequately represented
by the Department of Health's Air Pollution Control Division
and its legal counsel. Thus, if the interest affected is that of
the general public, and if the Board admits the new party, it
will be implicity deciding that the Division is not adequately
representing the public's interest. The Board understandably
wants to avoid making this kind of resolution.
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It should be clear from the above that subsection (5) is in
serious need of revision. Although the Board has attempted on
occasion to solve the question of the subsection's confusing
language through it own set of rules, 6 and although a recent
Colorado Supreme Court case has upheld the Board's power to
allow interested persons to become parties, 7 a clearly articulated expression of legislative intent should be forthcoming.
Otherwise, the Board may spend too much of its precious time
dealing with questions that it has no legal authority to answer.
5.

Judicial Review

Section 17 provides for judicial review of "any final order
or determination by the Variance Board, the Division, or the
Commission. 7 8s The problem with section 17 is that it does not
state who is able to file for judicial review. Obviously, the party
who had applied for the variance can file, and, according to
section 16 (2), the Division is given the right to obtain judicial
review. But does a person who has been admitted as a party
to the hearing also have that right? The Act is strangely silent
on this point. Arguably, since subsection (2) of section 17 allows
"any party" to move the court to remand cases back to the
Variance Board, it might follow that "any party" also has the
right to appeal a Variance Board decision to the courts. Since
the Act fails to define "party," it presumably includes any party
to the variance hearing. 7 Section 17 explicitly provides that a
party petitioning for a variance may only appeal Variance
Board decisions which are "final." This precludes the possibility of delaying the proceedings by appealing minor Variance
Board rulings before an actual decision is rendered.8 0
As a final observation, section 17 does not require a party
to exhaust his administrative review remedies (an appeal to
the Commission) before he files for judicial review, although
the judiciary could easily require compliance with this procedure as a condition precedent to court review.8 '
76 At the Fry Bros. Roofing hearing, July 16, 1970, the Board conditioned

party status on whether it was represented by legal counsel, the nature
and extent of the perceived harm, and the information which the party
might offer to the Board.
77
Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist.
Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado
Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971), argued
June 20, 1972.
78
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-17 (1) (Supp. 1971).
79 This. in fact, has been the interpretation given § 17 by the Variance
Board in dealing with the rights of persons petitioning to be made a
party before the Board even though "party" could be construed to
mean "party to the court litigation."
80 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 153 (1965).
S Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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6. Injunctions
Section 18 is potentially the most important section of the
1970 Act. It allows a court to enjoin the operation of any polluting source which is in violation of a Commission standard.
The difficulty with this procedure is that the Board does not
itself have the power to enforce its decisions or orders. If the
Board denies a variance request or renders a present variance
null and void for failure of the polluter to satisfy a condition
to the variance, it does not follow that an injunctive proceeding
will begin. Instead, the cease and desist order must become
operative, the polluter must fail to comply with the order, the
Commission must request the district attorney to bring the
injunctive suit, and the district attorney must find the requisite
time to bring the action before any court order can be issued
against the polluter. The effectiveness of section 18 is therefore contingent upon the Commission's willingness to request
that the local district attorney prosecute the violators. The
legislature diluted the effectiveness of the Act by failing to
provide that the prosecution of air pollution violators under
section 18 be mandatory.
7. Local Government-Authority-Penalty
The last provision in the Act which contains areas of uncertainty is section 25, which attempts to define the relationship
between cities, towns, and counties on the one hand and the state
on the other. Its language, unfortunately, leaves this important
relationship unclarifed. Subsection (1) commands that no
variance permit issued under local air pollution law shall be
construed to relieve the holder from his duty to comply with
any emission control regulations adopted pursuant to the Act,
nor will it relieve the Division from its duty to enforce such
regulations.12 This wording of subsection (1) indicates that the
Act is meant to override all local air pollution laws or policies,
including local variance board decisions, which are inconsistent
with those promulgated under the Act. Subsection (3), however, makes it clear that "application, operation, and enforcement of valid local air pollution laws shall be completely independent of, but may be concurrent with, the application, operation, and enforcement of this article. '8 3 Therefore, the Act
seems to vest authority in two independent government bodies,
thereby permitting the party applying for a state variance to
be caught in between, and perhaps subject to two inconsistent
decisions.
82
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-25 (1) (Supp. 1971).
83Id. § 66-31-25 (3).
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The best resolution of this uncertainty is to rely on the
Act's investiture of ultimate authority in the state board. 4 This
permits the Board to grant and deny state variances without
being bound by any local variance or decision passed with respect to the polluter, thereby furthering the policy of the Act.
However, given the language of subsection (4) of section 25,
it is not altogether certain that this was the intention of the
legislature. What the legislature probably meant to do was
allow enforcement of either the state or local rule, depending
upon which was more rigorous and restrictive. What is needed
is a legislative clarification of this ambiguity, or, if this is not
forthcoming, a comprehensible opinion letter from the Attorney General. 85
8.

Summary

It should be obvious that the defects of the 1970 Act are
numerous. The legislature failed to define functions and procedures. Part of the failure stems from draftsmanship. Part is
a result of the hurried enactment of the Act because of the
pressing need to have updated air pollution legislation. However, the statute's shortcomings are also due to the legislature's
unwarranted assumption that, if given enough discretion, those
charged with enforcing the statute will be able to effect a
compromise which abates air pollution and satisfies the various
needs of the interested parties. The validity of this assumption
will be the subject next examined.
V. TBE Am POLLUTION PROBLEM IN PRACTICE
By 1970, Colorado had reached a stage where the polluter,
the affected citizen, and the legislature had experienced a sequence of realizations and reactions which resulted in the enactment and re-enactment of a faulty air pollution control statute.
First, there was the fact of air pollution: its nature, increasing
gravity, and subtle ironies. Second, there was a growing awareness of the problem's existence, an identification of its causes,
and a nagging need to make a decision about how to correct
these causes. When it was determined that the market could
not function by itself to bring about an abatement of air
pollution, attention was logically focused on the law as a way
84 Thompson Pipe & Steel, June 18, 1970. This has been at the advice of
legal counsel to the Board.
85 In 1966 the Colorado Attorney General attempted to clarify the jurisdiction of local and state air pollution agencies, but the opinion was too

ambiguous for the Variance Board or its legal staff to understand.
Opinion letter from Attorney General Duke Dunbar to Alan Sternberg,
Littleton, Colorado, City Attorney, Aug. 27, 1968. As late as summer
1970, the Variance Board and the Division were asking the Attorney
General to clarify his original opinion letter.
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of implementing some kind of government action which could
solve the pollution problem. Within the law, it was decided
that a formal legislatively initiated response to the problem
was more appropriate than an "informal" citizen-initiated court
remedy. The eventual product was the Air Pollution Control
Act of 1966 which was updated in 1970. As we have seen, the
mere fact of its existence was significant. It provided for the
temporary appeasement of the Colorado public's discomfort over
air pollution effects; it placed the polluter on notice that governmental mechanisms were about to interfere with his private
decisionmaking; and it established the Colorado legislature as
a body which could and would respond to the fact of environmental problems. But, as discussed in Section IV, the language
of the statute is indicative of legislative non-concern over important aspects of the form and function of the legal institutions responsible for cleaning up the state's air. It also reveals
a seeming disregard for one of the prime causes of air pollution-transportation sources-as well as a tendency to sanction
a myriad of delaying tactics.
We will now examine how the various bodies operating
pursuant to this statute have fared. Inherent difficulties in
the legislative framework aside, the legal institutions involved
in pollution control have failed to respond to the pollution
crisis in imaginative ways which could have furthered the
statute's policy or at least maintained its viability. In addition, several practical problems have arisen to frustrate both
the efforts of the institutions to enforce the Act and the ability
of the polluter to achieve compliance.
A.

The Failure of Legal Institutions
1. The Variance Board
a.

Lack of Standards

The fundamental failing of the Variance Board is its passivity. It appears to consider itself a mere granter of variances
rather than an active and powerful arm of pollution control.
This self-image is especially unfortunate since the Board is the
only state agency with the power to exercise detailed control
over the abatement efforts of every polluter discovered by the
Division. The source of this power is the Board's ability to terminate the variance, which in turn reactivates the cease and
desist order. The price of a stay of the cease and desist order
should be high. If the Board developed comprehensive and
intelligible standards against which to measure variance peti-
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tions, then every polluter would be forewarned that he must
devise a plan in compliance therewith or be denied a variance.
Being forewarned, a polluter who is capable of effective abatement would be quite unlikely to risk the immediate enforcement of the cease and desist order which would follow an
emptyhanded appearance before the Board.
Unfortunately, no such standards have been formulated. The
Board has functioned as a receptacle for petitions which are
judged without reference to any discernible long-range policy.
Its only attempt to supply a standard took the form of six
"conditions . . . among those to be considered in granting a
variance."86; These guidelines are so general and uninformative
as to the internal workings of the Board that they are of
negligible practical value.
There are several adverse effects which result from the
failure of the Board to articulate standards. Most importantly,
because the Board does not offer clear grounds for its decisions,
courts and reviewing agencies do not have a substantive foundation upon which to attack the Board's reasoning. This, of course,
is desirable from the Board's point of view. If there are no
rules or precedents to be followed, no Board decision can be
successfully attacked on the basis of bias, inconsistency, or
unequal application of the air pollution control law. When no
comparisons are possible, the Board can operate in a relative
vacuum, free from accusations by polluter and public alike.
However, the Boards failure to establish standards is subject
to legal attack. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that "the orderly functioning of the process of review requires
that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted
be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."87 Otherwise,
there is little basis for effective judicial review.88 As the Supreme Court stated in Secretary of Agriculture v. United
States,'! an administrative decision will be remanded when the
86These were:

(1) potential danger of emissions, (2) respondent's (the
polluter's) good faith, (3) specific proposal for abatement, (4) past
performance, (5) contribution to the community, and (6) availability of
technology. Operational Guidelines of the Air Pollution Variance Board,
approved by the Air Pollution Control Commission, Aug. 27, 1970.
The Board rarely recognizes the distinction between the statutory
grounds for granting or denying variances found in § 15 of the Act.
Subsection (1) provides that the Board "may" grant variances in certain factual contexts but subsection (2) requires that the Board "shall"
grant variances if it determines that another set of conditions are
present. The most the Board will articulate is that it has found no
"corresponding public benefit" which would result from a denial of a
variance. But how the Board defines "public benefit" is unknown.
87 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
88Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). See also Geer v.
Stathopalos, 135 Colo. 1, 309 P.2d 606 (1957).
89 347 U.S. 645 (1954).
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administrative body has not "explained its decision with the
simplicity and clearness through which a halting impression
ripens into reasonable certitude."90
One adverse effect of the Board's proclivity to make its
decisions independent of external standards is that Board decisions are unpredictable. This makes it virtually impossible
for the party before the Board to be prepared to state an
effective case. Moreover, it has resulted in the Board rendering
inconsistent opinions with respect to polluters who are in
essentially the same economic position, as well as being charged
with identical violations of the Act."1 Another immediate result of this confusion is delay. The polluter often does not know
what is expected of him at a hearing and consequently does
not bring the appropriate information. The hearing must be
postponed while the polluter performs a task which should
have been completed well before his initial appearance.
The Board is no more aggressive once the hearing gets
under way. The individual Board members, who are in essence
volunteers, rarely have sufficient knowledge of the particular
case or of the technological and economic problems involved
to ask probing questions or make a thoroughly informed judgment as to the feasibility of the proposed abatement program.
Their decision is frequently based on the unchallenged presentation of the petitioner who has an obvious interest in
painting an unrealistically favorable picture.
b. The Unjustified Fear of Taking
Perhaps even more significantly, the Board has timidly
responded to polluters because of its two-fold fear of losing
jurisdiction over the polluter through denial of a variance and
of having its decision reversed on appeal as a "taking" of private
property. 2 This fear stems from an irrational misunderstanding
of law and the legal process. The Board's loss of jurisdiction
through denial of a variance can only have a positive result if
the continuance of variances results in the polluter being able
to continue to pollute ad infinitum without concerning itself
with the cease and desist order. Moreover, should the Board lose
jurisdiction to the courts, the judiciary is far more likely than
the Board to terminate the pollution by issuing an injunction.
Furthermore, court decisions can supply needed legal precedents
90 Id. at 654.

91 Compare the cases of Luria Bros., May 7, 1970, Ideal Cement, July 2,
1970, and Fry Bros. Roofing, July 19, 1970.
92 Section 15 (2) specifically requires the Board to grant the variance
whenever there would otherwise be "an arbitrary and unreasonable
taking of property or practical closing of any lawful business or activity." (emphasis added).
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which might reduce some of the confusion surrounding the law
of air pollution control.
If the fear of losing control over a party's particular pollution-causing activity is not a valid reason for the granting of
a variance, neither should be the fear that a denial might be
viewed by a reviewing court as a legal taking of property.
There are several sound legal reasons for concluding that the
Board is far too intimidated by the "taking" prohibition. Significantly, the Act provides the Board with a means of circumventing the restriction against "takings" by enabling the Board
to make the preliminary determination of whether a "public
benefit" will, in any case, outweigh the closing of the business.9 3 This broad grant of discretion gives the Board the right
to deny variances, knowing that the denial may well result in
a "closing," as long as it believes that there will be a corresponding public benefit resulting from the cessation of the
polluting activity.
In addition to this statutory escape clause, there are three
other legal doctrines which support a construction of the statute
permitting variance denials even when there is a closing of a
polluter's business. First, it is settled that the government can
control uses of land under its "police powers" without there
being a fifth amendment "taking." 94 For example, in Hadacheck
v. Sebastian95 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead"G the United
States Supreme Court upheld on the basis of the police power
two city ordinances which flatly prohibited activities which
the plaintiffs had lawfully conducted prior to the adoption of
the ordinances. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
these prohibitions represented "takings without compensation"
and ex post facto legislation. State courts have taken a similar
stance97 even where the practical value of the land is completely destroyed." This line of cases stands squarely in support
of the Board's statutory authority to close down polluting businesses if the circumstances require. All that the Board need do
is determine that a "corresponding public benefit" will be
gained from the reduction in pollution.
§ 66-31-15 (2) (Supp. 1971).
94Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska. 164 U.S. 403 (1876) makes the 5th
amendment's "taking" clause applicable to the states.
95 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
116369 U.S. 590 (1962).
97E.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
98 Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206
N.E.2d 666 (1965).
9- COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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Zoning laws and cases provide a second body of authority
which supports the conclusion that the Board can avoid the
Act's requirement that variances be granted whenever there
would be a practical closing or taking resulting from a variance
denial. When zoning ordinances are initially adopted to limit
permissible uses of property, or, in a situation more comparable
to air pollution laws, when property is rezoned so as to prevent
uses of property previously allowed, some protection is provided the owners of property then using their premises in a
forbidden manner. This protection takes the form of a grant of
an exception to the general zoning plan for prior nonconforming uses. Similarly, polluting operations are "protected" under
the 1970 Air Pollution Control Act only because they existed
prior to its enactment and only because the Variance Board
has decided to carve out an exception to the Act in certain
instances. Section 15(2)'s prohibition against variance denials
which result in practical closings of "lawful business(es)" is
thus not really an unsurmountable restriction, for these businesses are "lawful" in a very tenuous sense. They are lawful
only because their polluting operations preceded the enactment
of air pollution control laws, and should the Board, Commission,
or state legislature decide to remove the protection, they would
no longer be lawful within the meaning of the statute. The
courts have made it clear in zoning cases that "where the benefit to the public has been deemed of greater moment than
the detriment to the property owner, we have sustained the
prohibition of continuation of prior nonconforming uses. 1'
Likewise, the Variance Board seems legally capable of terminating a polluting business' lawful status whenever it feels
that the public interest would thereby be benefited.
Reference to nuisance theory provides a third ground upon
which to base the denial of a variance. A "public nuisance"
exists whenever there is an invasion of the public interest due
to activities which endanger or interfere with the health, safety,
property, or comfort of a considerable number of people. By
utilizing the concept of public nuisance as a tool for land use
control, local and state governments have been able to restrict
or entirely eliminate those activities which substantially interfere with the interests of other landowners. " ) The 1970 Act is
99 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42, 176 N.Y.
S.2d 598 (1958).
"00 See Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106,
169 P.2d 171 (1946),
where the court held that the State of Colorado and County of Arapahoe had pre-empted the field of public nuisance as it related to the
case. See also note 40 supra.
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arguably nothing more than an exercise of the state's legislative
power to control public nuisances. If this be so, the Board may
safely restrict or cause the termination of air pollution activities which interfere with common public rights without concerning itself with the possibility of there being a "taking." 10 1
c. Other Board Defects
This is not to say that the Board should never grant a variance. If the polluter can demonstrate that the variance will
be put to its intended use-a grace period during which he can
achieve compliance-then it is clearly in the best interest of
the public to preserve a going business. However, the granting
of a variance should not mean the cessation of Board involvement until the variance has expired. The Board is empowered
to impose conditions on a variance and to order revocation
if any of those conditions are not fulfilled. 10 2 Almost every
variance is granted on the conditions that the polluter take
measures leading to abatement and that he submit periodic
progress reports. Although polluters often fail to fulfill these
conditions or merely satisfy them in a haphazard fashion, only
in the most extreme cases are variances revoked. The potential
for continuing control inherent in the power to condition is
thus lost through nonenforcement.
Finally, the Board's general attitude with respect to the
public is defective. In the past, the Board has only reacted to
pressure, while never initiating positive action on its own. It
has waited for the public's outrage to motivate the state legislature to initiate legislative reforms; it has excused its lack
of effectiveness in curbing pollution on the grounds that it is
straitjacketed by the statute's "taking" prohibition, and it has
remained in limbo assuming that a changing tenor of the times
will eventually allow it to do more. Such an attitude is selfdefeating. Public opinion will not be aroused until a catalyst
is introduced in its midst. Since the legislature refuses to
supply it, pressure for technological advances, financial commitment, and changing public attitudes toward air pollution
101 See, e.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118

1

P. 928 (1911). Also there is another more practical consideration which
weighs against the possibility that Board action may cause a practical
taking. Before a Board denial of a variance results in the closing of
a polluter, four contingencies must occur. The polluting party must
refuse to subsequently abate its air pollution violation, the Commission
must uphold the Board's variance denial, the Office of the Attorney
General must vigorously prosecute the violation of the cease and desist
order, and a reviewing court must enforce it. None of these events are
assured, especially the last.
(Supp. 1971).
2 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-15 (4)
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must come from a body such as the Variance Board. Its centrally located position in the overall scheme of the Air Pollution Control Act makes it the prime candidate for stimulating
public demand for clean air measures. Its power to deny variances, to grant them under rigid conditions, and to initiate
court cases puts it in the forefront of air pollution control.
More importantly, it is a regulator disguised as a judicial court
and, therefore, its activities are clothed in absolute legitimacy.
The potential for leadership is present; all the Board need do
is actualize it.
2.

The Air Pollution Control Division

Once the polluter is before the Variance Board, the 1970
Act specifically grants party status to the Division and gives it
the power to furnish such personnel to the Board as may be
required. 10 3 Beyond these provisions, however, the Act is silent
with respect to the relationship of the Division to the state
Variance Board. This gives the Division considerable latitude
to define its own role in Board proceedings. The current role
is minimal. Although represented by legal counsel, the Division
inevitably refuses to take an adversary position in variance
hearings. Objections to statements or conclusions by the petitioner are rarely offered. More importantly, the Division does
not present affirmative testimony based on independent investigation to serve as a countervailing factor to the polluter's
presentation. These failings become particularly obvious when
the Board is confronted with evidence of a highly technical
nature. The Division's engineers often lack sufficient time to
evaluate proposed control techniques and are consequently
unable to answer the Board's technical questions. In such a
case, the Board has no satisfactory way to evaluate the soundness of a petitioner's abatement plan.
In a larger context, the' Division has been ineffective because it has been saddled with pressing demands and limited
resources. There is, of course, a manpower and financial shortage. But more significantly, there is an unreasonable time demand placed upon the Division. To qualify for state and federal funding the Division must spend up to one-half its man
hours preparing reports and compiling largely useless data
regarding staff composition, monies expended, and day-by-day
activities to "justify" its existence in Colorado. This combination
of public relations and lobbying for continued funding accomplishes little in the way of eliminating air pollution.
103 Id. § 66-31-16.
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3. The Colorado Judiciary.
The Colorado courts' participation in the state's air pollution control program suffers from the same faults that the
Division experiences: internal failings and external demands.
An area of internal difficulty is the overzealous concern of the
judiciary with absolute procedural regularity. This is especially
true where a Colorado district court is called upon to review
the enforcement procedures employed by the Division. In
three cases brought before reviewing courts after cease and
desist orders had been issued by the Division, the courts voided
the orders on the grounds that the Division had not taken
reasonable steps towards advising, counseling, and investigating
the polluting parties before the orders were issued.1 04 The immediate effect of these decisions was to allow the polluters'
operations to continue even though they were in express
violation of the air pollution control statute.
Despite their tendency to decide on the basis of procedural
matters, reviewing courts have occasionally had the opportunity to review the merits of Variance Board decisions. At
times these courts have merely upheld the Board's determination. 105 At other times, however, they have either misconstrued
the meaning of the Board's order to the polluter, or have interjected themselves in the decision on a matter peculiarly within
the Board's expertise.' "" While a reviewing court may review
the evidence presented before an administrative agency to determine whether the agency has acted correctly, 10 7 it is not
prudent for it to substitute its judgment for that of the Board
on matters with which it is unfamiliar.
The most obvious problem with judicial review of agency
decisions is the time involved in obtaining a final decree. It
usually requires between 1 and 2 years to obtain a ruling
from the district court and, in the event of an appeal, another
State v. Specken, Civil No. 54970 (Pueblo County Dist. Ct. 1967); East
Side Lumber Co. v. Colorado Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 18466
(Larimer County Dist. Ct. 1970); Colorado Dept. of Health v. Zupan,
Civil No. 66693 (Pueblo County Dist. Ct. 1971).
105 Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist.
Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado
Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971); argued
June 20, 1972.
10G Frank Cook, E. Side Lumber Co. v. Colorado Air Pollution Variance
Bd., Civil No. 18466 (Larimer County Dist. Ct. 1970). The Court here
concluded that the time period allowed the polluter by the Board to
install control equipment was unreasonably short. The court also misinterpreted the Board's decision to mean that the polluting party only
had 3 months to completely abate its air pollution violation when in
fact the Board had only requested that the polluter furnish the Board
with a realistic "plan" within 3 months.
107 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
1"'4
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2 years can pass before the court of appeals or supreme court
disposes of the case.I1s During all this time the cease and desist
order goes unenforced. Furthermore, these court proceedings
typically occur after the polluter has operated under a lengthy
variance from the Board.
4. Local Government Air Pollution Control Agencies
The lack of effective cooperation between state and local
pollution control agencies is another impediment to state-wide
pollution abatement. City agencies which are charged with
granting local variances to local polluters rarely attempt to
coordinate their decisions with the rulings of the State Air
Pollution Variance Board. Therefore, a polluter may operate
under two variances-one from the city and one from the
state. If the conditions of the two variances are not identical,
the polluter may find himself in an impossible dilemma. To
compound the problem, a 1972 "confidential" state report on
local air pollution agency efforts has charged that aggressive
air pollution enforcement actions are not being pursued by
city and county agencies.""5 Such statements, although they
may be true, help to aggravate the strain in relations between
state and local enforcement officials and diminish needed cooperation between city, county, and state pollution control
efforts.1 10
5.

The Attorney General's Office

The Attorney General's Office is given two basic functions with respect to air pollution enforcement, neither of which
is enumerated by the 1970 Act. First, an assistant attorney
general serves as the Board's sole source of legal expertise.
The duties of this legal advisor include examining witnesses,
making objections to questions posed by the polluter's attorney, and advising the Board on the legal justification for
its decisions. He is also given total responsibility for drafting
written opinions. The Board merely grants or denies a variance,
lists any conditions it may want to impose on the polluter, and
1,8Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist.
Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado
Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971), argued
June 20, 1972.
"'' Denver Post, Jan, 30, 1972, at 23, col. 1. Accordirng to this 1972 report,
authored by the chief of the State Air Pollution Control Division, local
agencies are not succeeding because of insufficient personnel, lack of

technical capability, public apathy, lack of concern by public officials,

no strong political program support, and that old bugaboo, insufficient
funding.
110 The director of the Denver Air Pollution Control Section has publicly
stated that the State Air Pollution Control Commission is "guilty of
providing a great deal of totally false and completely undocumented
information." Denver Post, Dec. 1, 1971, at 3, col. 5.
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then leaves the formal and legally binding document to its
legal advisor.
These opinions are not overly instructive as to the process
through which the decision was reached. The legal advisor is
often unable to specify what facts were crucial to the Board's
determination or how the facts related to specific sections
of the Act. This is because the Board often fails to articulate
its reasons for a decision, and because the Board's attorney
is rarely present at the Board hearings. Polluters receive little
guidance as to what act or omission was responsible for their
success or failure before the Board. More importantly, from a
legal standpoint, reviewing courts may be unable to perform their statutory function. Both the United States111 and
Colorado' 12 Supreme Courts have observed that administrative
decisions require definite findings. Until the Board takes a
more active hand in its opinions, it runs the risk of incurring
unnecessary delay should a reviewing court decide to remand
for more specific findings.
The second function of the Attorney General's Office is
to act as counsel for the various agencies in any litigation which
may arise, including actions initiated to enforce orders and
regulations. The Attorney General's staff has performed this
task quite competently. They have successfully argued in
support of the constitutionality of the 1970 Act, 113 defended
the Board and Division against the claims of parties disputing
decisions," 4 and convinced courts to issue injunctions against
polluters who ignore valid cease and desist orders. 115
Practical Problems
Many practical aspects of the' air pollution problem are
beyond the reach of any act or agency no matter how well
drafted or efficiently run. The most obvious stumbling block is
the critical lack of truly effective pollution abatement equipB.

"' Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
"12 Lawless v. Bach, 489 P. 2d 316 (Colo. 1971); Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo.
536, 713 P. 2d 980 (1957). The practical reasons for requiring administrative findings have to do with facilitating judicial review, assuring
more careful administrative consideration, and avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions. As the United States Supreme Court
has stated: "We require that . . . enough be put on record to enable
us to perform the limited task which is ours." Eastern-Central Ass'n
v. United States, 321 U.S. 194. 212 (1944).
'13 Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist. Ct.
1971), appeal filed sub non. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado Air
Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971); argued June
20, 1972.
11 State v. United Redi-Mix and United Sand & Gravel Co., Civil No.
18482 (Mesa County Dist. Ct. 1969).
15 See State v. Commerce City Auto Salvage, Civil No. B-98806 (Denver
Dist. Ct. 1967).
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ment. Technology, like law, experienced a late entrance into
the field of air pollution control. Few control devices are
presently in production and most of those available have not
been used for a sufficient length of time to judge long range
dependability." 6
More importantly, the cost of this equipment is so high
that only a well-funded polluter will have any hope of finding
the necessary capital, unless the public undertakes to spread
the cost. 117 Even assuming that the appropriate equipment is
available and that the particular polluter can afford it, there
remains a concatenation of commercial horrors which may
delay its installation almost indefinitely-strikes, shipping delays, backlogs, inventory shortages, work slowdowns, and all
the other common hazards of business life. 118 These unconIn fact, for some industries and pollution sources there are at the
present no air pollution control devices which could be installed to
terminate air pollution emissions, simply because engineering and technology have not advanced to the point where air pollution can be
eliminated. This means, of course, that even if a well-intentioned and
financially equipped polluter wished to end his air pollution violation,
he may, through the failings of technology, be unable to accomplish
this goal. Remarks by William D. Ruckelshaus, United States Environmental Protection Agency Administration at Denver "town meeting,"
Jan. 21, 1972.
Even when the devices such as electrostatic precipitators and
scrubbers are available, polluters have tremendous difficulty in obtaining reliable apparatus. The polluter usually must spend many years
learning how to use the apparatus efficiently, during which time it is
inevitably under pressure from environmental protection groups and
state agencies attempting to enforce the state's air pollution control
act. The Public Service Company, for example, estimates that "startup" time is 3 years after installation. Denver Post, Jan. 21, 1972, at
24, col. 5.
117 It has been estimated that strict application of clean air standards could
cost some $3.9 billion a year on a national basis. Denver Post, Jan. 3,
1972, at 24. col. 1. In Colorado, industry, excluding power companies,
spent some $3.3 million on pollution abatement in 1971; Robert
Connery of the Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry at
hearings before the Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission, Jan.
12, 1972. Large polluters, such as the Public Service Company and
C.F.&I. Steel Corp. of Pueblo, Colo. plan to spend over $15 million
over the next 3 years specifically for ordering, construction, and installation of pollution control equipment. Denver Post, Dec. 9, 1971, at
45, col. 2: Id., Dec. 16, 1971, at 47, col. 1. Although the expense seems
enormcus, this outlay is required by the size of the problem and the
scarcity of good pollution abatement equipment. The large expense
of controlling air pollution is very revealing-for it indicates that only
the very largest and richest polluters can afford the equipment which
is necessary to eliminate the important causes of air pollution.
118 The practicalities of business economics also involve themselves in the
air pollution problem and its eradication. One usually effective method
of disposing of a company's waste product besides burning it is to
convert it into another product or to sell it for some other use. Unfortunately, the smaller firms are not able to find markets for their
waste products as readily as the larger ones. Kaibab Industries case
before Variance Board, Jan. 6, 1972. Another economic problem posed
by the smaller polluters is that if they spend the requisit6 funds
for control equipment, they may have to lay off workers in order
to lower their operating costs. This forces the environmental control
agencies to choose between two important social goals- employment
and clean air.
116
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trollable problems make the need for tough legislation and
aggressive administration of pollution control laws even more
urgent.
The failure of adequate publicity is a final contributing
factor which assists the mismanagement of the state's overall air pollution control program. Publicity is needed to illuminate the policies and procedures of air pollution control and
arouse the public interest in the problem of air pollution. Due
to the absence of publicity concerning the internal workings of
the legal institutions responsible for implementing the state's
air pollution plan, the public has remained ignorant of the
policies and philosophies of these agencies and hence has remained unaware of what is wrong with the state's air pollution
laws. The lack of publicity is also responsible for the fact that
very few members of the public become directly involved in
the processes by which decisions or policy determinations are
made. Not only does this exclude many affected segments of
society from the environmental quality decision process, but
it also deprives those individuals who must make these decisions of pertinent evidence or testimony about the potential
or actual adverse effects caused by the polluter.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Colorado's experience with air pollution control offers
several valuable lessons for the future. First, no program can
succeed unless it is based upon a well-conceived, well-drafted
statute. The Colorado Act, like any other, is the child of
political compromise. Its weaknesses may stem from lobbiedfor ambiguities and omissions rather than poor draftsmanship.
Be that as it may, unless corrective legislation is enacted the
progress of abatement will continue to be halting.
Second, the administrative bodies charged with enforcing
the statute, no matter what its inherent weaknesses, must take
an aggressive stance in relation to their duties. The Colorado
Variance Board's performance could be vastly improved if it
were less intimidated by polluters. The procedural safeguards
which must be a part of any statute should not be allowed to
degenerate into a labyrinthine haven for procrastinating
polluters.
Finally, no abatement effort can succeed without strong
public support. Ideally, government is the vehicle through ,which
the will of the people is implemented. Government intransigence is a fact of political life which must be overcome if that
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will is to become reality. The ultimate responsibility for poor
legislation and poor enforcement must therefore fall on the
citizens of Colorado. Until the people make an unmistakeable,
continuing commitment to clean air, government will not be
forced to respond with continuing efforts to improve systems
and methods of control. As the Colorado experience amply
demonstrates, when a problem such as air pollution adversely
affects an entire community, when that problem is intimately
tied to that community's economic, social, and political roots,
and when the nature of the problem demands a technological
breakthrough which has not yet occurred, law and its legal institutions alone cannot directly or immediately bring about an
elimination or abatement of that problem.

NOTE
POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS:

POLICE-YOUTH RIDE-ALONG PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION

T

HE urbanized society of the United States is presently enduring the great internal stress. A pattern of continual confrontation creates pressures which shape and often distort the
soul of the American city. Although these conflicts affect the
community as a whole, they bear down most heavily upon the
minorities, the poor, the youth, and inevitably, the police.' Of
these, police and youth are most directly affected as they represent interests in constant conflict.2 Repeatedly, either police or
young people are singled out as the "cause" of violence or destruction. 3 To characterize either group as the cause is of course
an oversimplification, but police-youth confrontations often do
accentuate the points of friction between larger, less exposed
segments of our society. "The thrust of much of the group protest and collective violence-on the campus, in the ghettos, in
the streets-is provided by our young people. It may be here,
with tomorrow's generation, that much of the emphasis of our
national response should be."'4 It is here-meeting the protest
and the violence of youth-that police response is unavoidable.
The police, as representatives of "the people," are sworn
to protect life and property from harm. A fact not apparent
from the police oath, however, is the fact that "the people" is
heavily weighted in favor of the "middle-class majority" which
means white, successful workers, businessmen, professionals, and
those currently predominant governmental and political inter-

D. BAYLEY & H. MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE 109 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BAYLEY]; D. BOUMA, KIDS & COPS 154 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BOUMA; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 56-57 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE]; Bensman,

Foreword to N. ALEX, BLACK IN BLUE at xvi-xviii (1969).
2 BOUMA at 31; CHALLENGE ch. 3; J. KENNEY & D. PURSUIT, POLICE WORK
WITH JUVENILES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 7, 27, 84

(4th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as KENNEY]; Knebel, Police in Crisis,
LOOK, Feb. 6, 1968, at 14.
3 BOUMA at 15, 29; CHALLENGE at 67; Bensman, supra note 1, at xii-xiv;
Denver Post, Aug. 10, 1971, at 3, col. 1 (relating to a violent encounter
between Denver police and young Chicano citizens at a neighborhood

"action center").
4 President's Commission on Violence, Jan. 31, 1969, cited in BOU'MA at
129.
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ests concerned with maintaining the status quo. 5 "Tomorrow's
Generation," on the other hand, invariably represents forces
crying for change. Thus, because of their disparate interests, it
is obvious that police and young people are to be the principal
actors in urban conflict. 6 Inasmuch as contact, if not friction,
between the police and the representatives of youth is almost
inevitable, that contact offers a natural focus for police efforts
to improve communication and understanding in particularly
alienated communities.
At least within the realm of peaceful conflict resolution,
this communication between conflicting parties is an absolute
prerequisite. That this first step has been recognized by the
police is evident from their ever-increasing efforts in programs
generally known as Police-Community Relations (P-CR). 7 Increasingly, police departments, minority communities, and others
sensitive to the need for communication have established centers for rumor control and improved contact with city government.8 There is no doubt about the increasing number of police
and community commissions and councils formed to promote
improved police-community relations, nor can it be doubted
that the number of individuals who have become aware of the
need for better policy-community relations has increased. Commissions and councils formed to date have, however, left lingering suspicions concerning their "grass roots" impact on the problems to be confronted. Recognizing the probable shortcomings
of efforts so far made in this area, it is essential to avoid "windowdressing" and concentrate on truly improved police-community relationsY In order to meet this need, programs must
5 N. ALEX, BLACK IN BLUE 4-8 (1969); BOUMA at 28. But see

Chief Gain's

statement that police in large heterogeneous urban areas must "reject
the role of guardians of the status quo" and embrace the role of "social
change agents," employing "pre-active rather than reactive" operations.
Address by Oakland, California Police Chief Charles R. Gain at the
University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colorado, April 3, 1972.
6 See Bernstein, Alienated Youth, 33 FED. PROBATION 3, 10 (1969).
7 BOUMA at 20; CHALLENGE at 99-103, 112; KENNEY at 30-32.
8 BOUMA at 20, 95, 149-57; Elson & Rosenheim, Justice for the Child at the
Grass Roots, 51 A.B.A.J. 341 (1965). An example is "Cooperative Endeavor," established by Denver citizens, law enforcement officials, and
representatives of community organizations in 1968 for "communication
not confrontation."
9 CHALLENGE at 99-103; McKee, Understanding the Community, in POLICE
AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS; A SOURCEBOOK 113 (A. Brandstatter & L.
Radelet ed. 1968) (points out that the use of the word community is always an overstatement, [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK]; Denver Post,
Mar. 1, 1972, at 26, col. 1 (editorial on a Denver City Council special committee report calling for police reform to obtain improved P-CR). Fort
Collins, Colo. Councilman William Lopez has stressed this need: "We
have to develop man-to-man communication [before progress is made to
improve relations between the police and members of the Hispano community]. Somehow, you have to be able to understand the MexicanAmerican and feel comfortable with him." He urged police officers to
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recognize that: (1) modern police responsibility must extend
to and include prevention of crime and destructive violence;
(2) communications between police and the community is vital
to such prevention; and (3) effective police-community relations
programs are vital to such communication.
One innovative approach to improving relations between
police and community youth along the lines outlined above, is
suggested by the Police Youth Patrol in Jacksonville, Florida.
The keystone of the program is simple: to have citizens ride
with police officers on patrol.
The innovative aspect of the "ride-along" idea stems from
the focus on youthful citizens and from the follow-through
beyond a single "sightseeing" ride. 10 The underlying assumptions are that police and young people have a great deal to
learn about each other and that the ride-along program provides
the opportunity for this mutual education. This note, based in
large part on the Jacksonville experience and model, endeavors
to describe a proposal for general police department application, to elaborate on the concept of crime prevention through
communication facilitated by a ride-along program, and to outline a sample of the potential benefits of the program.
I.

THE PROPOSAL

The police-youth ride-along program (PYRA) is a community relations and training plan designed and administered by
local police departments as a part of the larger P-CR effort.
develop inter-action with Hispanos during times they are not involved
in a crisis situation such as an arrest. Denver Post, Apr. 3, 1971, at 14,
col. 1.
The Jacksonville, Florida Police Youth Patrol is one of several P-CR
programs which Jacksonville provides its young people to fight apathy
and misunderstanding. This broad version of ride-along is an organization of young men between the ages of 16 and 21 who are accepted
without regard to their social, religious, economic, or criminal backgrcunds on a "no questions asked" basis. The main objective of the
organization is to provide a structure through which youths can ride,
on a continuing basis, with police officers on routine, 8-hour shifts.
The program began in May, 1969 with a $25,000 grant and about
80 members riding along on the weekday watches. After a 30-day pilot
program, it was expanded to 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. By Aug. 12,
1969 there were 46 black and 235 white Police Youth Patrolmen for a
total of 281. By Jan. 1970, the number of PYP's had grown to 650, by
Dec. 1970 to 873, by Apr. 1971 to 981, and by Apr. 1972 to over 1,300. As
Lt. John E. Gcode stated early in 1970, "For the first time anyone can
remember, there is a youth participation in law enforcement to such a
degree that it is making an impact on the general public. That is, it is
more than just 'whitewash.' " By Mar. 1971, in addition to providing
rides for full 8-hour shifts on all shifts in the patrol division, the following daily Police Youth Patrol assignments were available: 4 to Investigation, 12 to the Jail, 6 to Communications, 1 to Traffic, 6 to ID, 1 to
Fourth Watch, 1 to the Vice Squad, 1 to the Police Academy. Letters
and materials from Public Affairs Officers, Chief Tom J. Heaney and
Lt. John E. Gocde, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Fla. to this author, 1970-72 [hereinafter cited as Heaney & Goode].
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Its viability as a communication link originates in the availability of an existing low cost resource-the police patrol force.
Any community which boasts a police force of an appreciable
size can avail itself of the benefits of PYRA without a substantial increase in funds allocated to existing P-CR programs.
PYRA is envisioned as an informal association of young
men 1 l organized and, at least to some extent, supervised by the
police. It provides the participants, who range in age from 14 to
21,12 an opportunity to ride on routine patrol with police officers
and observe, and to some extent participate in, the functions
of the police department. Needless to say, such a program offers
the participants a substantial opportunity for meaningful communication with a police officer.13
Although maximum interaction between police and youth is
the ultimate goal of the PYRA program, there are factors which
may limit this attainment. Ideally, in order to assure broad
exposure and one-to-one exchange of ideas, PYRA riders should
be assigned to accompany patrolmen on their normal shifts in
any district.1 4 However, depending on local conditions, rides during high-risk hours, or in certain high-risk districts, might, upon
a weighing of the benefits and risks involved, have to be restricted to some degree.'5 In any case, a police department might
be well-advised to institute a pilot program based on conserva11 "Official delinquents are predominantly male. In 1965 boys under 18
were arrested five times as often as girls." KENNY at 8. Also, having
young women riding with officers opens the officers to potentially
sensational slanders. Be that as it may, a police department would be
well-advised to provide all possible opportunities for women as well as
men. Particularly, if the program were to open the various offices
and bureaus to PYRA participants (as in Jacksonville), women could
easily be included in the program to interact with policewomen at
work.
1 Age should be a variable determined by local conditions. If the age
group recommended in the text results in too much diversity, two
groups, one for 12-15 and another for 16-21, are recommended as
alternatives. The highly successful Jackscnville program has an age
group of 16-21, but other sources indicate that younger ages are of vital
importance in crime prevention programs. BoumvA at 147 (indicating
junior high school age as critical); CHALLENGE at 56 (indicating ages
11-17 as crime-prone, and 18-24 as having the highest rate for violence);
T. RUBIN, LAW AS AN AGENT OF DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 30-32 (Youth
Development & Delinquency Prevention Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welfare Pub. SRS-JD-173, 1971) (supporting juvenile
court jurisdiction for ages 12-18) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN].
13 See Kumata, Police-Citizen Interactions as a Problem in Communication in SOURCEBOOK at 458.
14 The Jacksonville, Florida Police Ycuth Patrol closely approximates this
ideal. The word district indicates the general geographical area of rider
residency and that patrolled by the smallest police subdivision which
acts as an auto patrol headquarters; in a given case, this might be a
precinct, district, or the entire city.
15 Thu Jacksonville program now has Police Youth Patrol Riders in all
districts, cn all shifts, for the entire shift. One-man cars would be preferred, but two-man cars often patrol the more interesting shifts and
districts and would present only slight physical handicaps to communication. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1971, at 47, col. 1.
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tive premises and then to move to a broader program as experience and success permit.16
Design and coordination of the program should probably
originate with the Police-Community Relations unit, while local
implementation and administration should be carried out at
the lowest subdivision serving as an auto-patrol headquarters.
Prospective riders would apply to that subdivision and receive
such assignments to ride as would be convenient.
If PYRA is to be effective, a police department must strive
to ensure fullest possible support up and down the ranks. Although the goals and guidlines should be simple, thorough preparation and full explanation for all ranks would be necessary
prerequisites for a sound program.' 7 Procedures for the program
should be established with a minimum of "red tape" for both
policemen and riders.' 8 The bulk of rider coordination, logging
in, and local project design could easily be handled by PYRA
participants themselves thereby avoiding the need for additional
police or administrative employees. 19
' The Jacksonville program started with what was essentially a pilot
program, and has grown steadly until it now virtually covers the department with Pclice Youth Patrol observers. Jacksonville description, note
10 supra.
17 "In the pilot program the involvement of the supervisor in the patrol
division in explaining the goals of the program to his subordinates will
be vital to the success of the program." Letter from Chief Tom J.
Heaney, Police Public Affairs, to this author, July 23, 1971; KENNEY at
98; Kumata, supra note 13.
18 A simple address and information card for file purposes and a roster
sheet for the rides would suffice. The matter of injury liability should
be considered, but for the sake of openness and simplicity, dispensing
with waiver forms is recommended. In letters from the police departments in Jacksonville, Fla., Phoenix, Ariz., San Diego, Cal., and St.
Louis County, Mo., reflecting a total of more than 100,000 rides, no
liability claims were reported. As a matter of practical planning significance, municipalities must acknowledge the apparent demise of
governmental immunity and the increasing advisability of providing
insurance or other provision for claims coverage. See, e.g., Evans v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 130-11-1 to -17 (Supp. 1971).
1 Administration of the Jacksonville Police Youth Patrol has been kept
simple. Youth Patrolmen originally fill out a general information application with the P-CR unit. They then call up the P-CR office at least 2
days before the requested ride but no earlier than 7 days. If they
wish to cancel, they call the patrol Captain. They are to report to the
assembly room 30 minutes prior to their ride. The P-CR office maintains a 30-day roster in rough form. Two days in advance, a copy of
each day's roster is typed and provided to the patrol division. The
patrol supervisor assigns an officer to each Youth Patrolman. During
the ride period, comments concerning late arrival, sickness, etc. can be
added to the roster. The used roster is then collected the following day
and filed in P-CR. The only other form is an alphabetical file to which
the fact of each ride and infcrmation added to the daily roster are transferred. Volunteer Youth Patrolmen handle much of the administration,
answering phones, and coordination of the program in the P-CR office.
Heaney & Goode, supra note 10. Youth involvement in administrative
such "action model" programs in J. WEBER
cperations is recommended in.
& C. CUSTER, YOUTH INVOLVEMENT 1 (Youth Development & Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare Pub. SRS-OJD-138,
1970).
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Obviously, the individual patrolman must exhibit competence and confidence on the job while he assists the youthful
citizen to better understand police procedures and missions. At
the same time, middle-command personnel must provide positive guidance and exhibit sensitivity in assigning individual
patrolmen to PYRA duty. The chief and command officers
should promote a department consensus that PYRA is not only
a legitimate endeavor, but one of primary significance to enhanced police effectiveness. The program should be designed
to reveal actual police attitudes to the youth rider. False pretenses or weak police support must be avoided lest they confirm a young person's worst suspicions.
At a minimum, a PYRA program would provide its participants an opportunity to ride with, observe, and become acquainted with an officer in the youth's patrol district (a district
residence priority for rides should be observed to preserve this
feature). Joining and leaving the program should be made as
easy as possible to establish a "no pressure" atmosphere, but at
the same time officers and participants alike should understand that the experience is likely to be enhanced by extended
association with PYRA. PYRA participants should be urged to
ride several times with different officers on different shifts and
in various district locales. Extended participation would put the
rider at ease and allow him to observe a broader, more representative sample of officers and police work.
The "cornerstone" of the program is its provision for "low
pressure," one-to-one (or very small group) discussion which
is clearly more constructive than tense confrontation which so
often arises between police and youth. At the very least, this
sort of meeting would furnish both sides with practice in "what
not to say" to the other side. Finally, to best resolve any difficulties which might arise within a PYRA Program, PYRA
procedures should provide for a simple report on allegedly offensive conduct which could be made to a designated district
supervisor by either a rider or an officer. This provision for
informal airing of complaints should facilitate "staying within
the system" and supply feedback for command officers concerning the conduct of participants and officers involved in the
program.
II. TiB CoNcEpTuAL FRAMEWORK
"[TIhe most promising and so the most important method
of dealing with crime is by preventing it .... It is simply more
critical that young people be kept from crime, for they are the
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Nation's future .... -20 PYRA's ultimate purpose is to contribute
to the prevention of crime. To appreciate its great potential in
this regard, one must look briefly at the various meanings of
"crime prevention."
While the formal definition of "crime" is set out in the
applicable code and case law, a more realistic definition goes
beyond the formal and takes into account police discretion and
practice. Thus, individuals are sometimes arrested for innocent
conduct, while at other times criminal conduct passes without
police intervention. 21 Clearly, to some degree at least, crime is
what the police say it is.
The concept of "prevention" can be perceived in at least
three ways. At a high, philosophical level the emphasis is on
individual self-control arising out of behavioral training in the
home and community. At a more realistic, if somewhat more
pessimistic level, prevention is seen as deterrence of criminal
behavior through preventive police action.2 2 The third view of
prevention, and the one which seems most realistic, is a combination of these two. To the extent that most crime is, and
must necessarily be, undetected, 23 individual self-control is an
ultimate requisite for a truly crime-free society. Nevertheless,
there is no denying the deterrent value of police presence.
If effective crime prevention is a product of a combination
of individual self-control and the deterrent effect of police
presence, it is obvious that a convergence of views on the part
of the police and the citizenry with respect to what constitutes
criminal behavior is essential for maximum preventive impact.
20 CHALLENGE

at 58.

at 79, 103-04. Cf. Edwards, Police and the Community: A
Judicial View in SOURCEBOOK at 29. This is not to say that police discretion should necessarily be limited. In fact, there is good argument for
increased "on-the-spot discretion," if it is exercised equitably and
reasonably. CHALLENGE at 95, 104-06; KENNEY at 71-72, 85; J. WILSON,
VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 7-8 (1968).
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Chief Justice Warren, in
the opinion of the court, stated:
One general interest is of that of effective crime prevention and
detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest.
Id. at 22.
are not
"[S]omething between 70 and 90 percent of the crimes ...

21 CHALLENGE

22

23

reported to the police at all .

. .

. [O]nly roughly one-fourth of those

crimes that are reported lead to arrest .... " Testimony of James Vorenberg, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and former Executive
Director, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Hearings on H. Res. 17 before the Select Comm.
on Crime of the House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 271-78
(1969).
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It is in this regard that programs such as PYRA, which are
designed to increase mutual understanding, are most valuable.
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the propriety
of crime prevention as a police role. It must be conceded that in
the past the police function has been viewed in terms of detection of crime and the apprehension of the criminal. The argument follows, then, that moving into the distinctly different
field of prevention is simply not a legitimate concern of the
police profession. 24 In answer, it must be pointed out that presently the great bulk of police time is spent, not in detection or
apprehension, but in such preventive activities as "showing the
shield," mediating family altercations, or assisting citizens with
25
minor problems.
Eminent judges, police officials, and scholars support the
legitimate if not pre-eminent role of the policeman in the prevention of crime. 26 A realistic recognition of the criminal process'
27
Most
lack of impact on criminal activity supports this view.
of the "criminal justice system" is improperly preoccupied with
symptoms rather than causes of social maladjustment. It follows, then, that enlightened prevention is the most appropriate
area in which to concentrate present police resources. 28 Indeed,
Quinn Tamm has stated: "Today the police officer who believes
'social work' is beneath him, who thinks police-community
relations programs are merely 'publicity gimmicks,' is living
in a fool's paradise. More importantly, he isn't getting the job
29
done."
As matters now stand, meaningful youth-police communication is rare and is often attempted only under the pressure
of antagonistic circumstances. The human element of "the cop
on the beat" has been lost through the adoption of the autoSee generally N. ALEX, supra note 5, at 70-72.
at 91-92, 97-98; KENNEY at 84; Goldstein, Police Response to
Urban Crisis, 28 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 417, 418 (1968). See Remington,
The Limits and Possibilities of the Criminal Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW.
865 (1968).
26 Chief Justice Warren in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); BAYLEY at
199; KENNEY at 10, 28, 85-86; RUBIN at 15; Cahill, Challenges in Contemporary Law Enforcement in SOURCEBOOK at 178.
27 BOUMA at 60; CHALLENGE at 58, 79; RUBIN at 1; Vorenberg testimony
cited note 23 supra.
28 CHALLENGE at 58; Edwards, supra note 21, at 25; Bordua, Comments on
Police-Community Relations, 1 CONN. L. REV. 306, 325 (1968). See
generally A. AICHHORN, WAYWARD YOUTH 29 (1935); Report, the Industrial Psychological Ass'n of Colo., Inc., The Fifth Annual Institute on
Community Relations and the Administration of Justice 22, April 30,
1971.
2
9 Tamm, Foreword to SOURCEBOOK.
24

25 CHALLENGE
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mobile patrol,3 0 thereby making the patrolman a more impersonal symbol. At the same time, demands for sensitive understanding have steadily increased. 31 The policeman seldom knows,
or is known by, the people whose streets he patrols; therefore,
it is not surprising that attempts at crisis communication often
disintegrate into brutal actions and reactions. PYRA would offer
the policeman and the youth rider an opportunity to see one
another as human beings; and differences in life style, appearance, socio-economic background, and general philosophy would
become less offensive, or at least more understandable through
the private "give and take" of the ride-along experience. A
PYRA-informed, sensitized policeman would be better prepared
to exercise restraint and remain "cool" under the stress of confrontation and thereby avoid "generating" crime. 32 Not only
would the policeman better comprehend the context and probable consequences of the community attitudes, but the potential
wrongdoer confronting him would have fairer warning as to
what conduct would provoke police reaction."' Because "riot is
the communication of utter despair and hopelessness, ' 3 4 even
a little understanding might go a long way.
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS
Benefits which would flow from police-youth communication arise because interaction tends to moderate extreme positions and brings the attitudes of the participants closer together.
Recognition of this has led to the adoption of such programs as
the Police Athletic League (P.A.L.), which provides a recreational outlet for the communities' young people. It has also
prompted various innovations such as "cop hops," "store-fronts,"
''
and "eyeball-to-eyeball techniques."35
Some of these ideas, when
seriously implemented, have aided in smoothing the way
3
through troubled times. 1
30 BOUMA at 26.

During the 1971 Denver mayoral campaign, two of the
three leading candidates advocated increased use of foot patrolmen.
Denver Post, Apr. 14, 1971, at 62, col. 1.
31 CHALLENGE at 99-103; Lett, A Sense of Responsibility in SOURCEBOOK at
178.
32 CHALLENGE at 92, 100.
33 "[K]nowledge of law can be an important ingredient of acting within
the law ....
" RUBIN at 40. "Law" here would encompass the law in
police practice.
34 SOURCEBOOK at 470.
35 BOUMA at 20. As an example, the Denver store-front P-CR began in
Sept. 1971 and by early 1972 had five locations providing effective
links with the people throughout the city. Memorandum from Captain
C. Herrera, Police Community Relations Bureau, Dept. of Police, City
& County of Denver, to all city agencies and schools, Mar. 1972.
3 Jacksonville disturbances during the summer and fall of 1971 were
thought to be less severe because of the PYP program. Letter from
Chief Tom J. Heaney, Police Public Affairs, Office of the Sheriff, Con-
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Vast improvement in "grass roots" communication and understanding can be expected from a local P-CR store-front or
a thriving P.A.L. activity. Programs such as these have the
neighborhood as their meeting place and therefore have the
opportunity to directly influence the attitudes of a great proportion of the community. However, even in these activities, one
suspects an insufficient involvement of the majority of the
working police officers. For one thing, only a limited number
of officers can be associated with store-fronts or P.A.L. at any
given time. Also, "voluntary" programs such as P.A.L. tend to
attract individuals who are already convinced of P-CR value.
Finally, such programs often involve little more actual police
7
participation than official sponsorship and financial support .
The major challenge then, lies not only in providing a communication link sponsored by the police, but in creating a
medium which necessarily involves broad representations of the
community and the police. Most importantly, that medium must
be designed to remain open during the 2:00 a.m. street encounter
as well as around the "concerned citizens' council" table.
A.

Police Benefits
Effective police work begins with police knowledge of and
sensitivity to the community and improves with development
of a concomitant community trust. So long as the vast majority
of police time is spent on routine preventive patrol during which
the family squabble is far more common than the armed robbery, officers should gain and maintain proficiency in listening,
understanding, and persuading.38 If modern patrol requirements
do not allow officers time to leave their cars to meet the people
then PYRA can bring the people to the cars. 39 Such a compensating measure is particularly essential whenever urban police
officers are not residents of the districts or even the cities which
solidated City of Jacksonville, Fla. to this author, April 2, 1972. The
Grand Rapids, Mich. laboratory confrontation technique placed hostile
individuals together under controlled conditions and allowed them to
vent their feelings in the hope of improving understanding. Even during
subsequent riots, attitudes were believed to be better due to the exposure. BOUMA at 149-50. In a Denver junior high school where probblems had sometimes cccurred, police-youth confrontation, first by
tapes and then in person, was found to improve relations. Denver Post,
Mar. 19, 1971, at 2, col. 1.
•7 E.g., Oakland, California Police Chief Charles R. Gain has abandoned most
such programs (including store-front operations) as mere "symbolism"
and has said that "[i]f people have confidence in their police department,
there is no need for symbolism." Denver Post, Apr. 3, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
38
BOUMA at 19; CHALLENGE at 100. See N. ALEX, supra note 5, at 80-81;
Sykes, Riots and the Police, 46 DENvrm L.J. 118 (1969).
:19 "The people" in this instance are only represented, but they are broadly
and vitally represented by the youth of the community.
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they patrol, and especially whenever officers are of a different
40
racial or ethnic background.
Police training is typically beginning to reflect a consideration of community relations, 41 but meaningful education in the
subject is difficult to attain if the recruit has had little prior
exposure to minority neighborhoods and tense group confrontations. He will inevitably learn his most meaningful lessons
from personal experience, and PYRA can provide at least a
part of that experience under friendly, controlled conditions.
PYRA involvement for the veteran officer has the same human
relations advantages and will tend to keep him up to date with
changing attitudes and conditions.
The presence of the youth rider would also have a long
term salutary effect because the patrolman would be motivated
to learn and review his law and procedures. Just as the veteran
often learns most by preparing to teach an assigned recruit, the
continuing curiosity and discussion of the youth riders would
serve to sharpen the officer's professional knowledge. For the
occasional officer who is not a ready conversationalist, the experience in communicating with a PYRA rider might help develop an invaluable human relations skill. Preventive patrol efficiency would increase through PYRA motivation of professionalism, and even officers of marginal competency, whose efficiency
might suffer temporarily, would benefit over time. Officers in
general would be subtly encouraged to be more courteous and
mindful of their public relations images, and they would prove
to be more careful in such simple matters as driving and caring
for their automobiles. As an incidental benefit, the rider's presence would help lighten the burden of boredom which weighs
so heavily during some patrol periods. This "boredom time"
would be wisely invested in the experience of mutual education.
40

41

E.g., Denver's 1970 population was about 22.7% black and Spanishnamed (based on U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, at 7-85, table 34
(PC (1) -B7) for black population and STANDARD RATE & DATA SOUaCES,
INC., SPOT RADIO RATES & DATA 173 Apr. 1, 1972 (estimate of Jan. 1, 1970
Spanish population)). But early in 1968, only 2.7% of Denver police
were blacks or Spanish-named. BAYLEY at 121, 154. In early 1972, Chief
Seaton revealed that just over 7.9% of Denver's officers were of those
minorities. Denver Post, Mar. 14, 1972, at 3, col. 4. Although the Police
Department will not provide the information, with Denver's present
"inner-city - suburbia" phenomenon, it can be safely estimated that
no more than half of the city's police officers live within its boundaries.
See. e.g.. BOUMA at 156; CHALLENGE at 112-13; KENNEY at 131-32;
Whearl.v & Green, Police Department Most Improved in Nation, Denver
Post, Apr. 11, 1971, at 28, col. 4 (reporting a training program of more
than twice the length with new emphasis on P-CR and other topics).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

One of the most attractive aspects of PYRA is its very low
cost. 42 By fully utilizing PYRA participants for rider administration, the police department would have to pay only the cost of
printing some forms, and perhaps, depending on the scope of the
program, 43 the addition of one or two people to the city-wide
police-community relations unit. The "attraction" of the program is already present and there is no need for costly advertising to sell the idea. 44 Publicity through simple news stories,
and contact with youth groups, would create more than enough
impetus to draw youth riders. 45 Also, for such an innovative
project, initial costs might well be offset by federal or private
46
grants.
In Jacksonville, aside from administrative costs and the costs for making
up forms, the ride-along Pclice Youth Patrol costs include: (1) arm
bands $.36 each (2) T-shirts $1.44 each (3) jackets $4.66 to $6.50 each
(4) plastic name tags $.65 each. Letter from Chief Tom J. Heaney,
Police Public Affairs, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Fla. to this author, July 23, 1971.
43 Jacksonville Police Youth Patrolmen, blacks and whites together, also
participate in other projects of community service. E.g., to reduce auto
thefts, they have worked shopping centers, placing cards encouraging
owners to "Lock it and Pocket the Key" under windshield wipers cf
offending cars; they have distributed information on crime prevention
themes at large public gatherings; they have assisted in traffic control
during the Christmas rush; they have helped with crowd control and
distribution of gifts during Judge Drake's Annual Christmas Party
for underprivileged children which had over 23,000 in attendance.
Heaney & Goode, supra note 10.
44 The police patrol car is a highly visible symbol of all the folklore, good
and bad, which has grown up around American police forces. It is
synonymous with action and adventure. The natural attraction of the
PYRA program is reflected by Police Youth Patrol growth in Jacksonville from 80 riders in 1969 to over 1,300 in 1972. A report from the
ride-along program in St. Louis County noted that "[a] 'once a year'
provision was added to the program because it was found that many
young people were taking advantage of the prograr." Letter from St.
Louis County Dept. of Police, Community Relations to Denver Law
Journal, Aug. 16, 1971. In San Diego, where only about 40 can ride per
weekend, the information sheet describing the program ends with:
"Because of the overwhelming respcnse to this program, it has become
necessary to restrict applications to individual requests and exclude
most organized groups, such as scout troops, church social groups, and
others. Although the program is completely booked for some time
ahead, applications are still being accepted for future rides." Information sheet accompanying letter from San Diego Police Dept. to this
author, Jan. 21, 1972. In Phoenix, the ride-along program was indicated
as the mcst effective in reaching the city's youth. Return letter from
Phoenix Police-Community Relations to this author, Jan. 3, 1972.
45 Cf. KENNEY at 100-01. Jacksonville, Phoenix, San Diego, and St. Louis
County information, note 44 supra.
46 E.g., Denver often is considered for grants to law enforcement research
and action programs. Denver Post, Apr. 16, 1971, at 2, col. 5. Funds are
available under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-81 (Supp. May 1971) amending 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3701-81 (1970) and the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3801-90 (1970). On Jan. 13, 1972, Vice President Agnew and Attorney General Mitchell announced that, under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the cities of Atlanta, Ga.;
Baltimore, Md.; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Newark,
N.J.; Portland, Ore.; and St. Louis, Mo. were each to receive the greater
part of $20 million in federal grants for 3-year, high impact anti-crime
programs under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. 2
42
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Although it is not central to the concept, police recruiting
should be enhanced by a good PYRA program because of the
47
honest, nonobligatory appraisal PYRA furnishes to both sides.
A police department desiring to attain racial balance in its
make-up could, through PYRA's "low presure" structure, provide wide encouragement to young minority group men by
drawing riders from appropriate youth groups, or even street
gangs. If the youths became interested, the PYRA exposure
would supply them with timely insight into how they could
best prepare to meet entrance standards and thus, a greater
percentage could be expected to qualify when the time came
for application. 48 Again, the recruiting effort would be low in
cost and high in beneficial results.
Youth Benefits
The salient advantage of the program is its educational
value for the young citizen. 4'1 Through participation in the program, the young person could see for himself and perhaps come
to appreciate the work which the policeman must do. In addition PYRA would give him an opportunity to ask questions
and express opinions which would create more balanced views
on both sides. The informality of the program would pose a
minimal threat to a youth's life style and since there is a great
deal to see and learn in the course of a patrol, it is extremely
B.

1972, at 1. A special committee of the
Denver City Ccuncil also indicated a willingness to fund the implementation of P-CR programs which were recommended in studies by psychiatrists and minority consultants. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1972, at 26,
col. 1.
47 See, e.g., JACKSONVILLE ATTITUDES: In a survey taken in high
school classes (no sample size or selection procedure indicated), young
males were asked: "Would you like to follow law enforcement as your
career?"
PERCENT ANSWERING
Not Sure Yes
No
26
19
55
High school males
PYP members were asked: "After riding
in a police car in the PYP program, do you
teel that you would like to follow law
enforcement as your career?"
63
29
8
PYP members generally
38
61
1
Black PYP members
Heaney & Goode, supra note 10.
48 The 1970 Denver recruiting results showed that overall, 22% of those
returning applications were sworn in. 23.6% of Anglo applicants were
sworn in, 15% of Spanish-named, and 15% of Negroes. Percentages
51.9, Negro
passing the written test were Anglo- 78, Spanish-named26. Report, Denver Police Department Police-Community Relations
(1971) (mimeo.).
4!I "[The] law is too important a force in our society to be relegated to beRUBIN
lated description when a child is finally brought to court ......
at 40.
LEAA NEWSLETTER, JAN.-FEB.
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likely that young people would enjoy extended, in-depth participation. 50
Once a youth realized that a communication link was honestly open, he could use that link to express himself, rather
than resorting to some destructive or disruptive behavior. There
would be a realistic contact through which he could reach the
"establishment." Although the youth might not become interested in a police career, he would at least find himself better
equipped to understand and meet his responsibilities as an informed citizen and voter. 51
Resultant Community Benefits
To the broader community, the most obvious immediate
benefit would be the significant reduction in criminal behavior
on the part of active PYRA participants.5 2 However, the more
significant community benefit would be a possible reduction
in crime in later years because of the PYRA participant's early,
healthy contact with the police.
C.

As one of several indirect benefits, increased communication
between youth and police could reasonably lead to reduced
tension and violence, and a more productive utilization of human
resources. 53 Even if altercations should arise, neither side would
be so likely to escalate to deadly violence where many policemen and youths were personally acquainted. It is simply far
more unlikely that one would shoot another whom he knows
or with whom he can identify. The individuals would be persons to one another, not just stereotypes, objects, or symbols.
50 Jacksonville description, note 10 supra. Auto patrol is always interesting

and sometimes very exciting. Seldom silent, the continual radio traffic
is one of the best conversation starters. Also, all the codes, procedures,
forms, boundaries, missions, and auto equipment can be explained.
Since the competent patrolman is constantly looking for signs of lawbreaking, he can simply narrate the reasons for his route, his specific
observations and his suspicions. Most policemen also have a wealth of
"war stories" which they can tell as they pass the "scenes of the crimes."
Discussion of the officer's career experience and possibilities, entrance
requirements, and the Police Academy are interesting subjects even
for the youth who is only casually interested in the police career pattern.
An invitation of the rider's thoughts on police practice, police standing
in the community, or police effectiveness might generate a most interesting and valuable exchange.
51 The 1971 grant of the 18-year-old vote is unequivocal recognition of the
increasing competence and importance of American youth. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI.
.52 E.g., Jacksonville parents have commented that the PYP programs "help
keep [their sons] out of trouble," "give the boys something to do that is
worthwhile," and "keep them off the streets." Heaney & Goode, supra
note 10. Although there is a chance that the rider could actually try to
use his position, perhaps in collusion with others, to assist in committing
crime, the chance is negligible, and on balance, well worth the risk.
53 See Lett, supra note 31, at 170, 178 (addressing the need for communication between the sensitive but demanding minorities, blacks and police,
who are urged on by the "community" with a "Let's you and him fight"
kind of encouragement); Bordua, supra note 28, at 322.
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Through the youthful PYRA participants, numerous family
members and friends would come to appreciate police efforts
as genuinely human and beneficial. 54 Also, the added degree of
masculine guidance provided by the police officer could greatly
benefit the PYRA family, particularly if it were one of the
fatherless families so common to urban America.55
Although it would still fall on the shoulders of the police
to meet criminal behavior as it arises, PYRA would produce
an informed nucleus of youths and parents who could view
the situation with a better balance of perspective. PYRA would
provide the sort of informal monitoring by police of youth
and youth of police which would tend to keep all parties more
"honest" in their attitudes. Because of constant contact with
youths in all communities, the police, when taking necessary
action, would be in a better position to act early and wisely.
The community's police service would very likely be both more
responsive and more efficient.
For the police, for youth, and for the community, PYRA
spells better relations. Although it is no panacea, it does meet
a sorely neglected need by providing communication which is
directed at the primary antagonists, inclusive of wide police
and community representations, locally based, personal, low in
pressure, low in cost, and extremely high in promise.
Gary H. Tobey

5

In the Jacksonville program, the youths and the parents have overwhelmingly praised the insight provided and the beneficial impact on
youth attitudes and conduct. Sample quotes of responses to a 1971 Police
Youth Patrol questionnaire are: In response to the question "Do you
feel that being in the PYP has helped you? If yes, How?"-"I've
gained a better understanding of the city's police program and found
out that they have to put up with a lot more than the average person."
"I Eee it ain't all easy and they aren't pigs and we couldn't do without
them." In response to the question "What do you feel is the best thing
fact that the youth of America can
about the PYP Program?"-"The
learn from somebody else's mistakes." "The fact that you can really
get to know same of the best and nicest men you will ever meet." In
parents' comments: "I am glad he got on with the Police Youth Patrol
he has changed a lot since from that." "Marked improvement in behavior, grades and outlook. Our son has much enthusiasm for PYP and
far mcre respect for the law. Unlike most government programs, this
one seems to be accomplishing its aims. We would find it hard to overpraise or overrecommend. Realizing results in Jacksonville and other
cities may vary widely, the success here makes it evident that our local
directors and officers are doing a very good job." "My son's views
toward Police Officers has changed for the good. He knows them instead of fearing them. They are friends to him." "We are very pleased
with [our son's] interest in the PYP program. We feel he has witnessed
events that has made more of an impressicn on him than a thousand
words from us."

5z,
See CHALLENGE
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NOTE
BRANCH BANKING IN COLORADO

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
INTRODUCTION

the United States there are 14,000
W ITHIN
banks operated within a single structure

unit banks of which 85
percent have less than $25 million in deposits.' There are 7,700
-

communities with only a single unit bank and 1,800 towns with

only two unit banks. 2 Excluding branches, 75 percent of the
country's chartered banks are in one-bank or two-bank commu-

nities. Only one out of 10 of these unit banks serves over 5,000
people, and half serve populations of less than 1,000. In contrast,
the nation's commercial banks permitted to have branches are
located in 29,300 structures with each location serving an
average of 6,700 people.
With the sole exception of Wyoming,' all of the states
and the District of Columbia have legislated with respect to
branch banking. Regulatory schemes vary widely, permitting
state-wide branching,4 allowing branches within the county
where the main office is located and in counties contiguous to
that county,' authorizing branches only in the county in which
the head office is located,'! and prohibiting the operation of

1Rose, Are Those 11,400 Banks Really Necessary?, FORTUNE, Nov. 1970,

at 113.
2 Bratter, The Role of Branch Banking in Area Development, 1 MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS (THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE VENTURE)

87, 88 (1966).

3 E. HALAAS, THE BANKING STRUCTURE IN COLORADO 22 (1969).
4 Such states include: Alas., Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Hawaii, Idaho,
Me., Md., Nev., N.C., Ore., R.I., S.C., Utah, and Wash. E. HALAAS, supra
note 3, at 22. South Dakota has changed its law to allow all present
branches to continue, but new branches must be the result of a merger
with an established facility. See South Dakota Section, POLK's BANK
DIRECTORY (1971).

, Those states which allow branches in the county where the main office
is located and all counties contiguous to that county are: Miss. (100
mile limit), Mich. (25 mile limit), N.M. (100 mile limit), Ohio, Penn.,
and Wis. (25 mile limit). New York and New Jersey allow expansion
within prescribed banking "districts," and Louisiana banks may branch
in contiguous counties

or

"parishes."

Those

states which

refer to

branches as "offices" and allow them in the head office county and contiguous counties are: Ark., Iowa, and N.D. Gup, A Review of State
Laws on Branch Banking, 88 BANKING L.J. 675, 682 (1971).
6 States which allow branching within the county where the main office
is located include: Ala., Ind., Ky., Mass., Tenn., Utah, and Va. E. HALAAS,
supra note 3, at 22. New Hampshire allows branches to exist in the
same city as the head office (plus 30 miles), and Georgia limits its
branches to the same city. Gup, supra note 5, at 682.
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branch banking completely.7 The Colorado scheme" fits most
reasonably in the final category of complete prohibition. 9
This diversity in the regulation of state banking is evidence
of the continuing controversy over the values and dangers of
branch banking. The purpose of this note is to analyze present
restrictions on branch banking in light of their origins and appropriateness in today's banking environment. The approach
taken gives general consideration to the traditional arguments
which both justify and refute the need for branch banking
regulations. Since the federal government sought to provide a
balance in the dual federal-state banking law through the McFadden Act, 10 member banks of the national banking system
may not exceed any branch banking restriction created by state
law. 1 Consequently, state law will be the primary focus of this
note, with specific consideration being given to the Colorado
restrictions.
I. COLORADO BANKS AND BRANCH BANKING LAW
2
Branch banking has always been prohibited in Colorado.'
In 1911 the Colorado legislature passed the present branch banking statute which provides that "every bank shall be conducted
at a single place of business and no branch thereof shall be
maintained elsewhere.' 3 In 1969, the legislature enacted an
exception to this restriction by authorizing banks, after approval
by the State Banking Board, to operate one detached facility
for receipt of deposits, cashing of checks, and delivery of cash
within 2,000 feet of their main office.' 4 These limitations apply
solely to commercial banks and impose no restrictions on savings and loan associations.
Significantly, the application of the statutory prohibition
against branch banking has been limited by the Colorado
Supreme Court which has required the presence of the unitary
type of operation characteristic of a branch bank for the restric7 Those states which absolutely prohibit branching are: Colo., Fla., Ill.,

Kan., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Okla., Tex., W. Va. E. IIALAAS, supra
note 3, at 22.
8 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (1963).
" It should be noted that a recent amendment to the Colorado statute
permits the establishment of branches within 2,000 feet of a parent bank.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969).
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 29, 34a, 36, 51, 52, 57, 72, 76, 81, 82, 84, 161, 321, 342,
371, 501, 521, 591, 593 (1970).
11 McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
12 Ch. 19, § 68, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 166.
13CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (1963).
14
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969).
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tion to apply.' 5 This judicial requirement of unitary operation
departed from the view held by the Colorado State Bank Commissioner who had argued that chain banking- the operation
of several banks owned by a holding company- was with within the interdiction of branch banking. 16 The effect of the court's
decision was to limit the statute to commercial banks maintaining "extensions" which are an integral part of the main
office's operation- the essence of a unitary type of operation.
All other methods used by banking institutions are not subject
17
to the statutory prohibition.
The prohibition of branching raises issues with respect to
the adequacy of service for Colorado citizens which should be
kept in mind in an evaluation of the appropriateness of Colorado's anti-branching statute. Colorado has 80 one-bank towns,
with an average population of 1,800, which are not near larger
metropolitan communities. These small town banks are available to serve 20 percent of the state's population, constitute 37
percent of the state's banks, and account for only 9 percent of
the total state bank deposits.' 8 It is interesting to note that the
unit banks, presently serving a significant segment of Colorado's population, have a disproportionately small percentage of
Colorado's total bank assets.
II.

HISTORICAL

RATIONALES FOR BRANCH

BANKING PROHIBITIONS

The reasons for branch banking prohibitions are varied and
conflicting. One fact, however, does seem clear: branch banking restrictions are an almost unique American phenomenon.
English law permits completely uninhibited branching of
banks,19 as do the laws of most other countries.20 To account for
America's singular treatment of the banking industry, it is
necessary to understand a number of factors in early American
banking history.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, most of
the branch banks in the Eastern States were replaced by
smaller, independent banks in. response to restrictive legisla15 Peoples Bank v. Banking Board, 164 Colo. 565, 571, 436 P.2d 681 (1968),
citing First Nat'l Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp., 306 F.2d 937, 943 (9th
Cir. 1962).
16 Goldy v. Crane, 167 Colo. 44, 47, 445 P.2d 212, 213 (1968).
17 Group and chain banks are owned by the same person or group, but
avoid the "unitary type of operation" by operating each bank as an
individual entity with its own officers and directors and by not intermingling funds or services with their affiliate members. E. HALAAS,
supra note 3, at 21, 24, 103, 105.
18 Id. at 100.
19 Halleck, Freedom in Banking, 31 BANKING L.J. 870, 871 (1914).
20

E.

HALAAS,

supra note 3, at 18.
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tion. 2 1 This legislation was not aimed at branch banking per
se, but rather at the issuance of so-called "wild cat" currency.
This problem was resolved when the Bank Act of 1865 drove
circulating notes of state banks out of existence by the imposition of a 10 percent tax. 22 After this Act, most state banks were
converted into individual national banks.
Although note issuance was a major factor in prompting
anti-branching regulations, there were other difficulties which
attended the operation of branch banks. The Second Bank of
the United States met with grave difficulties of supervision in
the 1860's when "[p]oor roads and transporation systems made
it almost impossible for auditors or officers from the head office
to check the work in the several branches.12 3 Further investigation into this communication problem reveals that many early
regulations were predicated upon the reasoning that when the
steadying influence of ever-present bank officers was absent,
security of deposits was lessened and probability of loss was
24
increased.
That this concern for the safety of deposits was justified
is illustrated by a 1910 Colorado case, Kipp v. Miller,25 which
dealt with the dissolution of the State Bank of Monta Vista
which had operated two highly profitable branches in Creede
and Garrison for 10 years. The dissolution caused creditors, who
had dealt in good faith with the branches as part of the state
bank, to bring suit against the stockholders who had shared in
profits from the branches. The defense of an ultra vires act was
raised since branches were prohibited, but the shareholders
were estopped on the ground that they had acquiesced in a relationship of which they were well aware. 26 "[G]eneral publicity was given to the relations between these branch banks
and the State Bank ....
[L]etterheads of the branches bore the
legend that they were associated with the State Bank ...
[I]ndeed their relations seem to have been a matter of common
'27
knowledge.
It is obvious from a reading of Kipp that the regulatory
system at that time was indifferent to the branching issue, since
the branches had been allowed to go unregulated for 10 years
and the suit arose only when creditors, following the failure of
21

G.

22 J.

CARTHINHOUR,

BRANCH, GROUP AND

CHAPMAN, CONCENTRATION

Id. at 94.
50 A.L.R. 1340, 1342 (1927).
25 47 Colo. 598, 108 P. 164 (1910).
26 Id. at 607, 108 P. at 167.
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the parent bank, sued to enforce the liability of stockholders.
Therefore, the concern for stability, plus the possibility of
cumulative failure in such unrestricted situations as that presented in Kipp, may be the best explanation for the 1911 statute
which regulates Colorado branch banking today. Evidence of
this can be found in a letter dated January 16, 1908, from the
Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, S. H. Thompson, Jr.,
to the Colorado State Bank Commissioner, Harry M. Beatty: "It
is evident that the purpose of the legislature in prohibiting
branch banks was to avoid the dangers which might follow
from the temptation to transfer the funds of one branch to another and thus impair the financial conditions of the various
28
branches."
During the late nineteenth century the national banking
system, in an effort to afford safe banking facilities, became
very inflexible; as a result, money panics occurred in 1873, 1893,
and 1907.2) During these difficult times branch banking was
discussed as a means of relieving the problem of small communities without banking facilities; but legislatures did not
"contemplate encouraging [the location of banks in] unduly
places that could not support unit banking. ' 30 In 1904, John
Hamlin, Attorney General of Illinois, stated that branch banking
would promote uncertainty and "increase the liabilities of banks
in proportion to capital stock, and encourage an extension of
business,"' ' 1 which he considered detrimental to bank safety and
against sound public policy.
Another factor which prompted anti-branching legislation
was the desire to control the influence of "big money." In 1887
the Comptroller of Currency, William L. Trenholm, voiced the
often repeated fear that an extension of branch banking would
mean money monopoly.32 The fear of monopoly has been often
forwarded as an explanation for the ban on branching:
"[A]merican (and especially rural American) fear of 'foreign'
money power, and the desire to keep local banking resources
' '3
in local hands, are probable explanations for this prohibition.
Perhaps the most emotional advocate of branching prohibitions was the 1907 Bank Commissioner of Wisconsin, Marcus C.
28
29
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Bergh, who described branches as being "foreign to the American principle of free banking and contrary to the spirit and
'' 4
intent of the Wisconsin banking law. 13 This "un-American"
characterization has been constantly used by later advocates
of anti-branching legislation, but the allegation is never accompanied by a detailed explanation of its basis. Bergh also gave
a more practical explanation of the previously mentioned communications problem by pointing out that branches would
require the state to employ several examiners at one time to
simultaneously examine the main bank and its branches. This
point may be a factor often overlooked in attempting to analyze
early legislative concerns over the difficulties accompanying
branch banking.
Another historical argument against branching was that
early taxes were structured in such a fashion that if branches
35
replaced unit banks, the local community would lose taxes.
Thus, there existed a local incentive to prohibit branches. A
further local argument against branches contended that a
branch, governed by strict rules and regulations from the main
office, would leave few decisions to the manager's discretion.
Consequently, it would be difficult for a young man, or a local
infant industry, with little capital to secure credit from a
36
branch.
III. THE

CURRENT APPLICABILITY OF THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE
FOR THE PROHIBITION

OF BRANCH BANKING

Based on the foregoing, the historical rationale for the prohibition of branch banking can be separated into five main categories: inadequate communications, lack of stability, management incompetency, lack of local control, and miscellaneous
dangers. It is important to examine these historical rationales
from the viewpoint of modern banking practices and the
present situation in the banking industry.
A.

Communications

A detailed examination of the change in communications
systems since 1911 is not necessary to conclude that the communication problem, a substantial factor in past anti-branching
legislation, has long since been solved. Auditors and examiners
no longer encounter difficulty in getting to branches. This outdated argument was aptly dismissed in 1966 by George W.
Mitchell, a Federal Reserve Board Governor, who "envisions the
34 Branches of Banks & Trust Companies, 24 BANKING L.J. 166 (1907).
35 V. WILLIT, CHAIN, GROUP, AND BRANCH BANKING 176 (1930).
36 Id. at 43.
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advancement of automation to a point that not only will permit,
but will force, profound changes in banking structure."3 7 He
further points out that computers will soon make it possible
to avoid outmoded banking restrictions and that some banks
38
have already done so through the mail service.
B.

Stability

The stability concern, like the communications issue, has
completely changed in its characteristics. It is now well accepted that: "[T]here is little question but that a powerful
branch organization offers a greater protection as a repository
of funds than does the small independent institution. '39 Onesixth of all banks existing in 1920 failed by 1928. 411Figures from
post World War II to 1966 show that an average of only five
banks, or .04 percent of the total number of banks, fail each
year. 41 This rate is so low it has prompted Representative
Patman, Chairman of House Banking and Currency Committee,
to remark that there are not enough bank failures. He indicates
that, unlike the situation in 1899, the market today is not sufficiently competitive and that if more competition existed consumers would benefit. 4 - He further points out: "When we boast
of no bank failures, let's remember that several thousand other
business firms may have failed because the banks did not take
43
as many reasonable risks as they might have taken.
Management Competency
The fear of poor management stems from an apprehension
that branches could carry on the same business as the main
institution "without being subject. to safeguards afforded the
establishment and administration of the latter. '44 Today, due
mainly to the increase in communication technology, branches
may be easily regulated and protected by the head office's
"administration" and "safeguards." The fear of not having the
president ever-present has therefore been technically relieved.
However, there currently exists an argument which charges
that the complex managerial hierarchy moves all competent
C.
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40 V. WIaLrr, supra note 35, at 108.
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managers to the main office, leaving local areas with managers
who have no ability to react to local problems. How wellfounded is this fear?
D. Feared Loss of Local Control
Fear of loss of local control is a bifurcated argument used
to justify the prohibition of branch banking. The first aspect
of the argument is that the local populace will not be able to
effectively influence "absentee" managers who make decisions
from the main office. This, it is asserted, will make loans difficult to obtain and subordinate local interests to those of "big
city" banks.
With respect to the impact of branching on the availability
of loans, it should be pointed out that "the smaller the bank,
the higher the ratio of sterile assets (cash) and government
securities to total resources. '45 Data indicates that banks with
deposits of 5 to 10 million dollars hold 35 percent of their assets
in liquidity reserves and 51.7 percent in loans and discounts.
The banks with 25 to 100 million in deposits hold 28.3 percent
in liquidity reserves and loan 54.9 percent. Institutions having
more than 100 million in deposits hold 27.6 percent in reserves
and loan 55.7 percent, while the very largest banks loan 75
percent of their deposits. 4" Thus it seems clear that instead
of making it more difficult for local people to obtain loans,
4
branching would actually have the opposite result.

7

The argument that community participation in local banks
benefits the community is equally unrealistic. A Federal Reserve Board study in 1962 showed that among banks with assets
of less than 5 million dollars (the 80 unit banks in single Colorado towns previously mentioned average assets of less than
3.3 million 41), 20 people or less owned 90 percent of the stock.
In most of these banks the controlling interest was held by
three stockholders. 4" Needless to say the interests of a small
group of stockholders do not always correspond to those of the
community.
An example of Coloradans "benefiting" from local autonomy was demonstrated in the 1963 case of Banking Board v.
Holyoke Industrial Bank. 0 The issue raised was: Did the fact
that the community had one bank preclude the need for an45 Rose, supra note 1, at 113.
46

Id.

47 Id. at 138.
48 E. HALAAS,

supra note 3, at 100.
49 Bratter, supra note 2, at 88.
50 152 Colo. 489, 383 P.2d 318 (1963).
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other? The Colorado Supreme Court overturned the banking
board's denial of a permit for a second bank when the record
revealed that the existent bank was a family organization whose
procedures included: in addition to a regular service charge,
the imposition of a "float charge" of 10 cents per $100 face value
for every check deposited which was drawn upon another bank;
paying 1 percent on savings accounts up to $10,000 with no
additional interest on accounts in excess of that amount; discouraging savings accounts; not handling consumer accounts;
limiting loans to $6,000; and making little effort to gain larger
loans for customers through correspondent banks.
The question of whose local interest is really being protected by unit banking is summarized by James Saxon, the
Comptroller of Currency from 1962 to 1966:
It is perfectly clear that [restrictive branch banking] laws show
little regard for the public interest, that they are designed to protect the selfish interests cf the less energetic or competent segments of the industry which cannot abide the prospect of competition. It is unfortunate that such laws do not meet the economic needs cf the people and of the industries, but
serve instead
the determined opposition of parochial interest.51

The second aspect of the feared loss of local control argument involves the belief that free competition among banks of
all sizes will bring about a money monopoly in the major banking centers and cause a depletion of bank assets at the local
level. This argument is based on speculation with respect to
what would happen to small unit banks if forced to compete
with big money branches. One answer is found in the Hearings
of the Committee on Banking and Currency where Mr. Saxon
acknowledged that, for many banking services, size confers no
advantage. Experience has shown that well-managed, adequately capitalized, aggressive small banks can and do prosper
when in competition with the country's largest institutions. "For
such banks, which rely upon their own efforts, and not upon
public protection against competition, there will always be a
'52
place in the banking structure.
Existence of larger banking institutions has not proven to
be detrimental to a competitive atmosphere. Studies have shown
"that the most competition, and the most aggressive competition,
typically occurs among the nation's relatively small number of
larger banks. '5 3 Indeed, these larger banks are competing, or
147,
150 (1962).
52 Hearings on the Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 374
(1963).
5 E. HALAAS, supra note 3, at 94, citing C. KRIEPs, MONEY, BANKING AND
MONETARY POLICY 199 (1962).
51 J. SAXON, 100TH ANNUAL REPORT OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
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are at least willing to compete, with many of the smaller banks
throughout the nation. The extent to which these banks are
allowed to grow does not have to be regulated differently in
various states, since the Bank Holding Company Act and the
Bank Merger Act5 5 can now be relied upon as effective barriers to excessive concentration of banking at the state level. "
In any event, to allow Colorado's group and chain banking to
expand only through acquisition of established institutions is a
less rational alternative than to allow new branches to be
created as direct and local competitors to existing banks in
growing population areas.
It is often argued that economies of scale provide cost benefits which will allow branching institutions to monopolize the
industry. This argument is fallacious. Many studies conclude
that as the size of a bank increases, costs decline for unit banks
but increase for branch banks; 57 and, it has been shown that
branching results in higher costs for nearly all bank service.58
As for the magnitudes of these cost differences, a study by the
Commission of Money and Credit conducted on all member
banks of the Federal Reserve in 1959 found these differences to
be small but consistently higher for branches. 59 Another study
of unit and branch banks showed the cost of services for banks
with four or more branches to be higher by 9 percent of total
operating expenses.60 This belief in the creation of a monopoly
through the use of cost advantages is further contradicted by
California statistics which show that for the period 1961-66 the
number of branch banks increased 47 percent (California has
permitted branches for over 50 years),61 while the number of
unit banks rose 76 percent.6 2 Therefore, the fact that monopoly
is not created by allowing branch banking is demonstrated by
practical experience, as well as by cost studies.
This idea of prohibiting money monopoly advanced by the
proponents of anti-branch banking regulations has another and
12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (Supp. 1972), amending 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (1969).
§ 1828(c) (1970).
56General Bankshares Corp., 53 FED. RES. BULL. 65 (1967); Wells Fargo
Bank, 52 FED. RES. BULL. 655 (1966).
57 D. ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 83, 87-88 (1954).
58 Edwards, supra note 41, at 787.
59 Benston, Branch Banking and Economies of Scale, 20 J. FIN. 312, 328-29
(1965).
54
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often untold aspect. The prohibition of branch banking, ostensibly intended to block a money monopoly, often gives the local
unit banker a mild form of local monopoly. The public is not
best served by these regulations which protect banks of a particular size; the consumer is more interested in the establishment of a banking system which effectively meets his needs.
The protection of perhaps undeserving interest is not a new
problem and is summarized by the late Senator Glass of Virginia, a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee for over 30 years:
The appeal of the little bank, so-called, against the "monopolistic" tendencies of branch-banking is misleading when we come
to reason about it. The fact is that the little banker is the monopolist. He wants to exclude credit facilities from any other
source than his bank. He wants to monopolize the credit accommodations of his community: He does not want any other bank
in his state to come there.63

A recent Colorado example of this practice of exclusion is
found in Banking Board v. Turner Industrial Bank,64 where the
main criteria for denial of a new charter by the Banking Board
was the existence of another bank in the area. In its decision,
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the effect of a new
charter upon existing institutions should not be an issue when
a decision could be based upon advantages to the public and
their needs. Despite such recent recognition of public needs,
there is a better solution for the regulation of monopoly in the
banking industry than absolute branching prohibitions.
E.

Other Factors
The old fear of issuing notes and wild cat currency no
longer exists. Although there is little doubt that an original
motive for creating branches was to provide an outlet for notes
that could be redeemed only at the main office, thereby keeping
the notes in circulation for a longer period of time, the need for
such a favorable "float" situation is extinct. Moreover, there are
many other collateral issues, such as local taxes and increased
requirements for examiners, that must be exposed in order to
weigh the merits of branch banking accurately. These issues
indicate that motives exist for prohibiting branches which persuade the legislature not to adhere to an objective public benefit analysis.
Political considerations have always contributed input and
should be weighed appropriately in any evaluation of the bank63 Bratter, supra note 2, at 90.
64
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ing system. An interesting comment made as far back as 1924
illustrates this point: "While the economic arguments for branch
banking would logically lead to nation-wide branch banking as
it exists abroad, political considerations render the discussion
of such an extension purely theoretical at this time. '65 This idea
of branch banking policy being a mixture of both political and
economic forces holds true today. It is the political forces outside of the legal system which must be harnessed toward the
objective of serving the public benefit rather than being allowed to continue to favor pressure groups. Only after an
attitudinal change can the legal regulatory system prescribe
efficient laws which avoid circumvention (such as today's allowing group and chain banking) and either prohibit or allow
branch banking.
IV.

WHAT CAN BE GAINED BY ALLOWING BRANCH

BANKING?

Since the historical rationales for the prohibition of branch
banking are certainly subject to question, the benefits to be
derived from a change to allow branch banking should be examined. Also the questions should be asked: What have other
states which have changed their banking restrictions gained by
the change, and what does a continued prohibition of branch
banking cost the public?
A 1961 study conducted by the University of Chicago on
Illinois banking practices reveals facts which lead one to question the public benefit derived from a branching prohibition.
Illinois is a classic example of a state where unit banking has
prevailed in the face of pressures to change it. The study
termed Chicago the most "underbanked" city in the nation and
labeled the Illinois banking system as not only incomplete and
rigid but also unsuccessful in attracting savings or putting out
loans at lower rates. Branch banking's value was regarded as
"the most powerful method . . . [of] improving the supply of
bank services quickly and at the lowest cost to the community."66
If branch banking were allowed, service could be increased
for the public's benefit to improve on such conditions as found
in Holyoke. As the Illinois study indicates, the branch prohibition causes unusual charges by other non-bank entities. 67 Not
only can services provided by branch banking be less expensive,
they can also be much more convenient. This is especially
65 C.
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true for Colorado because of its changing population patterns,
a fact which will encourage the banks to open branches in the
growing suburbs. The increase in service gained by allowing
branches to coexist is summarized by a study conducted by the
New York State Banking Department which listed among the
beneficial effects of branch banking these positive points:
"lower loan rates, higher interest on savings deposits, more
liberal loan maturities and loan-value ratios, greater services
and banking facilities, larger lending authority and greater
' '6
convenience for the public.
Another facet of banking which may be improved by the
removal of branching prohibitions is the free transfer of funds
from one sector of the state to another. Presently, the method
used by unit banks to satisfy the needs of their customers with
large cash demands is to establish correspondent relations with
other banks. This arrangement requires that a substantial
amount of the liquidity funds of local banks be deposited with
the larger corresponding institution. This in turn causes a local
bank's excess liquidity reserves to be removed to the big money
centers where they often earn a lower return than possible
given other potential uses. The money centers profit from such
an arrangement at the expense of the local bank. This situation
would definitely be improved if branches could transfer funds
internally with "sister" branches without restraint. In the absence of branching restrictions, transfers could be based upon
present need rather than upon an automatic funneling of funds
to big business and big money centers.
A further advantage of branch banking is the manager's
potential freedom in determining local needs, an ability which
local unit bank managers lack because of their heavy dependence on the larger correspondent institutions for a final decision
on loans.
Not only would the branches achieve more local autonomy
and profits, but a local businessman who outgrows a small unit
bank's capabilities could continue to do business with a local
branch, instead of taking his business to a different region or
state. For example, in New Hampshire, where branching is
prohibited, bankers are showing concern over many growing
corporations transferring their business to larger banks in Boston.69 The fact that other means exist for promoting competition between large and small institutions, such as the promotion
68
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of group and chain banking, is aptly dismissed by James Saxon
who states that the existence of such alternatives is no justification for arbitrarily depriving the public of the benefits to be
derived from small unit banks directly competing with larger
70
unit banks and their branches.
The prohibition against branching also produces a vacuum,
created by unsatisfied financial demands, which institutions
other than commercial banks fill. Loan companies, credit unions,
industrial banks, savings and loan associations, private lenders,
and various federal agricultural credit agencies are the institutions which are supposedly filling this void at present. These
organizations are, however, not equipped to perform as efficiently the full range of services which commercial banks
offer.7 1 Furthermore, from the public's point of view, these
alternatives offer more costly and less efficient operations than
commercial banks. James Saxon has warned that unit banks
and their opposition to branch banking are directly responsible
for the growth of these non-banking institutions, a fact which
injures all segments of the commercial banking industry. Saxon
also feels that the regulation of branch banking lessens banking
efficiency and prevents the growth of banks both large and
7 2
small which are able to fill the varying needs of society.
An outgrowth of this dilemma has been the increase in
holding companies and chain banks. There is no doubt that
many bankers regard the multi-bank holding company or privately controlled chain bank as merely a technique to circumvent
7 3
branching restrictions, with no other purposes or advantages.
However, there are important differences between these alternatives and branch banking, especially concerning their capital
structures. Holding companies are basically a series of unit
banks with independent cash supplies; there is no free flow of
currency between the members of the company or chain. The
result requires holding company and chain banks to reside in
populous areas where they can profitably survive. Smaller communities, consequently, are deprived of the ready access of a
local bank. On the other hand, branches can be structured to be
as small as necessary and thereby operate successfully in suburban areas where unit banks, though owned by a holding com70
71
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pany, could not operate profitably. 74 Therefore, the prohibition
of branches not only deprives some areas of local banking, but
also encourages group and chain banking.
It can also be argued that economic growth is a benefit
derived from branching. Those states which have the most
fragmented banking--which include Colorado, even though
group and chain banking account for one-third of all banks and
two-thirds of all deposits7 5 - appear to show less economic
progress than those maintaining a favorable environment for
banking growth through branching. 76 This fact alone does not
indicate which phenomenon is the causative agent, but this may
be inferred from observing which states fragment banking by
prohibiting branching.
Most states which prohibit branches have predictable homogeneous economies which do not demand a funds flow system
necessary to satisfy diversified business population and seasonal
needs of varying areas. Most agricultural states are dominated
by stable businesses whose financial needs are not growing
quickly enough to lobby for more progressive regulatory systems. An example of this type of economy is Iowa, which is
noted for its predictable corn-hog cycle economy. Conversely,
California's free branching system reflects the population's and
industry's needs in an ever-changing environment. There, various demands on resources do not allow money to be restricted to
predictable agricultural seasons, and therefore dictate a more
flexible funds flow which is provided by a branching system.
The statistics verify the progressive nature of branch banking.
Five of the six states which had the greatest increase in per
capita income from 1957 to 1967 showed increases in their banking concentration. The six states with the lowest increase in
per capita income during the same period all had decreases in
banking concentration.77 Though admittedly either characteristic need not be dependent upon the other, these figures add
credibility to the arguments for branching when discussing the
future of Colorado's growing economy.
SUMMARY

Colorado needs more flexibility in its laws regarding branch
banking. The historical problems upon which today's laws are
based have become either obsolete through time or controlled
by new laws. There remain no valid reasons (other than Saxon's
74 D. ALHADEFF, supra note 57, 232.
75 See Colorado Section, POLK'S BANK DICTIONARY (1971).
76 Rose, supra note 1, at 142.
77 Id.
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selfish interests explanation7 8 ) for such restrictive laws to exist
under the guise of protecting the public. The public deserves
branch banking service. The economic needs of Coloradans,
coupled with the presently inefficient laws, are allowing the
less favorable alternatives to branch banking to fill the void
created by the present prohibition. These laws, when combined
with Colorado's unique control of commercial banks which allow
savings and loan associations to go unregulated, aggravate this
situation and point toward the need for immediate legislative
action on the subject of branch banking.
Moreover, the present statutory restrictions, if arbitrarily
continued, could be stripped of their foundation by changes in
the national banking system. The desire of the national system
for less stringent restrictions is explained by the former Comptroller of Currency, James Saxon, who, when discussing the
branching restrictions, remarked, "To withhold entirely any
means for reaching our national goals [of efficiency] is to court
the peril of failure - a failure we cannot afford in today's
world."7 9 It is therefore strongly urged that before the national
banking system is changed to eliminate the state's restrictions,
thus weakening the dual banking, Colorado's present laws be
updated to coincide with other states' modern concept of what
benefits the public.
James E. Heffer

supra note 51.
Hearings, supra note 52, at 375.
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COMMENT
CRIMINAL LAW -

CONCURRENT

SENTENCING

-

Multiple Convictions
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-1-508 and

DeBose v. People, 488 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1971)
INTRODUCTION

the recent case of DeBose v. People' the Colorado Supreme
Court held that: (1) since robbery 2 and conspiracy to commit
robbery3 constitute separate and distinct offenses, multiple convictions may be obtained for their commission; and (2) the
separate offenses of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery
may be punished, in the discretion of the trial court, by consecutive sentences. In so holding the court adopted the common
law rule which prevails in the United States. 4 The new Colorado Criminal Code,5 enacted a few months prior to the court
opinion in DeBose, deals with both consecutive sentences and
multiple convictions and became effective on July 1, 1972. This
comment examines the impact of the new Colorado Criminal
Code upon the rule recently established by the Colorado Supreme Court in DeBose.
N

I. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS

The first part of the DeBose holding established that a defendant may be convicted for both robbery and conspiracy to
commit robbery. Section 40-1-508(1) of the recently enacted
Colorado Criminal Code, however, bars multiple convictions for
several types of multiple charges, 6 but it does not bar multiple
convictions for conspiracy and the related substantive offense.
1 488 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1971).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-5-1

(Supp. 1967).

3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-35 (1963).

4 See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); United States
v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915); Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d
742 (9th Cir. 1955).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40

(Supp. 1971).

6 Id. § 40-1-508(1).
Prosecutionof multiple counts for same act. (1) When any conduct
of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He
may not be convicted of more than one offense if:
(a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (5) of this section; or
(b) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the
other; or
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Although section 40-1-508(1) was supposedly adopted from
section 1.07 of the Model Penal Code,' the Colorado Criminal
Code omits the portion of the Model Act which provides:
When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant
. may not
... be convicted of more than one offense if . . (b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other .... 8

Instead, the Colorado legislature substituted in its place
language barring multiple convictions for attempt and the substantive offense. By virtue of this substitution it appears that
the legislature agrees with the DeBose rule that multiple convictions may be obtained for the separate and distinct offenses
of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.
II. CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES?

DeBose also established that related multiple offenses may
be punished, in the discretion of the trial court, by consecutive
sentences. The new Colorado statute, however, provides that
concurrent sentencing will be required in situations in which
multiple prosecutions are prohibited. That prohibition, which
is a significant innovation in itself, is briefly examined prior to
the discussion of concurrent sentencing.
A.

Multiple Prosecutions
The potential of prosecutorial abuse in multiple prosecutions has recently received much attention. Procedural rules
which allow the prosecutor to hold separate trials for separate
offenses arising from the same transaction permit the prosecutor to engage in "jury shopping" a technique by which prosecutions may continue until a verdict satisfactory to the prosecutor is rendered."' Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in

(c)
(d)
(e)

7 Id. The
adopted
added).

Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the
commission of the offenses; or
The offenses differ only in that cne is defined to prohibit
a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to
prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or
The offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct
and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted,
unless the law provides that specific periods or instances
of such conduct constitute separate offenses.
Comment states erroneously: "Subsection (1) of this section is
without change from Model Penal Code Section 1.07." (emphasis

8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (Proposed Final Draft, 1962).
:9Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 n.3 (1969).
'1 Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S.
464 (1958).
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Ashe v. Swenson,1 argued that the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy ought to be construed to include protection from "jury shopping." The Colorado legislature appears
to have adopted Justice Brennan's formulation in section 40-1508(2) of the Criminal Code:
If the several offenses are known to the district attorney
at the time of commencing the prosecution and were committed within his judicial district, all such offenses upon which
the district attorney elects to proceed must be prosecuted by
separate counts in a single prosecution if they are based on the
same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode. Any such offense not thus joined by separate count cannot thereafter be the basis of a subsequent prosecution.1 2

Although the section contains the limitations that the prosecutor must be aware of the offense and that the offense must
have been committed within his judicial district, these limitations do not dilute the effective prohibition on "jury shopping."
It is important to remember that this subsection does not bar
multiple convictions; it merely requires the state to seek such
convictions in a single trial whenever the offenses charged
occurred within the same criminal episode.
B.

Concurrent Sentencing

Section 40-1-508 (3) requires that under certain circumstances
any sentences imposed upon multiple convictions run concurrently:
When two or more offenses are charged as required by
subsection (2) of this section and they are supported by identical evidence, the court upon application of the defendant may
require the state, at the conclusion of all the evidence, to elect
the count upon which the issues shall be tried. If more than
one guilty verdict is returned as to any defendant in a prosecution where multiple counts are tried as required by subsection
(2) of this section, the sentences imposed must run concurrently."

The term "identical evidence" is employed to identify a situation
where only one "crime" has been committed, apparently codifying the Blockburger additional fact test 1 4 for determining when
the traditional double jeopardy protection applies. According to
this test, robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery are separate
and distinct offenses, since each requires the proof of a fact not
11 397 U.S. 436, 488 (1969)
12
1
3
14

COLO.

REV.

STAT.

Id. § 40-1-508(3).

(concurring opinion).
(Supp. 1971).

ANN. § 40-1-508(2)

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). "[T]he test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provisicn requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."
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necessary to the proof of the other. This distinction was considered to be of major importance by the majority of the court
in DeBose.15 The second sentence of subsection (3), however,
requires that any jail terms imposed upon multiple convictions
run concurrently. 1 This sentence, taken alone, appears to overrule the second holding in DeBose.
It might be argued, however, that subsection (3) taken as a
whole, is applicable only in "identical evidence" situations and,
thus, provides different protections at different stages of the
same prosecution. This argument would contend that the second
sentence of the subsection is applicable only when the court
does not require the state to make an election as provided in
17
the first sentence. But this is not a proper interpretation. The
two sentences of subsection (3) should be read separately because they apply to mutually exclusive fact situations. In the
first, an identical evidence situation, there is only one "crime,"
and therefore, as a matter of law, only one conviction can occur,
and the bar against consecutive sentences is inapplicable. This
merely codifies the Blockburger test."8 In the second fact situation, multiple convictions are anticipated: a defendant need
only show that his case is subject to the requirements of subsection (2) to receive protection from consecutive sentences.
Since the two sentences of subsection (3) refer to different fact
situations, it is clear that they are independent.
The question remaining, then, is whether the crimes of
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery must be prosecuted
as separate counts in a single prosecution under subsection (2).
The critical language of that provision is the phrase "same act
or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode." The
Drafting Committee Comment indicates that this phrase is
15 DeBose v. People, 488 P.2d 69, 70 (Colo. 1971).
"'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-508(3) (Supp. 1971). The provision employs the terms "guilty verdict" and "tried." If a defendant pleads
guilty to the charges (as the defendant did in DeBose), he would be
unable to qualify for the protection from consecutive sentences. It is,
however, doubtful that a court would be inclined to construe these
terms strictly, because to do so would be to provide protection to only
those defendants who exercise their constitutional right to a trial by
jury.
17 Interview with former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Otto Moore
and Harvey Cochran (members of the Drafting Committee of the Colorado Criminal Code), Legislative Drafting Office, Denver, Colorado,
Nov. 3, 1971. The drafters intended that these sentences be taken
separately. It would be bizarre, indeed, to give a defendant protection
from more than one conviction, and to allow him the lesser protection
of barring ccnsecutive sentences if he failed to exercise his right to the
former protection.
18 Test quoted note 14 supra.

1972

COMMENT

synonymous with "same conduct or criminal transaction.' 19 A
"criminal transaction" is not limited to each individual violation
of a separate statutory provision; it includes all of the violations which a defendant commits while pursuing a single objective. 2 All of the acts of the conspiracy and the commission
of the substantive offense were directed at accomplishing the
same purpose: the successful completion of the robbery. Thus,
these crimes fall within the phrase "series of acts arising from
the same criminal episode."'2' Even the majority of the court
in DeBose characterized the defendant's actions as a single
course of conduct in the same criminal transaction.2 2 Therefore,
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery are offenses which
must be prosecuted as separate counts in a single prosecution
as required by subsection (2), and if multiple convictions are
obtained, consecutive sentences may not be imposed.
CONCLUSION

As a result of the enactment of the Colorado Criminal Code,
the DeBose rule allowing consecutive sentences for multiple
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode has been shortlived. 23 Although it is not clear whether the Colorado legislature intended to leave the remainder of the DeBose rule intact the rule allowing multiple convictions for conspiracy and the
substantive offense - it is clear that they have done so.
The legislature has, thereby, adopted an interesting middle
ground: in a DeBose factual situation, the judge may no longer
impose consecutive sentences, but a parole board may (must?)
take into account the fact that the defendant is serving a sentence for more than one offense. Unless the legislature intends
9
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-508(2), Comment (Supp. 1971).
24In re Ward, 64 Cal. 2d 672, 414 P.2d 400, 51 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1966); Neal
v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
21 Moore and Cochran Interview, supra note 17. The drafters used this
language with the specific intent to include conspiracy and the substantive offense which was the object of the conspiracy, as well as other
fact situations.
22 DeBcse v. People, 488 P.2d 69, 70 (Colo. 1971). The court here applies
the Blockburger test (quoted note 14 supra) - "[t]he test as to whether
the same act or transaction constitutes two distinct crimes or offenses
....
" This test is applicable cnly when the charges are either assumed
or cha-acterized to have arisen from the same act or transaction.
23 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-501 (1) (f) (Supp. 1971). This provision

indicates that if a significant change in the law has been applied to the
applicant's conviction or sentence which, in the interests of justice,
requires retroactive

application

of the changed

legal standard, the

defendant is entitled to post-conviction review even if his conviction
was affirmed on appeal. From this it would appear that DeBose might
be able to have his consecutive sentences changed to run concurrently,
especially since they were affirmed after passage of the new Code.
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to direct the parole authorities to differentiate on this basis,
there is little reason to exclude conspiracy and the substantive
offense from those multiple charges for which multiple convictions are barred. If the legislature did not so intend, a verbatim
adoption of section 1.07 (b) of the Model Penal Code would avoid
24
an unnecessary ambiguity.
Scott Anderson, Jr.

24

See p. 592 & note 8 supra.

BOOKS RECEIVED
CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS. A Law Quarterly. New York:
Martin Greenberg, Federal Legal Publications, Inc., Winter
1971-72. Pp. 180. $6.50 per copy, $24.00 per year. This publication
is a new legally oriented periodical intended to provide current
information on the legal, medical, psychological, and social
aspects of the drug crisis. While intended for attorneys, it is
written so as to be informative and easily understood by others
as well. Many articles are designed to make readers more informed community leaders, citizens and parents. For example,
this issue includes an article by a physician entitled "Drugs and
Drug Therapy: How to Interpret What You Read and Hear."
Other articles are specifically tailored to improve the effectiveness of attorneys in court, such as these two articles appearing
in this issue: "New Frontiers in the Defense of Drug Cases"
and " 'Dropsy' Evidence and the Viability of the Exclusionary
Rule," both written by experienced attorneys. Transcripts of
panel discussions or symposiums in which people of unquestionable expertise examine an important relevant topic are to be
regular features. This issue also features a panel discussion on
"Methadone Maintenance-Pro and Con." Other regular features
are to include brief reviews of significant court decisions, book
reviews, and a constantly updated bibliography primarily concerned with the legal aspects of drugs and narcotics.

THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW

ENFORCEMENT.
Neal A. Milner.
Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971. Pp. 268. $10.00.
The Court and Local Law Enforcement is a study which explores the impact of the Miranda decision upon local police.
The author's express purpose is to outline a methodology for
the analysis of policy impact. Milner suggests that the Supreme
Court outlined four goals in its Miranda opinion: (1) To discourage the use of confessions, which are inherently coercive;
(2) To insure that suspects are informed of their rights to
remain silent and to have an attorney present; (3) To improve
the quality of police officers; and (4) To reduce police anxiety
concerning the new procedure. The study is a comparison of
the impact of these policy objectives upon the police departments of four Wisconsin cities: Green Bay, Kenosha, Madison,
and Racine. The methodology employed consists of the traditional "hard" measures of crime statistics and clearance rates
as well as participant-observation, questionnaire, and interview
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techniques. Professionalization and participation in decisionmaking are treated as intervening variables.
Although the book appears to be primarily directed at sociologists who intend to make policy impact studies, the book is
easily understood by the laymen. Participants in the criminal
justice process should find this study of interest.
ADR SYSTEM. James T. Lyon. Washington, D.C.:
Tax Management Inc., 1971. Pp. iv, 105 (paperbound). This is
another in a series of Tax Management Portfolios. The author,
who is assistant vice president -taxes,
Chesapeake, Baltimore & Ohio Railroads, is obviously well-qualified to address this topic. The Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System
is a system for depreciation to be applied to machinery and
equipment and other specified types of property. It is new and
different enough to warrant the detailed analysis provided by
this portfolio. In this work, the author briefly outlines the history and background of the ADR System, compares it with prior
depreciation rules and procedures, and explains its provisions
with careful emphasis on problem areas. Readers will find
textual comments on these problem areas, numerous footnotes
to applicable code sections and regulations, and an extensive
42 page worksheet section containing an index of ADR regulations and other valuable working papers. This portfolio is a detailed guide for the tax lawyer and accountants, but its practical
and convenient format make it a useful and understandable
reference for the less specialized practitioner.
DEPRECIATION:

EcONOMIC IMPERIALISM:

A

BOOK OF READINGS.

Edited by Kenneth

E. Boulding and Tapan Mukerjee. Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press, 1972. Pp. xviii, 338, $10.00 (paperbound).
This work gathers 15 brilliant essays which portray the more
conventional concept of imperialism, i.e. the aspect of imperialism related to functions of production, consumption, and the
transfer of exchangeable goods. The works vividly describe the
nature of what economic imperialism is considered to be, as well
as depict individual case studies. The book is designed to stimulate the intellectual resolution of the controversies created by
Boulding's characteristic elements of economic imperialism and
of the doctrines that the political left contrives with these characteristics. This book could be considered a basic foundation
upon which to make a rigorous analysis of this controversial
economic subject.
ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW.

Irving J. Sloan. New York: Oceana

BOOKS RECEIVED

Publications, Inc., 1971. Pp. vii, 120. $3.25. In a brief and concise manner, Mr. Irving presents a wealth of important information, covering a variety of environmental topics, which range
from the cause and types of pollution to the role of the citizen
advocate in protecting the environment. Though a lawyer himself, the author has written a non-technical working text which
introduces present legislation and examines past litigation dealing with environmental control. Rather than analyze current
developments, the book attempts to set forth guidelines for the
concerned layman to employ when facing those environmental
problems which arise routinely in his daily life. In addition,
it contains an excellent bibliography of source material which
is valuable to anyone concerned with environmental quality.
This compact work is recommended to anyone who is involved,
on a lay level, with the battle against environmental degradation.
GETING JUSTICE:

THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE.

Stephen Gillers.

New

York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. Pp. x, 228. $6.95. Mr. Gillers is
a New York City lawyer whose "modest book" is meant "to
give nonlawyers (and lawyers unfamiliar with the area) an
introduction to the what and why of the criminal process." His
effort is successful. With the dual intention of making people
aware of their rights and justifying the decisions of the Warren Court, the author explains in a noncasebook manner the
basics of criminal procedure. The constitutional elements of
the area are introduced in terms of 22 rules, and the exclusionary rule is not addressed until nearly half-way into the book.
Laymen may find the frequent references to the specifics of
cases unnecessary, but the "unfamiliar attorney" will not.
INTERVENTION

AND

NEGOTIATION:

THE UNITED

STATES

AND

THE DO-

Jerome Slater. New York: Harper & Row,
1970. Pp. 245. $7.95. The swift "gunboat diplomacy" intervention of the United States in the Dominican Revolution of 1965
raised several grave questions about our foreign policy that
were largely ignored in the period immediately following the
revolution. As noted in the preface to this book, "there is not
a single book or article in any language that analyzes the full
range of U.S. policy in the Dominican Revolution from the military intervention of April, 1965, to the withdrawal of U.S. troops
in September, 1966." In an objective manner and with careful
documentation, Professor Slater examines the causes of the
revolution, the extent of the communist "threat," our long and
short-term policy objectives, and the natures of our successes
MINICAN

REVOLUTION.
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and failures. The author incorporates information gained from
more than 80 interviews with Dominican, United States, and
Organization of American States officials who were closely involved in the crisis. Professor Slater also goes beyond the
analysis of the Dominican intervention to apply the lessons of
that experience to the possibility of future revolutions or uprisings in Latin America. This is of particular importance in
light of the "no more Cubas" policy which dominated the thinking of the State Department in 1965-and may still today.
This book should be of particular interest to historians and
political scientists, and will also be valuable to anyone who
wants a graphic description of the wielding of American power.
Stanley Rosenblatt. Los Angeles: Nash, 1971.
Pp. 324. $6.95. Mr. Rosenblatt's work is an overview of the
more obvious problems in the criminal justice area. In discussing topics ranging from victimless crimes to court congestion, Mr. Rosenblatt points out the need for reform, and
offers some modest proposals to achieve that purpose. Innumerable examples of inequalities and miscarriages of justice
illustrate the author's thesis that our legal system is in need
of extensive overhaul. Lack of in-depth analysis of causes combined with the simplification of legal problems indicate that
Justice Denied is intended for a non-legal audience.
JUSTICE DENIED.

THE SOVIET SEA CHALLENGE:

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL

OF THE

Rear Admiral Ernest McNeill Eller, USN
(Ret.). Chicago: Cowles Book Company, Inc., 1971. Pp. ix,
315. $6.95. Admiral Eller's long career experience as a naval
officer and Director of Naval History for the U.S. Navy is evident in this intriguing chronicle of the Soviet naval buildup.
For many years the U.S. Navy has maintained overall superiority in naval strength among all the nations of the world, but
Admiral Eller presents us with a clear and serious message.
U.S. cutbacks and Soviet growth over the past several decades
have resulted in the present numerical superiority of the Soviet
naval and maritime fleets. All Americans who are worried
about Soviet armies, ICBM's, and air power are warned to consider yet another increasing threat to U.S. military superiority
-Soviet
sea power.
WORLD'S

OCEANS.

ABSTRACTS OF
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL PUBLICATIONS'
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
COMPUTER

AIDING

IN

THE

HUMAN

IDENTIFICATION

OF

CRIMINAL

SUSPECTS. Melvin H. Rudov, Albert Zavala, and Ernest S. Okonski. Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc., Buffalo, N.Y. September 1968. Pp. 146. A survey was made of current personal
appearance systems of some of the major law enforcement
agencies. These data were used to define the requirements for
an automated personal appearance system. Using these data,
a design of a APPAD (Automatic Processing of Personal Appearance Data) System was developed; this design included the
system's file content and its hardware and software components.
Several considerations of the use of an APPAD were discussed
including civil rights, control of access to files, and file purging.
A plan for implementing the APPAD was presented. Order
Number PB-202 031. $3.00.
Robert G. Dorsey. Army Combat
Developments Command, Judge Advocate Agency, Charlottesville, Va. September 1970. Pp. 167. The study analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of various methods of producing
complete, verbatim records of trial by courts-martial in the
Army in the field, 1970-75. It concludes that the machine shorthand (stenotype) method, employing warrant officer court reporters, is faster and more reliable and can be operated with
fewer personnel and less equipment, and at somewhat lower
cost than the closed-microphone electronic recording (stenomask) system as presently authorized, and is comparable in
cost to the present system when adjusted to provide more
realistic personnel and equipment authorizations. Personnel and
equipment requirements and costs can be reduced still further
by creating a corps of highly qualified stenotype reporters
assigned to the U.S. Army Judiciary. Order Number AD-728
127. $3.00.
COURT REPORTING PRACTICES.

PERSONAL

APPEARANCE

IDENTIFICATION:

PSYCHOLOGICAL

HUMAN IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION PROCESSES.
* These

abstracts

are reprinted

STUDIES

OF

Albert Zavala.

from GOVERMENT REPORTS ANNOUNCE-

MENTS and UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT

REPORTS. Unless otherwise indicated, the studies abstracted may be
obtained in their entirety by ordering from the National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Payment must be
enclosed with the order, and orders must include the "order number"
given after each abstract.
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Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc., Buffalo, N.Y. January
1970. Pp. 456. A compilation was made of human characteristics important for identifying criminal suspects. Based
upon this survey, several experimental studies were conducted
to obtain further data. These experiments included the following; a study of exposure time upon witness accuracy; a comparison of front, profile, and portrait views; the contribution
of color to mug shot identification; an analysis of the features
used by people in identifying white males, black males, white
females, and black females; a comparison of spoken speech
with sound spectrograms; the contribution of dynamic imagery
to identification; and the effect of distraction upon witnesses.
The results of these experiments are summarized and recommendations are made for improving personal appearance identification by law enforcement agencies. Order Number PB-202
032. $6.00.
Jack A. Klapper, Michael
A. McColloch, and F.R. Sidell. Edgewood Arsenal, Md.
July 1971. Pp. 13. Case records of 33 U.S. Army volunteers who
received varying doses of ethyl alcohol (0.6 to 1.6 gm/kg) are
reviewed. Significant relationships are reported between performance on a cognitive task and personality as measured by
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Army
General Intelligence Test. The personality characteristics of
the subjects who were relatively resistant to the cognitive decrement produced by the lower doses of alcohol were similar
to those reported for chronic alcoholics. At higher doses, however, sensitive subjects had these same characteristics. Order
Number AD-728 450. $3.00.
PERSONALITY AND REACTIVITY TO ALCOHOL.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THE COMPREHENSIVE
ANDER,

FRANKLIN,

PULASKI,

UNION,

CRIMINAL

JACKSON,
AND

JUSTICE

JEFFERSON,

WILLIAMSON

1971-76.

PLAN

JOHNSON,

COUNTIES,

MASSAC,

ILLINOIS.

ALEXPERRY,

Greater

Egypt Regional Planning and Development Commission, Carbondale, Ill. 1971. Pp. 133. The plan is a review of the existing
structure of criminal justice programs in the ten counties of
Alexander, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Massac, Perry,
Pulaski, Union, and Williamson and a review of the status of
these programs in relationship to emerging national, state, and
regional changes in the criminal justice system. The plan also
projects possible solutions to some of the criminal justice needs
within the area. Order Number PB-201 931. $3.00.
CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

ACTIVITIES

IN

THE

GREATER

EGYPT

REGION.

ABSTRACTS
FRANKLIN, JACKSON,

. 603

JEFFERSON, PERRY AND

WILLIAMSON COUNTIES,

ILLINOIS. Greater Egypt Regional Planning and Development
Commission, Carbondale, Ill. 1971. Pp. 46. The report provides
an initial analysis of the overall effectiveness of the criminal
justice system in the Greater Egypt Region. It includes sections
on the police, the prosecution, the courts, probation, corrections,
juvenile delinquency and crime prevention. The purpose of the
plan is to identify the stage of development of criminal justice
services and to indicate the direction of development that will
be required over the next several years in order to bring about
a stabilization and reduction of crime in the Region. Order Number PB-201 930. $3.00.
EMPLOYMENT
INSTRUMENTALITY

THEORY

PREDICTIONS

OF

STUDENTS'

ATrrrUDES

TOWARDS BUSINESS AND THEIR CHOICE OF BUSINESS AS AN OCCUPATION. Terence R. Mitchell and Barrett W. Knudsen. Washington
University, Seattle, Wash. July 1971. Pp. 71. Both choice of and
attitude toward business as an occupation were predicted
from the components of instrumentality theory. This theory
suggests that evaluations and choices are determined by the
instrumentality of the object or choice leading to certain outcomes weighted by the evaluations of the outcomes. The results supported this hypothesis. There was also a strong indication that the reasons for not choosing business were more related to the instrumentality component of the theory than to
the evaluation component. Choice of other occupations is limited
to attaining valued goals rather than to differences in the
evaluation of goals. Order Number AD-729 241. $3.00.
1970's. Neil A. Palomba and Edward
B. Jakubauskas. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1971.
Pp. 244. The Industrial Relations Center's fourth annual Summer Manpower Research Institute was held at Ames, Iowa,
from June 8-12, 1970. Government and university researchers
there explored the nature of, and need for, manpower research
in the 1970's, and the development and purpose of manpower
research centers. Specific topics included: (1) BLS research
programs; (2) research as a force of change among the urban
poor; (3) longitudinal studies of labor market behavior; (4) the
evolution of performance; (5) the role of the university as a
resource in promoting community and economic development;
(6) cross-cultural research in management studies; and (7) the
emerging need for interagency coordination and development
personnel in the manpower field. Order Number PB-202 352.
$3.00.
MANPOWER RESEARCH IN THE
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A

STUDY OF NEGRO

MALE HIGH

SCHOOL

DROPOUTS WHO

ARE

NOT

Regis H. Walther.
George Washington University, Washington, D.C. September
1970. Pp. 304. A study investigated the characteristics of Negro
male high school dropouts that might inhibit their participation
in Federal work-training programs. Interviews were conducted
with 300 Negro male youths in Baltimore and St. Louis, dropouts during the 1966-67 academic year who were believed not
to have availed themselves of Federal work-training programs.
Failure to participate in MDTA and other training programs
was traced primarily to the fact that less than one-third had
ever heard of these programs. Those who knew about them
indicated they did not want what the programs offered. The researchers recommended greater use of media announcements
and better counseling for Negro youth through the schools and
the employment service. They also suggested changes in training programs to put more stress on career opportunities than on
simply "a job" and orientation to the world of work. Order
Number PB-202 110. $6.00.
REACHED BY FEDERAL WORK-TRAINING PROGRAMS.

THE

SUPPLY

OF

LABOR

AND

THE

INCENTIVE

EFFECTS

OF

INCOME

Samuel Arthur Rea, Jr. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. August 1971. Pp. 281. The theory of
labor supply is analyzed with special attention to the relation
betwen labor supply and unemployment. Techniques for stimulating the effects of transfer programs are developed. The
literature on the supply of hours and the effects of income
taxes, Social Security, and public assistance is reviewed. Supply
functions for those age 25 and over are estimated, and the
supply response to 11 alternative negative income tax plans is
simulated. A $2,400 guarantee for a family of four with a 50
percent tax rate is estimated to reduce hours supplied by the
recipients by 12 percent and decrease the number in the labor
force by 21 percent. The social security retirement test is found
to have no effect on hours supplied. Order Number PB-202 351.
$3.00.
MAINTENANCE

THE

PROGRAMS.

UNIVERSITY

AND

MANPOwER

EDUCATIONAL

SERVICES:

AN

J. Earl Williams.
Houston University, Houston, Tex. July 1971. Pp. 105. The goal
of the Manpower Educational Services Project at the University
of Houston was, in the short run, to explore using a university's
capability and position in the community to contribute to the
understanding and functioning of manpower programs in its
geographic area. In the long run, it was hoped that a permanent
EXPERIMENTAL

AND

DEMONSTRATION

PROJECT.

ABSTRACTS

center could be established with state and local support and
financing. This program included a small college manpower
lecture series, a Houston employer program, a series of manpower conferences, and a staff development program for manpower related agencies. Out of this project a permanent center,
the Center for Human Resources, has evolved. This Center offers
technical assistance, training and orientation, information services, and research to the community and a college curriculum
in manpower which was available in the fall of 1971. The results
of this showed that it is possible to take a relatively small
contract which calls for services necessary to the development
of a manpower related center and, given time, achieve the more
important long-run objective, the development of a major manpower resource in the form of a manpower related center on a
university campus. Order Number PB-202 116. $3.00.
WORK

AND

NON-WORK:

INSTITUTIONAL

PERSPECTIVES.

Robert

Dubin. California University at Irvine. July 1971. Pp. 39. A distinction is drawn between two models of social institutions,
contrasting their characteristics and pointing out the implications of each model for an understanding of work and the
production institution. It is concluded that the "multiequal"
model of social institutions provides a more adequate picture
of industrial societies. The analytical grounds for developing
the "multiequal" model are set forth as well as the implications for work that may be drawn from this model. Predictions
are made regarding the relations between institutions and work
in the future. Order Number AD-728 783. $3.00.
ENVIRONMENT
TOWARD WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT. John H.
Peterson, Jr. and Peggy J. Ross. Mississippi State University,
State College. 1971. Pp. 60. A study was made of changes in
the attitudes of local landowners toward watershed development
which took place during a 6-year period in which a small
watershed development project was underway in their area.
Attitude change was measured in terms of changes of percent of
landowners expressing favorable or unfavorable attitudes. The
findings suggest that implementation of a watershed project
is important in the attitudes toward water resource development. The findings suggest that just as favorable attitudes
facilitate water resource development, water resource development can contribute to the formation of favorable attitudes.
Order Number PB-202 209. $3.00.
CHANGING ATTITUDES

DECISION PROCESSES IN WATER QuALrTY MANAGEMENT.

Research
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and Development Laboratory. Engineering Science, Inc., Oakland, Cal. April 1971. Pp. 155. Various techniques of social system
research were combined with simulation modeling of water
quality decisionmaking in the State of California. Focus of
the study was on the description of the informal interactions
which govern decisionmaking, particularly in regards to regional-state interaction. Time-based behavior, and feedbacks
between the social and technical sector, are taken as important
parameters governing overall system behavior. The conflict
between long-term and short-term objectives is examined. A
behavioral exercise, involving role-playing techniques conducted
with members of the California regional water quality control
boards, is described in detail. Conclusions are drawn relating to
long-term environmental management, and with respect to the
nature and ethics of conducting social system research in environmental management. A model environmental management
system, incorporating an institutionalization of the adversary
process, is presented. Order Number PB-202 406. $3.00.
SOME

LEGAL,

SOCIAL

AND

ECONOMIC

PROBLEMS

OF

GROUND

D. Barlowe Burke, Jr., Arthur D. Jeffreys,
and Irving A. Spaulding. Rhode Island University, Kingston,
R. I. 1971. Pp. 23. The purpose was to ascertain the legal theories
under which pollution of groundwater is policed in Rhode
Island. The author suggests legal theory to preserve the quality
of the state's groundwater resources. Studies in the field and
state records are discussed. To improve this situation, direction
is suggested toward a notion of water law that balances many
possible uses for the water supply and recognizes the existence
of hydro-ecology in a watershed. Order Number PB-202 420.
$3.00.
WATER

A

POLLUTION.

STUDY

TION

AND

OF

THE

MAGNITUDE

POTENTIAL

OF

ABATEMENT.

TRANSPORTATION
VOLUME

VII.

NOISE

GENERA-

ABATEMENT

RE-

SPONSIBILITY.
Eastern Operations Division, Serendipity, Inc.,
Arlington, Va. November 1970. Pp. 84. The effectiveness of transportation noise abatement may depend upon the creation and
enforcement of appropriate legislation. Existing regulations and
enforcement experience have been analyzed for air and surface
transportation at the federal, state, and local level. The influence of the public and industrial self-regulation have also
been investigated. The report addresses the allocation of responsibility and the need for transportation noise abatement
standards. While the effectiveness of some forms of transportation noise abatement are constrained by the limits of techno-
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logical feasibility, the implementation and enforcement of any
noise abatement action is dependent upon the existence of the
necessary authority and responsibility. Within the context of
this discussion, responsibility is addressed primarily in the
regulatory sense. Order Number PB-201 831. $3.00.

A

STUDY OF SENSITIVITY TO NOISE.

R. W. Becker, F. Poza, and

K. D. Kryter. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Cal.
June 1971. Pp. 65. In the study, 140 subjects were exposed to
simulated sonic booms and recorded residential noises in one,
two, or three 2-hour sessions over a period of 6 months. Electrophysiological measures of heart rate and electromyographic responses to the stimuli were analyzed. Biographical, demographical, and personality inventories were also obtained for each
of the subjects. The purpose of this research was to: determine
whether there are different degrees of psychological and physiological sensitivity to noise in a large group of people; to determine whether and how such sensitivity varied in time; and
to relate such sensitivity to other psychological and personality
variables. Significant differences in psychological sensitivity to
noise were found in the subject population. These differences
remained stable for the duration of the experiment and were also
found to be related to the attitudinal and belief structures of
the individuals. Definite physiological responses to the simulated sonic booms were observed. However, the physiological
indices used in this research did not show individual differences
in physiological sensitivity to noise. These results do not preclude the possibility that more elaborate and extensive psychophysiological measurement might demonstrate varying physiological sensitivity to noise. Order Number AD-728 332. $3.00.
STATES
COAL RESOURCES AND
PRODUCTION.
Bureau of
Mines, Washington, D.C. June 1971. Pp. 51. Data are compiled
in this report on the total remaining coal resource of the United
States, the production of coal in 1970 by mining method, sulfur
content, ash content, and BTU value. Production of all coal has
been projected to 1976. Projections have also been made in
three sulfur categories: less than 1.0 percent, 1.0 to 2.0 percent,
and 2.1 percent or more sulfur. The total remaining coal resource of the United States, as of December 31, 1970, is estimated at 1,576 billion tons, consisting of 693 billion tons of
bituminous coal, 420 billion tons of 4ubbituminous coal, 447
billion tons of lignite, and 16 billion tons of anthracite. Order
Number PB-202 167. $3.00.
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